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equally culpable offenders has long been a subject of
jurisprudentialconcern. The author provides a critique of
recent efforts to objectify the sentencingprocess that rely on a

matrix table prescribing guideline sentence lengths on the
basis of offense severity and predictions of recidivism. With
particularemphasis on the Sentencing Commission authorized by pending federal legislation, he urges the need for
political accountability in the body that inevitably makes
value judgments in the preparation and administration of
such a guideline system. Finally, the author discusses the
normative issues that surround the development of any
sentencing system, critiques various normative models, and
advances a model that recognizes the paramountimportance
of equality in sentencing while preserving the efficiency of a
carefully administered system of categoric prediction.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the tide of social reforms a moment sometimes occurs when a
cause long ignored suddenly achieves recognition and respectability.
Once perceived as an idea whose time has come, the au courant cause
may become a "motherhood" issue that all espouse in principle and
defend vociferously against already vanquished opponents. Such
moments are dangerous, however, because the rapidity with which the
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flood stage crests can tempt the legislature to accept incomplete
remedies in order to pronounce the problem "solved." In this rush to
reform, however, deeper and more perplexing issues are sometimes
ignored or even unconsciously repressed.
So it may be today with the cause of sentencing reform. Sentencing
has long been the backwater of the criminal justice system-an ugly
little secret veiled from public scrutiny by the myth of rehabilitation
and avoided by overworked appellate courts with the same distasteful
aversion the Victorians gave public discussion of sex. A decade of
serious criticism has now changed much of that: First came critiques,'
then models for reform,' and now federal legislation, S. 1437.1
Popularly known as "son of S. 1,''4 S.1437 represents the most
serious attempt yet made by the legislature to achieve procedural
regularity in the sentencing and parole process without discarding the
idea of individualization. In overview, it contains what a consensus of
1. The seminal works in the recent consensus that the rehabilitative model of sentencing has
failed include F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964); R. DAWSON. SENTENCING
(1969); and Cohen, Sentencing, Probationand the RehabilitativeIdea" The View From Mempa v.
Rhay, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1968). These early probing works of the 1960's were followed by the
bombshells of the 1970's. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE CoMMrITEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE
(1971); M. FRANKEL,CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WIHOUT ORDER (1972); and J. MTFORD, KIND
AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973). Although the tone and style of these later works range from the
careful, lucid discussion of Judge Frankel to the outrage of Caleb Foote and his fellow members
of the American Friends Service Committee, to finally the elegant irony of Jessica Mitford, the
works have demolished, for the current generation, the idea that an individualized approach to
sentencing that emphasizes treatment and rehabilitation is either feasible or safe. In turn, they
set the stage for the new models next cited.
2. D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975); N.
MoRRIS,THE FUTURE OFIMPRISONMENT (1974); P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN&D. CURTIS,TOWARDA
JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM (1977); REPORTOFTHETWENTIETH CENTURY FUNDTASK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, REPORT ON FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHIMENT (1976); E. VAN DEN
HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
(1976); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).

3. S.1437, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978); see S. REP.No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1(1977)
(legislative history to date) [hereinafter cited as COMM. REP.]. The bill passed the Senate on
January 30, 1978 and is currently before the House Justice Subcommittee. For a summary of the
political cross-currents affecting the bill, see Clymer, New Criminal Code Is Due for Still More
Decoding, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1978, at E4, col. 3. All references to statutory sections are to the
Senate's version of the bill unless otherwise indicated.
4. S.1437 is a successor compromise bill to S.1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For a short
history of the legislative twists and turns in the recodification of the Federal Criminal Code, see
P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at ix, 85-93, and COMM. REP.,supranote 3,
at 10-15. The recent legislative pursuit of recodification and federal sentencing reform dates
back well before S.1 to at least the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
(the "Brown Commission"), which published an extensive Study Draft in 1970. See NATIONAL
COMlISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 145-1376 (1970). See
generally Brown & Schwartz, Sentencing Under the Draft FederalCode, 56 A.B.A.J. 935 (1970).
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recent critics would probably recognize as the holy trinity of sentencing
5
reform:
* It introduces a modest degree of appellate review into an area
where substantive review has been virtually nonexistent;6
* It establishes at last a procedural requirement that the
sentencing court explain its decision,' an element of due
process long ago imposed on virtually every other governmental official involved in adjudicative decisionmaking;
" Finally, in its most important and potentially controversial
reform, it creates a Sentencing Commission as a quasiadministrative agency to promulgate sentencing ranges within
the statutory minima and maxima set by the legislature. 9
5. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CuRrs, supra note 2, at 58-67 (summarizing
consensus). In suggesting that these three reforms, which represent the lowest common
denominator on which all recent critics can agree, are by themselves not fully sufficient, this
article does not mean to disparage them or imply that they are not essential. Cf Coroe REP.,
supra note 3, at 885-93, 1055-61, 1159-72 (Senate Judiciary Committee's justification of their
use).

6. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec.101, § 3725 (1978). This section establishes a limited
right of appellate review when the sentence imposed is outside the guidelines issued by the
Sentencing Commission. The standard for review, however, is forbiddingly high: The appellate
court must determine that the sentence is unreasonable before it may remand and must then
"state specific reasons for its conclusions. . . ." Id. §3725(e). Sentences within the guideline
ranges will be subjectto discretionary review by appellate courts on the filing of a petition for leave
to appeal under proposed subsection (b)(2) to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
1d. §3725(b).
7. If the sentence is outside the guideline range, the court must state "in open court" the
"specific reason for the imposition of a sentence outside such range." Id. Nevertheless, the bill
does not specifically require that the reasons be in writing. In contrast, prison authorities are
required to supply the inmate with a written statement of reasons before taking disciplinary
action that could result in the forfeiture of statutory good time credits, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974), and the Parole Commission is effectively required by statute to retain a
complete record of every proceeding and make such available, upon request, to any prisoner
eligible for parole. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(t) (1970), as amended by Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233 (1976). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972) (requiring written statement by factfinders as to evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole).
8. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school suspension); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) (disciplinary action of prisoners); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)
(termination of probationary employee); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of
welfare benefits). For a philosophic and constitutional perspective on the importance of an
adequate explanation, see Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative
Discretion Through a Reasons Requiremen4 44 U. CiH. L. REv. 60, 80-93 (1976).
9. S. 1437 proposes to add a new chapter 58 to title 28 of the United States Code. See
S. 1437, 95th Cong., sec. 124, §§991-998 (1978). Chapter 58 will establish and regulate the
Sentencing Commission as "an independent Commission in the judicial branch." See id, § 991.
The duties and powers of the Commission are also set forth in this chapter. Id. §§994-995.
A potential inconsistency exists in S. 1437 as to the presumptive force of the guidelines issued
by its Commission. Section 3725(e)( 1) authorizes an appellate court to reverse a decision
outside the guidelines only when it finds such a decision "unreasonable," thus placing the
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Given the much-documented existence of serious disparities in
sentences assigned to similarly situated offenders, 10 these relatively
dilute reforms seem essential, and probably each element in this
trinity of appellate review, mandatory explanation, and administrative
guidelines requires the others if the total improvement package is to
work. 1 In view of the vacuum these reforms replace, a major
transition seems close at hand. At such times, a wise French proverb
cautions us not to reject the good-S. 1437-in hopes of the best. If
so, what basis then exists for this article's skeptical suggestion that
the current flood tide of reform can sweep in incomplete and illconsidered remedies?
Two reasons compel further examination of these reforms. First,
because it is always easier to beat dead horses than to tame living
ones, many commentators still direct their criticisms at the unfettered
discretion of the sentencing judge. In continuing to whip this crippled
horse, critics themselves may have donned a set of intellectual
blinders that causes them to miss other, less visible variables, such as
the role of the prosecutor or the probation officer, 1 2 which social
burden of proof on the party appealing the sentencing judge's decision. Id § 3725(e)(1). But
section 2003(a)(2), which was added late in the drafting process, mandates that the "court shall
impose a sentence within the range described.., unless the court finds that an aggravating or

mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and that should result in a different
sentence." Id § 2003(a)(2). This section seems to mandate that the sentencing judge show
special findings of relatively unusual characteristics when imposing sentences outside the
guidelines.
10. The literature on sentencing disparities is burgeoning. Among the best known empirical
studies showing that like cases are not being treated alike, and indeed that the same case may be
treated very differently by different judges, are: A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY (1974) (study of Second Circuit sentencing judges who participated
in controlled experiment arranged by the Federal Judicial Center); Tiffany, Avichai & Peters, A
StatisticalAnalysis of Sentencing in Federal Courts:Defendants ConvictedAfter Trial 1967-68, 4
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 369 (1975); Zeisel & Diamond, Searchfor Sentencing Equity. Sentence Review
in Massachusettsand Connecticu 4 Aht B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 881 (1977); Zumwalt, The
Anarchy of Sentencing in the Federal Courts, 57 JUDICATURE 96 (1973).
11. Appellate review would not be effective without an obligation on the part of the
sentencing judge to explain his decision. Otherwise the appellate court would be forced to
speculate as to the balancing process that occurred below. Why guidelines are also essential is a
more controversial issue, although in a multicircuit federal system intercircuit disparity could
persist even with close appellate review. Nevertheless, even beyond the problems of intercircuit
disparity and the glacial pace at which appellate courts work to achieve consistency, several
commentators have argued, based largely on the research of Zeisel and Diamond, that effective
appellate review demands a common sentencing scale, which in turn seems to require a
guideline-drafting agency. See note 36 infra; text accompanying notes 240-43.
12. See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposals
for "Fixed" and Presumptive Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550 (1978) (discussion of
prosecutor's role in creation of sentencing disparities); notes 19-35 infraand accompanying text
(role of the probation officer).

980

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:975

scientists quietly have been telling us also cause disparities. To the
extent these hidden variables are at the heart of the problem, reforms
such as substantive appellate review or a required statement of
reasons by the sentencing judge may have less effect than is now
confidently expected.
Second and even more important, the remedy of a Sentencing
Commission can be more dangerous than the disease it is meant to
cure. Hippocrates told his student physicians that the first rule was to
do no harm. Because the idea of guidelines as embodied in S.1437
involves dealing with offenders in terms of their membership in
categories rather than as individuals,1 3 the Sentencing Commission
prescription represents strong medicine that may be accompanied by
disturbing side effects we have not adequately considered. Briefly,
our criminal justice system has always concentrated on achieving
14
fairness in making "micro" decisions involving individual cases,
but with the advent of such a Commission a new level of "macro"
decisionmaking about classes of persons is superimposed over that
micro-level. 5 At this level of generic decisionmaking, the concept of
fairness remains undefined and very much at issue.
13. Section 994 of S. 1437 requires the Sentencing Commission to establish "categories of
defendants for use in the guidelines" and to consider certain enumerated socioeconomic
characteristics, such as education level, employment record, and community ties, in formulating
such categories. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 124, §994 (b), (d) (1978). In essence, this
section directs the Commission to frame guidelines similar to those of the United States Parole
Commission that view the offender as a categoric risk. See Coffee, The Future of Sentencing
Reform, 73 MICM L. REV. 1361, 1405-15 (1975); notes 45-53 infra and accompanying text.
14. In short, dispositional decisions always have been made-whether at the plea bargaining,
sentencing, parole, parole revocation, or good time revocation stages-in an ad hoe fashion based
on the unique facts of a specific case presented to a decisionmaker. In contrast to such "micro"
decisions, guideline drafting is a "macro" decision in which an abstract choice is made between
competing policies without reference to the facts of any individual case. For example, when
framing its guidelines, the Sentencing Commission must decide at least implicitly the relative
weight to be given to such disembodied concepts as deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and
rehabilitation. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 124, §2003 (1978) (requiring that these
four enumerated purposes of sentencing be taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission when framing guidelines).
15. Sentencing guideline-drafting is not the only level of macro-decisionmaking. Several
junctures exist in our criminal justice system at which such "macro" decisions seem necessary if
the system is to produce fair results, or, at a minimum, results in which like cases are treated
alike. First, the system needs guidelines and standards to control prosecutorial discretion and
plea bargaining practices. One commentator has suggested that the Sentencing Commission
might even seek to assume such a role, since sentencing disparities may be caused as much by
prosecutorial behavior as by any other variable. See Zalman, A CommissionModel of Sentencing,
53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 266, 275-76 (1977). Beyond this prosecutorial stage, it is possible to
divide the basic dispositional decision into two components: (1) the "in-out" decision of whether
to incarcerate or to grant probation; and (2) if incarceration is thought necessary, the term-fixing
decision for the length of confinement. Several commentators have proposed dividing these
decisions between the sentencing judge and the parole board, the former deciding only whether
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For example, is it fair to extend the confinement of some offenders
beyond that of similarly situated offenders based on their marginally
greater likelihood of recidivism? 6 In so doing, are the values of
equality and fairness among offenders unreasonably sacrificed? For
those to whom a simple yes or no answer to these questions seems
satisfactory, the remainder of this article will likely prove anticlimactic. But to those for whom these questions are troubling, it is time to
change our focus, to stop beating the dead horse of judicial discretion
and begin the vastly more difficult task of taming the wild horse of
categoric prediction. This process of domestication has two major
components: first, identifying and reaching agreement on the
methodological issues associated with the mass implementation of
any system of categoric prediction; and second, developing a
normative critique of prediction systems that, if possible, expresses our
ethical reservations about categoric prediction without at the same
time effectively nullifying the predictive efficiency of such systems.
This task in turn supplies the roadmap for this article. To aid our
initial inquiry into the methodological issues of categoric prediction, it
is useful to stalk our horse more gradually and by a route that explains
more fully the significance of these issues in the forthcoming era of the
Sentencing Commission.
]7. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES IN THE STRUCTURING OF
JUDICIAL DISCRETION: HOW DO WE TREAT LIKE CASES ALIKE?

The efficacy of two of S. 1437's trinity of reforms-the requirements of appellate review and a statement of reasons-depends on
to incarcerate and the latter deciding how long. Thus, the function of a Sentencing Commission
would be limited to guideline drafting as to the "in-out" decision, and the United States Parole
Commission's guidelines would govern the term-fixing decision. See A. VON HIRSCH & K.
HANRAHAN,

ABOLISH PAROLE? 39-43 (NILECJ Grant No. 76-NI-99-0038) (1977) (to be

published in book form in 1978). Finally, guidelines could be used to structure discretion at such
postincarceration stages as the decisions whether to grant a pardon, whether to revoke probation
or parole (and, if so, for how long), or whether to forfeit good time credits. Although some
guidelines exist at these stages, little attempt has been made in most jurisdictions to structure
discretion at these levels with anything approaching the formality and rigor employed by the
Parole Commission.
16. The ethics of prediction in this context have been only occasionally addressed by the legal
literature. A key issue, of course, is whether it is fair to increase a sentence based on the
offender's predicted dangerousness. For excellent treatments of this question, see N. MORRIS.
supranote 2, at 62-73; Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 297 (1974); Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About
Predictions,23 J. LEGAL EDUc. 24 (1970); von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and
Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1972). This article
submits, however, that the recent practice of the United States Parole Commission presents the
issue of prediction in a form different from that which these commentators have analyzed.
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the validity of some basic and seldom-questioned assumptions about
the nature of the sentencing process:
* that the sentencing judge is the key decisionmaker who in fact
decides the sentence to be served; and
0 that sentencing disparities are therefore caused by the
inevitable variety of differing temperaments and philosophies
among sentencing judges.17
From these orthodox premises flow prescriptions, such as sentencing
councils, fuller sentencing hearings, and appellate review mechanisms
of various sorts, largely aimed at standardizing the behavior of
sentencing judges. 18 Although these premises are far from demonstrably false, alternative explanations of the causes of sentencing
disparities exist today that seem at least as consistent with the
available data and that place the locus of the problem elsewhere than
with the sentencing judge. Several of these rival explanations also
have particular relevance because they show the comparative virtues
of a guideline-drafting agency capable of making macro-level
decisions about the allocation of punishment.
A. SENTENCING DISPARITIES: ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF SENTENCING

Recent decades have seen a quiet and not adequately recognized
transformation in the sentencing process. The key event in this
process has been the professionalization of the probation staff. In a
phrase, the simple turnkey of an earlier era has given way to the
modern, highly trained probation officer, equipped with a master's
degree in criminology, a manual of standard operating procedures,

and a highly developed sense of the importance of his role in the
sentencing drama.' 9 A by-product has emerged, however, from this
17. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report attributes the existence of disparities to the fact
that "[elach judge is left to formulate his own ideas as to the factors to be considered in imposing

sentence.... The not surprising result is unwarranted disparities among sentences imposed by
different judges." Comi. REP., supra note 3, at 890. This is a seriously incomplete causal
explanation of the problem of disparities. See notes 19-25 infra and accompanying text.
18. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 16-20 (good capsule
summary of recent efforts at reform characterized by the authors as "fingers in the dike'S).
19. It is of course a commonplace that probation officers are today better trained and
prepared than in the past. See generally ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION (Approved Draft 1970); D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND
THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE (2d ed. 1969); P. KEvE, THE PROBATION OFFICFR
INVESTIGATES (1960); TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, THE PRESIDENT'S COMt ON LAW ENFORCE.
MENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 93-102 (1967).
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process of professionalization: a developing bureaucracy that defends
its institutional turf zealously. Indeed, some evidence exists that
probation officers throughout the country tend to define their success
in terms of their ability to obtain acceptance of their sentencing
recommendations from judges; the higher the percentage of concurrence between the judicial decision and their recommendation, the
greater the evidence, in their view, of their recognition as true
"professionals." 2 On the whole, probation officers have been
extraordinarily successful in winning acceptance of their recommendations. 21 In part, this success is unrelated to the quality of their work,
but instead is due to the judge's need to be perceived as fair 22 and to
his desire to diffuse responsibility for a decision provoking anxiety
23
and even guilt.
Of what relevance is this phenomenon? Some social scientists, after
studying the sentencing process, have concluded that the truly

More importantly, the desire on the part of the probation officer to be recognized as a true
professional leads him to seek to expand the definition of his role from that of a simple data
collector to that of a clinician preparing afull scale study of the offender. See Coffee, supra note 13,
at 1399-1404, 1400 n.158 (description of this process and the dangers it carries). In short,
practices within the criminal justice system are often explained as much by the aspirations and
needs of the bureaucrats who man the system as by the interests of society or the accused.
20. Probation offices often tabulate the rate of concurrence between their staff
recommendations and judicial dispositions. I have collected several such studies and one
conducted by the Federal Probation Office in Phoenix tallied this concurrence rate from April to
July 1975 (covering some 123 dispositions) and found that the concurrence rate for federal
judges in that district court ranged between 92% and 97%. Relevant here is the interpretation
the Phoenix office placed on this report: "lilt is felt that this review is evidence of the Court's
confidence in the report and recommendation made by the individual probation officer-or more
simply stated, confidence inprofessionalsdoingaprofessionaljob."See S. Thomas, Memorandum,
Recommendations and Court Dispositions (July 31, 1975) (copy on file at the Georgetown Law
Journal) (emphasis added).
21. Carter & Wilkins, Some Factorsin Sentencing Policy,58 J. CRIM. L. C. &P. S.503,504-05
(1967). The psychiatrist Willard Gaylin concluded in his survey of sentencing practices that in
some courts ". . . the probation officer rather than the judge is the sentencer." W. GAYLIN.
PARTIAL JUSTICE 13 (1974).
22. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 1456 n. 361 (discussing attribution theory of Thibaut,
Walker, and Lind that suggests the decisionmaker is more likely to balance his judgment
because of strong "role pressure" to avoid any manifestation of bias).
23. Social psychologists Janis and Mann have developed a widely respected theory that under
conditions of uncertainty decisionmakers engage in decision-avoidance and seek consensus from
their staff in order to escape responsibility for decisions about which they feel anxiety. I. JANIS &
L. MANN, DECISION-MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT
(1977). The psychiatrist Thomas Szasz has similarly observed that judges may use clinical data
to help them rationalize sentences about which they would otherwise feel guilty. Szasz, Some
Observations on the Relationship Between Psychiatry and the the Law, 75 AMA ARCHIVES,
NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 297 (1956). See also A. BLUMBERO, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 124-25, 137
(1967); J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS 390-91 (1971); note 31 infra.
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operative decisionmaker often is the probation officer.2 4 Although the
judge holds the legal power, he tends to ratify decisions made earlier
in the process by these new sentencing bureaucrats. Tension always
exists between sovereigns and bureaucracies. The modem day
sentencing judge is like the 17th-century monarch, who possessed
absolute power in theory but in practice was frequently manipulated
by the ministers who stood quiety behind the throne and controlled
the flow of information to him. Today, the judge must operate in a
system that processes a high volume of criminal cases, and therefore
he must rely heavily on his own ministers, the probation staff. Not
unexpectedly, some social scientists have pointed to the probation
staff-and to the differences in techniques and attitudes among
individual probation officers 25-as a likely major cause of disparities.
Why have recent proposals not sought to deal with this problem? To
suggest a theme that will reappear throughout this article, lawyers as a
class tend to share an unconsciously egotistical vision of the legal
process that makes it difficult for them to recognize that nonlawyer
participants could have a greater effect on the outcome of a judicial
proceeding than the lawyers themselves. In any event, a kind of false
consciousness has persisted: Both legislative and judicial efforts to
reform have continued to focus on the interchange among the court,
the defense counsel, and the prosecutor on the day of sentencing. By
this time, however, the outcome frequently has become a fait
accompli.
SENTENCING AS A DECISIONMAKING PROCESS: THE PROBLEMS OF
INFORMATION INTERCHANGE AND USAGE
If one views sentencing as a decisionmaking process it becomes
obvious that recent developments in the social sciences focusing on
decisionmaking have relevance to any serious attempt to upgrade the
quality and evenness of the decisions reached at sentencing. A host of
social scientists have studied the problem of selective reception of
information, noting the unconscious tendency of decisionmakers to
filter out some items of information while enlarging the significance of

24. R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, KEY ISSUES INCRIMINOLOGY 164-67 (1970); Wilkins, A Tpology of
Decision-makers?in PAROLE: LEGALISSUES/DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH 159, 168 (W. Amos & L.
Newman eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as AMoS & NEWmAN].
25. Carter & Wilkins, supra note 21, at 503-11. Hood and Sparks, supra note 24, at 159,
conclude that it is "primarily differences in the way in which information is categorized and
perceived [by judges] .

.

. which explain disparity in sentencing."
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others.2 6 That this research has considerable relevance to the problem
of sentencing already has been demonstrated by Professor Hogarth.
His elaborate empirical studies of the sentencing process led him to
conclude that the contemporary presentence report is a highly
unsatisfactory medium of communication because it frequently
produces an impression in the judge's mind contrary to that intended
by the probation officer.2 7 Overloaded with irrelevant information
from unstandardized presentence reports, the sentencing judge
inevitably tends to reach inconsistent decisions.2 8 Equally germane is
the research of Thibaut, Walker, and Lind on the relative effect of
inquisitorial versus adversarial styles of legal decisionmaking research; their work suggests that inquisitorial techniques, of which the
sentencing process is a virtual paradigm, tend to be more vulnerable
to the problem of hasty stereotyping.2 9 Finally, social psychologistsnotably Janis and Mann-have examined decisionmaking within
institutions and have identified a recurring pattern of decision
avoidance when uncertainty exists.3 0 They report strong social and
role pressures within the institutional context to seek consensus and
to delegate anxiety-producing decisions to subordinates, a phenomenon that may help explain the extent of the sentencing judge's
deference to the probation staff.31
26. See I. JANIS& L. MANN, supranote 23, at 82-83; H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER& S. STREUFERT,
HuMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING (1967). The problem of cognitive dissonance has been
recognized in at least one circuit court decision dealing with sentencing appeals. Citing
Professor Festinger, a leading theorist in this area, a Ninth Circuit panel acknowledged that
the "natural human tendency to reduce the dissonance created in choosing one of several
alternatives by thereafter persuading oneself that the chosen alternative is the correct one has
been recognized and measured by psychologists." United States v. Farrow, No. 74-2429, slip
op. at 9 (9th Cir. Sept. 1976), withdrawn and submitted en banc (Apr. 14, 1977). Thus, it
concluded that resentencings should be held before a different judge from the original.
27. J. HOGARTH, supra note 23, at 261. Professor Hogarth later adds bluntly: "The notion that
magistrates can sentence better if they know 'all about' offenders has been shown to be a myth."
Id at 390.
28. Because the human mind generally can effectively absorb only five or six items of
information in reaching a decision, voluminous presentence reports result in information
overload, Hogarth argues; in turn, this produc~s impairment of the efficiency with which the
sentencing judge reaches his decisions. Id at 302-03. The problem is greatest, he adds, when the
available range of sentencing options is broad.
29. Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentationand Bias in Legal Decision-Making,86
HARV. L. REV. 386, 388-401 (1972).
30. L JANIS & L. MANN. supra note 23, passim.
31. Id.; see notes 21-25 & 27 supra.
One recent case may exemplify this tendency for a conscientious judge to seek advice and
support from others before imposing a sentence about which he evidently feels some anxiety. In
UnitedStates v. Alton Box Board Co., Judge Parsons was faced with a request by the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department that he sentence middle class defendants convicted of
antitrust violations to prison terms. United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 1977-1 TRADE CASES
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The cited evidence suggests a more general observation. If
sentencing is a form of decisionmaking and if our ultimate goal is a
process that produces relatively consistent results based on relatively
accurate perceptions of reality, what is needed most may not be
checks and balances on the unfettered discretion of any decisionmaker, important as that goal is, but rather a reliable methodology. 2
Unless social scientists such as Hogarth, Wilkins, and Carter are
seriously wrong in their diagnosis, disparities may be at least as much
the product of an inadequate methodology-one that will almost
predictably yield erratic, random results-as of arbitrary decisions by
strong-willed judges. Once again, however, the lawyer's bias is to
avoid questions of methodology and to focus instead on those
questions that can be framed in terms of the traditional issues of due
process.
THE INFORMATIONAL INPUTS: PROBLEMS OF

QUALITY AND QUANTITY

Sentencing is an example of a decisionmaking process in which
decisions are made not directly about people, but about information
q61,336, at 71,163 (N.D. Il. 1977). Obviously torn between his recognition of the need for
deterrence and equality in sentencing between white collar and blue collar defendants on the one
hand, and his dislike for sending nondangerous defendants to prison on the other, he requested
the parties to brief the issue of appropriate sentencing alternatives. Id at 71,166, 71,168.
Eventually, he settled on minimal sanctions: fines, special probation conditions, and a very brief
terms of imprisonment. Id at7l,169. In defense of this decision and the lengthy process involved
in reaching it, he wrote:
To the lay person this amount of concern given sentencing in one case may
appear unduly laborious; but the careful judge, in every case and with relation to
every defendant, always exhausts all sources of information and advice before
arriving at what he can trust as being a wise and just sentence. The defendant will
have to serve the sentence, but it is the judge's conscience that will have to carry it
long after it has been served.
Id. at 71,168-69. With all due respect to Judge Parsons, whose concern seems exemplary, his
statement evidences both anxiety bordering on guilt and a consequent search for advice and
consensus from others.
32. Reliability, in a statistical sense, is defined as a "measure of the accuracy of a test or
measuring instrument, obtained by measuring the same individuals twice and computing the
correlation of the two sets of measures.'! WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d unabr.
ed. 1958). Gottfredson defines it as the consistency or stability of repeated observations, scores
or other classifications. Gottfredson, Assessment and Prediction Methods in Crime and
Delinquency, in TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, THE PRESIDEN'T'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMIN. OF JUST., TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 171, 174 (1967).

Reliability has also been defined as the "extent to which variations in scores among
individuals are due to inconsistency in measurement." J. BECK, S. SINGER, W. BROWN & G.
PASELA, THE RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION IN THE PAROLE DECISION-MAKING STUDY 1 (National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Parole Decision-Making Project, Supplemental Report
Twelve 1973).
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about people. 3 Such a process cannot outperform its informational
inputs: garbage in, garbage out. Uniformly, social scientists studying
dispositional decisionmaking have commented on the nearly hopeless
unreliability of the data used in the process. 3 4 Even more important
than the level of inaccuracies identified, however, is the level of
inconsistency found. 5 Often, factors deemed significant in one
presentence report may be omitted and ignored in another, although
present in both cases. Compounding the problematic character of the
actual data is an approach to data presentation that stresses not a
standardized comparative assessment, but an individualized understanding of each offender on his own terms. Here, then, is an
impressionistic methodology uniquely ill-suited to the elimination of
disparities, because it focuses on the uniqueness of each case and not
on the similarities among cases. Put simply, if we wish the sentencing
judge to treat "like cases alike," a more inappropriate technique for
the presentation of information could hardly be found than one that
stresses a novelistic portrayal of each offender and thereby overloads
the decisionmaker in a welter of detail.
B. A SENTENCING COMMISSION: OPPORTUNITIES AND DANGERS
These problems-the central role of a low-visibility decisionmaker
in the form of the probation officer, the methodological problem of
ensuring uniformity in decisionmaking, and the level of inaccuracy
and unevenness in the data employed-are stressed to indicate the

33. Wilkins, InformationOverload: Peaceor War with the Computer,in AMoS &NEWMAN, supra
note 24, at 394, 500, reprinted in UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION RESEARCH UNIT,
SELECTED REPRINTS RELATING TO FEDERAL PAROLE DECISIONMAKING (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SELECTED REPRINTS].

34. Wilkins, The Problem of Overlap in Experience Table Construction,in PROBATION, PAROLE
826,832 (R. Carter &L. Wilkins eds. 1976), reprintedin SELECTED
REPRINTS,SUpra note 33. For a study finding a low level of reliability of information in parole case
files by measuring the agreement between different people coding the same information, see J.
BECK, S. SINGER, W. BROWN & G. PASELA, supra note 32.
35. An early study found such inconsistency to be common. See Cohn, Criteriafor the
ProbationOfficer's Recommendations to the Juvenile Court Judge, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 262
(1963). A more systematic study has been conducted recently by the Sentencing Guideline
Project. Out of some 205 items of information relevant to sentencing studied, some 48 were
found to be missing in over 25% of the cases studied in a Denver pilot study sample; an
additional 21 items were missing in 11% to 24% of the cases studied. In total, then, over a
quarter of the relevant items of information studied were omitted more than 10% of the time.
Another pilot study conducted in Vermont and reported in the same project found roughly this
same percentage to have been omitted. L. WImKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON. J. GALPIN & A.
GELMAN, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 133-43 app. (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
AND ComuNrrY CORRECTIONS
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limitations of appellate review and similar procedural reforms.3 6
These limitations have been noted here as a prelude to the major
focus of this article: the issues raised by the advent of a Sentencing
Commission. For, of the trinity of reforms presented in S. 1437, only
such a quasi-administrative agency seems capable of responding
effectively to the foregoing problems.
The arguments for such an agency are clear. The guideline ranges
to be drafted by the agency can reduce the effect of uncontrolled
discretion within the sentencing bureaucracy and can minimize the
distortions arising from a methodology premised on ad hoc
individualization. By selecting in advance a limited number of
relevant factors and assigning each a formal numerical weight, it is
possible, as the United States Parole Commission3 7 has already
proven, to balance the goal of consistency in decisionmaking with the
objective of individualization. In short, discretion can be systematized, rather than simply abandoned as in the recent trend toward
flat time sentences.38 Finally, the Sentencing Commission promises to
be a body with a systemwide perspective and at least the potential to
upgrade the quality and evenness of the information used at
sentencing.
Although some arguments for a Sentencing Commission seem
conclusive, the Sentencing Commission proposed by S. 1437 raises
new, troubling issues. For the most part these issues relate less to
what might be termed the minimal concept of a guideline-drafting
agency, one that simply promulgates benchmark sentences based on
the offense and the offender's prior record, and more to the particular
type of agency and guidelines proposed by that bill. New ideas rarely
appear in elementary form; more typically, they emerge as part of an
interwoven complex. So it is with the Sentencing Commission concept
set forth in S. 1437, which comes fast on the heels of the new interest
in the incapacitation of offenders according to their statistical
likelihood of recidivism. Several distinct transitions have accompanied the emergence of this new incapacitation model. Increasingly,
new social theorists, most notably Rutgers' von Hirsch, Harvard's
Wilson, and N.Y.U.'s van den Haag, have emphasized society's right
36. See Hoffman & DeGostin, An Argument for Self-Imposed Explicit Judicial Sentencing

Standards,3 J. CRIM.JUST. 195, 197-201 (1975), reprintedinSELECTED REPRINTs. supranote 33.
37. Prior to the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act's passage in 1975, the Parole

Commission was known as the Board of Parole. Throughout this article the body will be
designated as the Parole Commission without differentiation unless the reference is made
expressly to actions of the former Board of Parole.
38. E.g., CAL PENAL CODE § 170(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§35-50-2-4 to -8
(Bums Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1252 (West Supp. 1976).

1978]

REPRESSED ISSUES OF SENTENCING

989

to punish the offender.3 9 Tactically, Wilson and van den Haag argue
that the only effective strategy for dealing with crime is one that gives
priority to the "tough" goals of incapacitation and deterrence over the
"soft" goals of rehabilitation and social reform.40 On the empirical
level criminologists have gathered evidence indicating that while
"hard core" offenders represent a low percentage of the total offender
population, they nonetheless account for a high percentage of total
41
serious crime.

The policy implications of such research are enticing. If one can
differentiate between "high-risk" and "low-risk" offenders and then
restrain the former group for marginally longer periods of time, the
result may be substantial reductions in the crime rate without
significant increases in the time of confinement served by the average
prisoner. Add to this picture the new interest of economists in the
theory of general deterrence, evidenced by a controversial series of
monographs concluding that increasing the severity of the penalty
might discourage crime almost as effectively as raising the risk of

39. Symptomatic of this trend has been the recent revival of interest in retribution as a
justification for punishment. See generally A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2; Gardner, The
Renaissance of Retribution-AnExaminationof Doing Justice, 1976 Wisc. L. RE v. 781. A revived
interest among philosophers presaged this new interest among lawyers. See generally
PUNISHMENT SELECTED READINGS (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 1975) (in particular, H. Morris,
Personsand Punishmen at 74). Newspaper editorials also have applauded the new emphasis on
"just deserts." See Editorial, New Look at Crime, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1977, at 20, col. 1.
40. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 2, at 51-52, 241-251; J. WILSON, supra note 2, at 162182, 200-08.
41. Wilson relies heavily on the statistical work of Shlomo and Shinnar, who have estimated
that use of an incapacitation strategy could have reduced the rate of serious crime in New York
City by at least two-thirds if every person convicted of a serious crime received a mandatory
three-year sentence. J. WILSON, supra note 2, at 200-01. In another study, the Shinnars
estimated that recidivists constitute only 16% of the criminal population, but commit 90% of the
crimes surveyed. See Van Dine, Dinitz & Conrad, The Incarcerationof the Dangerous Offender: A
StatisticalExperimen 14 J. OF RESEARCH IN CRMIE AND DELINQUENCY 22, 23-24 (1977). Both
Wilson and van den Haag place heavy emphasis on the birth cohort data developed by Marvin
Wolfgangin his study of 10,000 Philadelphia boys bornin 1945. J. WILSON,supra at200-01; E. VAN
DEN HAAG, supra note 2, at 247-50. Wolfgang found that while over a third of his youths acquired
a police record, only 6% committed five or more offenses before they were eighteen. Yet this tiny
minority accounted for over one-half of the recorded delinquencies and about two-thirds of all
violent crimes committed by the entire birth cohort. Of particular importance, Wolfgang found
that once a youth had been arrested, a second recorded offense became probable: if the youth
committed a second recorded offense, the probability of a third offense rose to 65%. Beyond the
third offense, probabilities of further offenses ranged between 70-80%-in short, the youth
became a highly predictable recidivist. Wolfgang, Crime in a Birth Cohort; 17 PROCEEDINGS OF
A. PHILOSOPHICAL SOC'Y 404 (1973). A very recent Rand Institute study that focused on
habitual criminals also has advocated an incapacitory strategy on the grounds that recidivism is
highly predictable for a small class of offenders. See J. PETERSILA, P. GREENWOOD & M. LAVIN,
CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL FELONS 118-21 (1977) (LEAA Grant No. R-2144-DOJ)
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apprehension, 42 and it becomes clear that a golden promise has been
held out to the public and the legislature: a strategy yielding quick and
cheap reduction of the crime rate. Although other researchers have
disputed the validity of such a conclusion, 43 a costless cure for crime is
understandably the opium of politicians. Thus, it is not surprising that
S. 1437 contains relatively clear authority for its Sentencing
Commission to adopt such an incapacitation strategy.4 4
Finally, independent of this debate over the purpose of punishment, the former Parole Commission began to develop in the early
1970s exactly the methodology that such a strategy of incremental
incapacitation required for use on a mass scale. 45 The Parole
Commission's aim was to develop not a new rationale for punishment,
but only a systematic response to the problem of sentencing
disparities. With remarkable candor for a bureaucratic agency, it had
conceded that recognizing the "magic moment" when offenders
became rehabilitated was beyond its capability. To point out that the
Emperor has no clothes, however, raises a ticklish dilemma when the
party making the announcement is itself the Emperor. For the Parole
Commission, this acknowledgment that it could not measure progress
toward rehabilitation, or even be sure that such an end state existed,
forced on it the awkward necessity of developing some de facto
system of appellate review. Confronted with hopeless disparities in
the sentences assigned similarly situated offenders, and having
abandoned the traditional defense mechanism of parole boardsclaiming that they only determined if the offender had been
rehabilitated-the Parole Commission effectively had two choices.
First, it could adopt some mechanical benchmark standard for parole,
42. The burgeoning literature on the economics of crime and the efficacy of deterrence cannot
be compressed into a footnote, but a comprehensive bibliography is available. See Palmer,
Economic Analyses of the DeterrentEffect of Punishment A Review, 14 J. OF RESEARCH IN CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY 4, 18-21, (1977). Among the leading works cited therein are: F. ZIzRINGO & G.
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Becker, Crime and

Punishment An Economic Approach, 76 J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 169 (1968); Symposium,
StatisticalEvidence on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishmen4 85 YALE L.J. 164 (1975).
43. Van Dine, Dinitz & Conrad, supra note 41, at 22.
44. S. 1437,95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 101, § 2003 (a)(2)(B) (1978) (instructing courtimposing
sentence to consider "the need for the sentence imposed ... to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant"); see Cori. REP., supra note 3, at 891.
45. For descriptions of the process by which the Board of Parole developed its guideline
system and its prediction table, the Salient Factor Score, see Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler &
Wilkins, Making ParolingPolicy Explici4 21 CRINE AND DELINQUENCY 34-44 (1975), reprintedin
SELECTED REPRINTS. supra note 33; Hoffman & DeGostin, ParoleDecision-Making: Structuring
Discretion, 38 FED. PROBATION 7 (December 1974), reprintedin SELECTED REPRINTS, supra note
33; Project, ParoleRelease Decisionmakingand the SentencingProcess, 84 YALE L.J. 810 (1975).
See also 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.58, 2.20-.21 (1977) (explaining parole guidelines policy and setting
out guidelines).
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such as forty percent of the original sentence. This choice, however,
would perpetuate the disparities created by judges at sentencing and
by prosecutors at plea bargaining. Alternatively, it chose to develop
formalized guidelines that geared parole release to some normative
standard, such as the severity of the offender's crime or his prior
culpability. This decision marked a rare and insufficiently celebrated
triumph of bureaucratic rationality.
In seeking to rationalize parole release, however, the Commission
made a second decision, one that was as sensitive as it was invisible.
In devising its guidelines, it chose-first as an experimental project
and then as a formal policy that was later ratified by the Parole
Commission and Re-Organization Act of 197646 -to rank offenders
not simply in terms of the severity of their crimes but also in terms of
their potential for recidivism. The result was a guideline system
consisting of a two-dimensional table: On the vertical axis was an
offense severity rating composed of six categories; on the horizontal
axis was a four-category offender prognosis rating, known as the
Salient Factor Score, reflecting the offender's statistical likelihood of
recidivism. As shown by the abbreviated diagram below, at each
intersection of the two axes on this matrix, a cell would contain the
guideline range within which the offender normally could expect to be
released.4 7

46. Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (1976) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)(1) (Supp. V
1975)).
47. 42 Fed.Reg. 31,786-87 (1977) (amending 28 C.F.R. § 2.20). A prior version of the
guidelines is set forth in P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGiN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 24. Although
the guideline ranges promulgated by the Parole Commission are not strictly binding on the
Commission's hearing examiners, decisions below the guideline ranges are comparatively rare.
From October 1973 to March 1974, some 88.4% of all parole release decisions were made within
the guideline ranges; only 5.396 were made below the guideline range, and only 6.3% were made

above the suggested ranges. See Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167, 169 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Table I
Adult Guidelines, Customary Total Time to be Served
Before Release (Including Jail Time)
Offense Characteristics:
Severity of Offense Behavior
Greatest
Very high
High
Moderate
Low moderate
Low

Greater than below-specific ranges not given
26-36 mos. 36-48 mos. 48-60 mos. 60-72 mos.
16-20 mos. 20-26 mos. 26-34 mos. 34-44 mos.
12-16 mos. 16-20 mos. 20-24 mos. 24-32 mos.
8-12 mos.
12-16 mos. 16-20 mos. 20-28 mos.
6-10 mos. 8-12 mos.
10-14 mos. 12-18 mos.
Very good
(11 to 9)

Good
(8to 5)

Fair
(5to 4)

Poor
(3to 0)

Offender Characteristics:
Parole Prognosis (Salient
Factor Score)
Thus, an offender convicted of a "high" severity offense normally
would be released in the interval between 16 to 20 months if he had a
"very good" parole prognosis, but not for 34-44 months if that
prognosis were "poor. ' 48 In short, this scheme amounts to adoption of
an incapacitation strategy, but it is only a qualified adoption because
limits are present here that are not present for the more extreme
forms of indeterminate sentencing. The Parole Commission placed
outer boundaries on the scope of permissible preventive confinement
based on the severity of the crime; within those limits, however, the
offender's relative status as a risk is decisive.
To many, the price of achieving consistency in this fashion is some
loss in the moral coherence of the system of punishment thus
formalized.49 On the simplest level, this problem is illustrated by
comparing the offender who has committed a "low moderate" severity
offense but has a "poor" prognosis, with one convicted of a "high"
severity offense but who has a "very good" prognosis. Although the
actions of the former were presumably less blameworthy, he could
48. See table I in text supra.
49. See A. VON HiRSCH, supra note 2, at 124-26.
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serve a 20 to 28 month sentence while the latter, more culpable
offender would be released after 16 to 20 months of incarceration.5 0 In
such an example it becomes clear that because the guideline ranges
overlap between severity levels, the offender's status as a risk may be
more determinative of his sentence than his actual triggering conduct.
Overshadowing this issue of the desirable balance between the
offender and the offense in the allocation of punishment are the even
more serious issues connected with the determination of the
offender's risk level. The designers of the Salient Factor Score felt
constrained to rely on those variables having the highest observed
correlation with subsequent recidivism." After extensive validation
studies with control groups, they found that a number of those
variables having a positive correlation with parole failure were of a
"neutral" socioeconomic nature; that is, they did not in themselves
carry any stigma or express any higher degree of culpability on the
part of the offender. For example, a low level of education, a defined
period of unemployment, and a single marital status are characteristics shared by a large segment of the general population and yet were
variables selected for the Salient Factor Score as a basis upon which
to enhance punishment. 2 In fact, attempts to find narrower predictive
variables were recurrently frustrated by the problem of "shrinkage";
that is, although narrower variables might be identified for a given
control group, they seldom held up in subsequent validation studies
on similar groups. 53 In overview, such categoric risk prediction
techniques tend toward substantial reliance on broad generic
variables; inherently, they find it easier to use predictors that relate
broadly to social status rather than narrowly to individual conduct.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES OF RISK-LEVEL DETERMINATION

The issues thus raised subdivide into procedural and substantive
dimensions. On the procedural level, there are first the methodologi50. See table I in text supra.
51. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supranote 35, at 23-26 (authors opted for overinclusiveness
of variables in order to enhance predictive utility of guideline model).
52. The original version of the Salient Factor Score and a careful description of its design and
testing can be found in Hoffman & Beck, ParoleDecision-Making:A SalientFactorScore, 2 J. OF
CalM. JUST. 195,204 (1974), reprintedin SELECTED REPRINTS, supranote 33. For a description of
the individual salient factors, see notes 124-26 infra and accompanying text.
53. See Wilkins, supra note 34, at 831-32 (comprehensible explanation of the shrinkage
problem). Wilkins explains that the poor quality of the data accessible to researchers at
sentencing has made it more reliable to use broadly based experience tables rather than
prediction devices that seek to isolate narrower factors or use more sophisticated multivariate
techniques. See also R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, supra note 24, at 185.
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cal issues: The predictive efficiency of such techniques is not high in
an absolute sense.54 Evidence also exists that base expectancy rate
tables may be culturally bound, that their predictive power erodes
over time, and that the problem of self-fulfilling prophecies can
sometimes creep into the validation process. 5 These problems in turn
raise the inevitable question of who will guard the guardians. Clearly,
our existing procedural remedies, even those intimated by the most
generous readings of dicta in case law, 6 were formulated to protect
against arbitrary action or negligent error in what I have termed the
"micro" context of individualized hearings. Disclosure of the
presentence report, substantive appellate review, and requirements
of a statement of reasons are all remedies designed for an individual
hearing procedure. They may protect against misinformation in the
presentence report, but they are virtually irrelevant when seeking to
prevent the dangers that a given prediction system may overpredict
recidivism or may be culturally biased or stale. Indeed, even at the
micro-level such remedies, focused as they are on sentencing, appear
increasingly remote to a system such as the Parole Commission's in
which the truly operative decision determining the length of
confinement is made not by a sentencing judge, but by a Parole
Commission hearing examiner in a proceeding that denies counsel the
opportunity to participate effectively.5 7
54. F. SIMON, PREDICTION METHODS IN CRIINOLOGY (1971). In this study, the British Home
Office surveyed some 40 prediction devices earlier placed in use (but not the Salient Factor

Score) and concluded that "for practical purposes their real predictive power is usually rather
low." Id at 14.
55. See Gottfredson, supra note 32, at 181-82; Laulicht, Problems of Statistical Research:
Recidivism and Its Correlates,54 J. CRIr. L.C. &P.S. 163 (1963). For example, some shrinkage
was experienced in the construction of the Salient Factor Score. Wilkins reports that the
California youth prediction tables did not work for the younger federal offenders when extended
beyond California, where they had been validated. Wilkins, Inefficient Statistics, in AMOS &
NEwMAN, supra note 24, at 217, reprintedin SELECTED REPRINTS, supra note 33; see notes 174 &
179 infra and accompanying text.
56. Although lists of the most progressive sentencing decisions in recent years are inherently
subjective, many lists would include the following three cases: United States v. Stein, 544 F.2d
96, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1976) (defendant must be given opportunity to rebut assumption relied on
by sentencing judge); United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241, 1249-51 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(effective assistance of counsel may be denied if defense counsel fails to familiarize himself with
all reports relevant to sentencing decision and to verify and rebut essential facts); and United
States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971) (trial court may rely on information in
presentence report only if it is adequately supported). Examined closely, these decisions, which
I applaud, focus only on individual facts in the presentence report and the respective obligations
of the probation officer, judge and defense counsel to verify them. To go beyond this level and
focus instead on the methodology of offender assessment would require a quantum jump that I
doubt the case law on sentencing can make in the near future.
57. Under the Parole Commission's regulations, an attorney may appear at the hearing in
which a Commission hearing examiner decides upon the applicable guideline. At that hearing the
examiner will determine both the Salient Factor Score and the "real offense" underlying the
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This new methodology for the comparative assessment of offenders
poses a crisis in accountability. In overview, this problem of
accountability comes into better focus when we examine the uniquely

value-laden issues that arise in the construction of any categoric riskprediction system. To give two examples, it is necessary under such

systems to agree on an outcome criterion and a measure for
58
determining the predictive efficiency of any given variable.
Typically, base expectancy rate tables such as the Salient Factor
Score use parole failure within a defined period as the outcome
criterion, but this may be a dubious measure of the relative risks that
different groups of offenders pose. Given the variety of causes, trivial
and serious, that can result in parole failure, the brief two-year period
used to observe subsequent behavior, and the absence of any
weighting system to distinguish the severity of a subsequent criminal
violation (i.e., a bad check is a more common but less dangerous event
than a series of armed robberies), the question that arises is whether
the "high-risk" group defined by such an outcome criterion
represents the most dangerous group of offenders or only the least
competent. Furthermore, in determining the predictive value of any
proposed variable two basic approaches to scoring are possible. We
can simply assign equal weight to all factors that correlate positively
with subsequent recidivism, however that term is defined, or we can
look more narrowly at the incremental predictive value of a variable
when added to those already in use. Arguments exist for both

crime for which the defendant was convicted. The hearing examiner also may upgrade the
offense to a severity level above that of the crime for which the offender was convicted.
Generally, this is the truly operational sentencing decision, yet the attorney's role at that hearing
is strictly limited by the Parole Commission's regulations See 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(b) (1977). This
regulation limits the attorney to making a "statement at the conclusion of the interview" and to
providing "such additional information as the hearing panel shall request." Id Ironically, this
regulation does not give the attorney the right to rebut or challenge questionable information in
the case file, a "right" that has been made a mandatory duty by some recent sentencing
decisions. See United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241, 1249-51 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing the
ABA Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures; counsel at a minimum must be
familiar with all reports used at sentencing, must supplement them if incomplete, challenge
them if inaccurate, and consult with client on dispositional alternatives, and failure to do so may
be a denial of effective assistance of counsel). Compounding this irony, the basis for upholding
such discretion in the hearing examiner is the argument that he is performing essentially the
same discretionary function as the sentencing judge. See United States v. Billiteri, 541 F.2d 938
(2d Cir. 1976). Yet under recent sentencing decisions, the exercise of discretion appears
procedurally more limited for the judge than it does for the Parole Commission's hearing
examiner. See cases cited at note 56 supra. On occasion, hearing examiners appear to have
informed counsel that they may not act in a "legal capacity." See Williams v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1974).
58. See text accompanying notes 107-15 & 163-70 infra.
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techniques, but the latter stepwise regression approach may lead to a
considerably different perspective on the utility of "neutral"
socioeconomic criteria. Such criteria, when examined in terms of their
marginal contribution, will appear to make a smaller contribution to
the system's predictive efficiency than when measured in terms of
their overall positive correlation with the outcome criterion.
The issue here is not whether the Salient Factor Score or any other
base expectancy table is methodologically deficient. In fact, among
the designers of the Parole Commission's guideline system were some
of the most distinguished empirical criminologists of our era.59 Even
so, the design and implementation of such a new system of
dispositional decisionmaking involves unique and sensitive choices
among competing values. Critical moments can be identified when
considerations of fairness have been balanced against those of
predictive efficiency. Such trade-offs may be inevitable, but the
process should be a political one in which the decisions reached are
visible and the considerations balanced are subject to public scrutiny,
prospective comment, and the political pressure that interested
groups in a pluralistic society are entitled to exert. Ultimately, the
decisionmakers must be accountable.
As others have argued at greater length, a nation's system of
criminal justice reflects its social ideology.6 0 In this light, there may be
a fundamental inconsistency in according the accused the balance of
advantage at the trial stage, thus underscoring our ideological
commitment to the dignity of the individual, but then measuring the
punishment assigned based on status variables associated with the
socially disfavored. To be sure, one can debate this question, but the
key point is that society at large has a right to think there is a moral
contradiction here. In short, the criminal justice process is not a
hermetically closed system, and when the offender's status is made
relevant, social values are implicated that transcend even the context
59. As the footnotes tb this article will attest, Leslie Wilkins has been one of the most prolific
writers in this area, and his book Evaluationof PenalMeasures is a classic work on the problems
of predicting and assessing both offenders and legal decisionmakers. Although it may be
premature to suggest nominations for the Sentencing Commission, the need for an empirical
criminologist such as Wilkins seems clear, as does the need for a counterbalancing presence of
those inclined to view the same issues from a more moralistic perspective. Other designers of the
Parole Commission's guideline system, notably Gottfredson and Hoffman, also have been highly
visible figures in recent criminology literature.
60. L. RADZiNowicz, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME (1966) (classic work on the interrelationships of a
society's values and its system of criminal justice); L. RADZINOWICZ &J. KING. THE GROWTH OF

CRIME 57-73 (1977) (more recent work on the same topic); Gerber & McAnany, Punishment:
Current Survey of Philosophy and Law, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 491, 502-35 (1967) (survey of
philosophical and other views of the purposes and practicalities of punishment).
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of the criminal law. These values are of legitimate concern to groups
within society normally not preoccupied with criminal justice. 61 At
such times, to paraphrase Clemenceau, criminal justice is too
6
important to be left to the criminologists. 1
In fairness to the architects of the Parole Commission's guideline
system, they consciously sought to avoid making discretionary
decisions that were beyond their special competence as technicians.
Thus, they designed the offense severity axis largely to formalize the
historical practices of the Commission's predecessor, the Board of
Parole. Whether such a historical orientation is wise is open to
question, but at least the result has provided an alternative to experts
arrogating value decisions to themselves. Self-imposed limitations,
however, are rarely a satisfactory substitute for a functioning system
of oversight. What is needed is some mechanism of checks and
balances by which to hold accountable the low-visibility decisionmakers at this new macro-level of our criminal justice system.
The dilemma of how to structure a system of accountability at this
new level is compounded by the fact that S. 1437 places the
Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch, unlike the Parole
Commission, which is part of the executive branch. Three basic
consequences flow from this change. First, the guideline-drafting
agency faces a blank slate because it no longer can see itself simply as
an agency seeking to even out disparities that other institutions have
thrust upon it. Not only is it less confined by prior practices than were
the Parole Commission's guideline draftsmen, but it has been
delegated a broad grant of authority with only vague legislative
directions on how to use it.63 Second, decisions made within the
61. For example, the NAACP normally might not have a policy on crime control, but
presumably it would be concerned about any approach to dispositional decisionmaking that
resulted in longer sentences for minority group offenders than for equally guilty white offenders.
62. See Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, supra note 45, at 38. The Project staff
computed the median time served historically for each offense coded by the Project, and
offenses having similar median times were determined to be of the same severity level for
purposes of the guideline system. See notes 186-88 infra and accompanying text (critical
discussion of this procedure). This practice seems to have been motivated in part by the
discovery that parole boards would place little weight on base expectancy rate data standing
alone, but instead preferred to focus on the offense severity. Id- at 37. See notes 48-49 supra and
accompanying text. This practice suggests that the criminologists have in fact induced the legal
decisionmakers to move in a direction in which initially they were reluctant to go. That is, the
guidelines reflect a move toward greater emphasis on risk and less on severity or, in this article's
terminology, more dependence on status and less on conduct In this light, the criminologists
may have succeeded in doing more than structuring discretion; to a degree, they may have
changed it.
63. Under S. 1437, sec. 124, § 991(b), the Sentencing Commission is directed to establish
sentencing policies that meet the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 101(b) of that bill. That
section of the bill directs decisionmakers to impose punishment for illegal conduct so as to:
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judicial branch tend to receive a far greater degree of deference and
immunity from public criticism than those made elsewhere within our
system of government. But this myth of the robe seems a dangerously
misleading cloak to throw around a Sentencing Commission that will
necessarily be making political choices involving conflicting social
values. Finally, when confronted with factually complex problems that
require a sophisticated but flexible remedy, the modern response of
the law has been to rely on the administrative agency model." Yet the
traditional safeguards on that model have been largely abandoned by
S. 1437. One of the bill's less noted features is that it substitutes an
agency that is largely immune from the reach of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA)6 for one that has been largely subject to that
(1) deter such conduct;
(2) protect the public from persons who engage in such conduct;
(3) assure just punishment for such conduct;
(4) promote the correction and rehabilitation of persons who engage in such
conduct.
Id, sec. 101, § 101(b). In short, deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation all are
recognized in a general explication that ignores the tension among these goals. Thus, the
Commission's compass points in all four directions at once. In addition, the Commission is
instructed further by proposed section 991(b)(1)(B) to "provide certainty and fairness" and
minimize "unwarranted sentence disparities" while also giving effect "when warranted" to
"mitigating or aggravating factors." Although the Committee Report indicates that these
provisions are to balance each other, Corm REP., supranote 3, at 1160-61, others might feel that
they simply contradict one another. At best, S. 1437 provides only a vague degree of legislative
guidance and merely restates the criteria for imprisonment found in section 7.01 of the ALI
Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft). Several states, including New York, have passed
revised criminal codes based largely on the Model Penal Code, and no one yet has suggested
that the problem of sentencing disparities has been solved for those jurisdictions. CoMM. REP.,
supra note 3, at 11-12.
As Judge Frankel has noted, the most common criticism of S. 1437 is that it amounts to an
abdication by Congress. Frankel, Jail Sentence Reform, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, § E, at 21,
col. 1-2. Judge Frankel answers this criticism with the argument that "complex subjects
requiring continuous adaptation of the law" such as sentencing "are beyond the capacities of
legislative bodies," and in similar situations ". . . Congress has found it necessary to create
specialized agencies." Id. I agree, but given the extent of the legislative delegation here it
also seems necessary that the safeguards usually attached to the administrative agency model be
adopted. These safeguards have not been adopted. See note 65 infra.
64. See Frankel, supra note 63.
65. The only provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) made applicable to the
Sentencing Commission is the rulemaking notice and comment requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1976). See CoMM. REP., supra note 3, at 1170 (explaining S. 1437 § 994(g)). The draftsmen
appear to have read broadly the provision and intent of 5 U.S.C. § 551, which exempts the
courts of the United States from the application of the APA. Id at 1170 n.17; see Cook v.
Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968) (Freedom of Information Act does not reach judicial
bodies such as probation offices). Quite apart from the policy arguments about whether the
Sentencing Commission should be subject to the APA, it seems questionable simply as a matter
of statutory construction whether an exemption for courts should be read broadly to mean
agencies of courts doing functionally the same tasks as other agencies subject to the APA. See
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It appears that the consequences of such a change have not been
adequately considered. The kind of decisionmaking that occurs in the
categoric risk approach to criminal corrections is of an inherently low
order of visibility and a high order of abstruseness. If one accepts the
premise that greater visibility is needed given the significance of the
value choices being made, an exemption from the APA becomes a
matter of serious concern when it is realized that with it comes an
automatic exemption from the APA's constituent statute, the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).67 The FOIA is the most obvious
means of enhancing the agency's visibility, and hence its accountability.
In reply to these warnings of an accountability crisis in our criminal
justice system, two rebuttals are likely. First, it can be asserted that
nothing really is new here: Low visibility discretionary decisions by
lower echelon personnel long have been a part of our criminal justice
system. More likely than not, sentencing judges in the past have
regularly considered the relative likelihood of recidivism when
imposing sentence. In part this observation is valid, but distinctions
here are striking. The effects of these new macro-decisions are felt not
by isolated individuals, but on a vastly larger scale by entire classes of
offenders. Even if it were true that guidelines only make explicit what
was hitherto intuitive, there still may be a significant difference-in
terms of the erosion of these social values-between random
instances of bias and the institutionalization of a formal policy that
note 66 infra. Professor Lesnick has questioned whether the Judicial Conference, the existing
body most closely resembling the Sentencing Commission, is properly exempt from the APA.
See Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process:A Tme for Reexamination, 61 A.B.A.J. 579

(1975). It is clearly the intent of the draftsmen, however, thatthe Sentencing Commission should
be exempt.

66. The former Board of Parole was held subject to the APA. Pickus v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974); National Prisons Project of the ACLU
Foundation, Inc. v. Sigler, 390 F. Supp. 789 (D.D.C. 1975). Congress later expressly accepted
this result in the Parole Commission and Re-Organization Act of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90
Stat. 219, codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 4203 (West Supp. May 1977). The Act brought the Parole
Commission's rulemaking powers within both the notice and comment and judicial review
provisions of the APA, id. § 4218, but exempted its adjudicative decisions. The legislative
history shows that Congress deliberately accepted the Pickus result. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 838,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1976), reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 335, 368.

S. 1437 will continue this result in the case of the Parole Commission. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3846 (1977). See Corui REP., supra note 3, at 1099.
67. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is contained within the APA as section 552. For
purposes of the FOIA, the term "agency," critical to the APA's application, is given the definition
set forth in section 551(1) of the APA, but section 552(e) expands the definition to include, inter
alia, "any independent regulatory agency." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976). If not for the clear
intent of the draftsmen, it could be argued that the Sentencing Commission was such an
"independent regulatory agency." See note 66 supra.
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explicitly offends our proclaimed concept of the irrelevance of racial,
social, and economic status. In addition, the newest feature of this
macro-level of decisionmaking is the unprecedented opportunity it
provides. Paradoxically, it at last makes the goal of accountability
realizable within this area of the criminal justice system. By
formalizing the criteria that are to affect the allocation of punishment,
it creates a nerve center through which important decisions must
pass. Where before there had been only the decentralized anarchy of
individual decisionmakers, there will exist a centralized body that can
be influenced, lobbied, sued, and reviewed. The irony then is that
accountability is both most lacking and most possible at this new
level.
A second potential reply to the assertion that the level of political
visibility provided for in the brave new world envisioned by S. 1437 is
insufficient, is the claim that the decisions to be made are largely of an
actuarial nature and hence too abstruse or ministerial to be either
comprehensible or of interest to many. Further, given the scientific
objectivity of the professionals involved in constructing base
expectancy rate tables, it can also be asserted that these experts are
not .engaged in any exercise of discretion as lawyers traditionally
understand that term. Thus, they require less supervision. This
argument surfaced in the legislative history of S. 1, the predecessor of
S. 1437.68 It is, however, a myth. One of the principal objectives of part
HI of this article is to identify those sensitive junctures in the
implementation of any categoric prediction system where value
choices must be made. To point out these choices is to suggest also
that other options might have been selected if the significance of these
choices had been highlighted. Put simply, we will seek to determine
what public participation in the rulemaking process of guideline
drafting might achieve if that process were made more politically
accessible.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF RISK-LEVEL DETERMINATION:
LIBERTY VERSUS EQUALITY

To this point we have focused only on the alleged existence of
subterranean value choices buried in the process of guideline drafting.
68. See S. REP. No. 9000, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Here it was argued that because "the
issues and considerations underlying [parole determinations] differ sufficiently from the usual

nature of administrative determinations" as to make "application of the Administrative
Procedure Act... unnecessary and unwarranted," the APA should be inapplicable to the Parole
Commission. Id- at 1082. Differ they do, but the real issue to be addressed is whether these
differences heighten or lessen the need for oversight and political accountability.
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The argument has been made that if conscious trade-offs between
concepts of fairness and those of efficiency are inevitable, it is
important to structure the process so that such choices are adequately
explored, explained, and subjected to the crossfire that occurs in a
pluralistic society when significant values and interests are implicated. Eventually, however, the question of substantive fairness must
be reached: Is it just to enhance the punishment given one offender
over that given another equally culpable offender because of the
presence in one case of socioeconomic' variables, unrelated to
blameworthiness but showing a positive correlation with predicted
recidivism?
This is the most controversial question involved in the use of a
prediction table, and to ask it is to invite a flurry of intuitive and
emotional responses. Some will argue, with scattered dicta to support
the proposition, that the law may not punish status in such a manner.69
69. The argument can be made that the Constitution requires that punishment be
proportioned to the offender's culpability and not his status. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942), the Supreme Court held that a statute providing for sterilization of certain habitual
criminals but not reaching embezzlers violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. In so doing, Justice Douglas noted that "when the law lays an unequal hand on those who
have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense . . . , it has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." Id
at 541. In Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969), there is also language suggesting that
status should be irrelevant, In requiring a finding of the defendant's dangerousness for
commitment under the Sexual Psychopath Act, Judge Bazelon noted, in dicta, that "Iiincarceration for a mere propensity is punishment nor for acts, but for status, and punishment for
status is hardly favored in our society." Id. at 1101-02. See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962). The theory suggested by Cross andRobinson, however, probably contains a fatal flaw
when applied to the context of sentencing. Proponents of preventive confinement can argue that
we are not imprisoning the offender because he is a risk or because of his status, but because he
has committed a crime. Accordingly, so long as the prisoner is not confined for a period in excess
of the "retributive limit" justified by the severity of his crime, he has no further entitlements.
Indeed, such an attitude seems implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973), which held that only a weak "rational relationship" test would be used
in subjecting issues of confinement length to equal protection scrutiny. Under such a test,
attacks on the use of status-sensitive criteria at sentencing seem foredoomed. See note 75 infra.
But Skinner is less easily distinguished because it seems to hold that punishment must be
proportioned to culpability. Of course it is questionable whether the Court was seriously
advancing a constitutional theory of punishment in that case or seeking only an expedient means
of outlawing compulsory sterilization as a criminal sanction. Still, more recently in Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975), the Court emphasized that "the criminal law . . . is
concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with the degree of criminal
culpability." At issue in that case was whether the state bore the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt not only the defendant's guilt, but his level of culpability; specifically, whether
he had acted with premeditation or out of passion. The Court held that the Constitution required
the state to bear this burden. Id at 704. Subsequently, the Court retreated from the position
expressed in Mullaney on the allocation of procedural burdens, see Patterson v. New York, 97
S.Ct. 2319 (1977), but in its death penalty decisions it has continued to emphasize the
importance of the offender's actual culpability, in particular the presence or absence of
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Clearly, such a practice coexists uneasily with the concept of equal
protection of the law. Anatole France wrote that the law in its majestic
impartiality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges
or to steal bread. But even this spurious claim of neutrality becomes
untenable when the poor, high-risk offender receives a longer
sentence for such a crime than the rich, low-risk offender. Adding to
the intensity of the debate is the tendency for socioeconomic variables
such as employment and education to be racially sensitive. With the
rate of black unemployment currently more than double the overall
jobless rate, it seems likely that in the high-risk category defined by
such criteria blacks will be disproportionately represented.7 0 In
fairness, it must be acknowledged that the racial impact of the Salient
Factor Score at the parole release stage is subject to interpretation;"
mitigating or aggravating factors. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976).
Indeed, in an extension of this argument the Third Circuit has recently held that the use of
"fixed and mechanical" guidelines would violate statutory and constitutional prohibitions, See
Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, No. 77-1679 (3d Cir. March 9, 1978). The court
did not hold that the Parole Commission's guideline matrix was in fact so rigid as to offend due
process, but only that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief if they could prove the facts alleged.
See also Woolsey v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973).
Thus, scattered seeds appear in the case law, particularly in Skinner, Mullaney, Woodson, and
Geraghty, which someday could sprout into a unified constitutional theory of punishment, one
that would require a closer relationship between punishment and culpability than simply that
punishment be within the outer limits imposed by the eighth amendment. No prophecy is made
here, however, that these seeds will soon prove fertile.
70. Recent unemployment statistics show the rate of black unemployment to be 14.5%, or
double the overall unemployment rate of 7.1%. Mossberg, Seeking a Solution: Black Jobless
ProblemStill Haunts President Despite New Programs, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
Because crime is age specific and principally a vocation of the young, it is even more important
to note that the unemployment rate among black teenagers is an extraordinary 40%. See id.
71. Current data is not available on the overall impact of the Salient Factor Score on minority
group offenders. A study conducted several years ago did suggest, however, that on the whole
minorities were not more adversely affected by the Salient Factor Score than white offenders
because both the highest and lowest risk categories were disproportionately white, with blacks
falling disproportionately into the intermediate categories. See Project, supra note 45, at 877
n.329. It can, of course, still be argued that the disproportionate white presence in the most
favorable category is alone sufficient to demonstrate a discriminatory impact. But to examine
only the aggregate impact of the Salient Factor Score may be short-sighted. There are special
reasons why a focus on the individual variables employed by the Salient Factor Score makes
more sense and provides more meaningful data. Apparently, one reason for the disproportionate
white presence in the highest and lowest risk levels was that the most risky and least risky types
of offenders by crime category are auto thieves and embezzlers respectively; both crimes have
been disproportionately committed in the past by white offenders. Interview with Dr. Peter
Hoffman, Director of Research, U.S. Parole Commission (Mar. 22, 1978). As a result, however,
this presence of a sizable number of white carthieves among federal offenders makes it impossible
to compare the racial effect of the Salient Factor Score upon otherwise similarly situated offenders. To make this comparison it would be necessary to isolate all offenders convicted of the
same offense and having other similar characteristics, except for race.
Accordingly, it may be wiser to look at the individual variables used by the Salient Factor
Score. Three variables are of particular interest because they involve socioeconomic factors
unrelated to the offender's level of blameworthiness: (1) employment history (basically, six
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yet, the fact that little data has been gathered or released may itself be
72
a symptom of the lack of visibility surrounding the present system.
months of verified employment over two years); (2) education level (twelfth grade or an
equivalency diploma earned before entry into prison); and (3) satisfactory living arrangements
(either a legal or common law spouse). A table provided by Dr. Hoffman shows the impact of
these three variables on black versus nonblack offenders (a comparison that, of course, may
understate any discriminatory impact because it treats Hispanics as whites). I have simplified
Dr. Hoffman's table, which was expressed in terms of subgroups of offenders having specified
numbers of prior convictions and incarcerations, by aggregating his data to show only the total
number of blacks and nonblacks who did or did not receive favorable points on the basis of the
three socioeconomic variables. The total sample consisted of 1188 blacks and 3455 nonblacks.
The results may be expressed as follows:
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE RECEIVING FAVORABLE POINTS
A.

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY VARIABLE

Number.
Percent:
B.

Number
Percent:
C.

Number
Percent:

Black

NonBlack

521
43.8%

1777
51.4%

EDUCATION VARIABLE

Black

NonBlack

266
22.4%

1171
33.9%

PLANNED LIVING ARRANGEMENTS VARIABLE

Black

NonBlack

219
18.4%

745
21.5%

Each variable seems to favor the nonblack offender, although Dr. Hoffman has informed me that
he does not believe the results are statistically significant for the planned living arrangements
variable. The disparity is greatest in the case of education (11.5%), but still significant in the
case of prior employment (7.6%). Consideration of all three factors is mandated by S. 1437. See
note 78 infra (chart and worksheet supporting these computations on file at the GeorgetownLaw

Journal).
72. The Parole Commission's Research Unit has reprinted two volumes of studies on the
Parole Guidelines Project. UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION RESEARCH UNIT, RESEARCH
REPORTS (1976) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH REPORTS]. The N.C.C.D. Research Center
cooperated in the Project and has published over a dozen monographs on the research design.
E.g., S.SINGER & D. GoTrFREDSON, PAROLE DECISION-MAKING: DEVELOPMENT OF A DATA BASE FOR
PAROLE DECISION-MAKING (Supplemental Report 1973); S. SINGER & D. GOTrFREDSON, PAROLE
DECISION.MAKING: PAROLE DECISION-MAKING CODING MANUAL (Supplemental Report 2 1973); P.
HOFFMAN & H. GOLDSTEIN, PAROLE DECSION-MAmNG. Do EXPERIENCE TABLES MATTER? (Supplemental Report 4 1973). None directly addresses this topic of racial impact nor gives the relevant
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Nonetheless, whatever the evidence at the parole stage, the racial
impact of socioeconomic variables seems likely to be more pronounced with the advent of a Sentencing Commission, because the
relevant population is far different at sentencing than at parole. At the
sentencing stage a far less winnowed and screened population is
present. Of the relevant population at sentencing, roughly fifty percent
receive probation" and thus never appear at the parole stage; this
group is likely to be disproportionately white.74
Rejoinders to this argument about the de facto discriminatory
effect of neutral socioeconomic variables are inevitable. The
hardnosed realist can argue that, on the basis of recent decisions, the
offender is not constitutionally entitled to anything more than
protection from intentional, de jure discrimination.75 Even the civil
libertarian may support the use of validated factors that have a proven
positive correlation with recidivism, because their use may result in
the imposition of less aggregate punishment if we can distinguish
high-risk from low-risk offenders.76 The utilitarian, as a believer in
cost-benefit analysis, would argue also that the system is best that
punishes least in achieving its intended goals. If our goal is to interdict
the criminal careers of true recidivists, segregating offenders into
high-risk and low-risk categories, then confining the high-risk group
figures. This does not suggest that the Parole Commission's researches are in any sense
suppressing iniformation, but only that researchers tend to have different interests than the
public at large and perhaps are less sensitive than the public about possible infringements of
values.
73. In 1972, for example, 45.8% of all federal offenders sentenced received probation; ofthese,
6.5% received short split sentences under which they were released before ever becoming
eligible for parole. P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 25, 29 n.12.
Therefore, nearly one-half of federal offenders never appear before the Parole Commission and
thus the relevant populations at sentencing and parole are very different.
74. There have been numerous studies of racial prejudice in sentencing. See Wolfgang &
Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion and the Death Penalty, in THE ANNALS OF THE ANIERWIAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (May 1973) (showing that blacks disproportionately
subjected to death penalty in rape cases because of racial discrimination); Comment, Discretion
in Felony Sentencing- A Study of Influencing Factors,48 WASH. L. REv. 857 (1973) (concluding
that race is one influencing factor). Even when no conscious prejudice is involved, it seems likely
that judges tend to grant probation disproportionately to middle class and white collar
offenders, who are usually white.
75. In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973), the Court held constitutional a New York
statute denying good time credits to prisoners for time spent in pretrial incarceration. Plaintiffs
argued that this denial of "jail time" discriminated against poorer defendants who were unable
to obtain bail. The Court reviewed the statute and found that prisons have more "rehabilitative"
facilities than jails and that, therefore, there was a rational basis for the state's desire to grant
good time credits for prison time only. Id at 270-73. The strained character of this
rationalization suggests that equal protection attacks on sentencing practices have for the
present little chance of success. See note 205 infra.
76. See text accompanying notes 278-80, 308-09, 331-35 infra.
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for a longer period represents a "principle of parsimony." Under such
an approach it can be demonstrated that the total cost in terms of
aggregate liberty deprived is lower for any given level of incapacitation desired than if we assigned equal sentences to equally culpable
offenders. 77 Morally, this argument would conclude, it is unnecessarily cruel to impose more punishment than is minimally necessary to
realize our incapacitory purpose. Arguably, a failure to so differentiate
thus becomes unconscionable.
Seldom can such stark trade-offs between the values of liberty and
equality be posed. Nor is this dilemma a fabricated one, because
S. 1437 clearly contemplates the use of several socioeconomic factors
that are likely to have a racially sensitive impact.78 Other jurisdictions
have also adopted, or are in the process of implementing, guideline
systems modeled after that of the Parole Commission. 79 Therefore, we
legitimately face a rare issue of applied jurisprudence: What role does
equality merit in our scale of values when its recognition may increase
the aggregate liberty deprived? Although others have debated issues
concerning the ethics of preventive confinement, generally they have
framed the issue differently, focusing instead on the high proportion

77. See text accompanying notes 391-95 infra.
78. See S. 1437,95th Cong. 2d Sess., sec. 124, § 994 (d) (1978). This section of the bill directs
the Sentencing Commission to consider the following variables in establishing categories of
defendants for use in the guidelines:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

age;
education;
vocational skills;
mental and emotional condition to the extent that condition mitigates the
defendant's culpability or to the extent that such condition is otherwise plainly
relevant;
(5) physical condition, including drug dependence;
(6) previous employment record;
(7) family ties and responsibilities;
(8) community ties;
(9) role in the offense;
(10) criminal history; and
(11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
Id When compared with the nine-factor Salient Factor Score, a high degree of overlap is
evident. See notes 123-26 infra and accompanying text.
79. Judicially prescribed sentencing guidelines developed by designers of the Parole
Commission's system are now in operation in Denver and are being introduced in Newark,
Philadelphia, and Chicago. Kress, Wilkins & Gottfredson, Is the End of JudicialSentencing in
Sight? 60 JUDICATURE 216 (1976). Guideline-drafting bodies have recently been created in Oregon
and Minnesota which appear patterned after U.S. Parole Commission's model. Interview with Dr.
Peter Hoffman, Director of Research, U.S. Parole Commission (Mar. 22, 1978). The trend
appears to be accelerating.
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of false positives that most systems of actuarial prediction yield. 0 But
the issue of whether it is just to confine someone under an
indeterminate sentence for as long as that person poses a substantial
risk of dangerousness is not truly the question presented by the modem
prediction table as it has been developed by the Parole Commission.
Under the Parole Commission's approach, the additional confinement
is only marginal, not indefinite, and is probably well within the outside
limit justified by the triggering offense. The critical issue thus posed is
different from that raised by civil commitment or sexual psycopath
statutes, where the potential confinement based on predicted
dangerousness is far greater. Here, the issue for those interested in
the ethics of prediction is the unique conflict that arises between the
values of liberty and equality.
Not only has this question been little discissed in the context of the
ethics of prediction, but surprisingly those modem jurisprudential
theorists who have recognized in related contexts the potential
conflict between the values of liberty and equality in the allocation of
punishment generally have opted to give priority to liberty.8 1 As a
result, they have assigned equality only a second echelon status,
which, when it conflicts with the goal of prevention, must be
subordinated.
Plainly, one can give common sense reasons why punishment
should not be based on status to any material degree. Among the
cogent arguments that have been made are: (1) that any statussensitive system flouts common morality, thereby bringing the law
into disrespect and ultimately interfering with the aim of prevention;
(2) that such a system severs the already tenuous connection between
the alienated offender and society; and (3) that it enables the offender
to blame society for misfortunes that are of the offender's own

80. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 34-35, 69-73; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2, at 35-44.
These critiques, however, rely chiefly on studies finding a high level of overprediction in clinical
diagnoses of dangerousness. Less evidence exists concerning categoric systems of prediction,
but they tend to be more accurate than clinical techniques. See P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS
STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954). Even more important, the offender's deprivation under a
categoric risk approach is generally only a marginal increase in his sentence, well within the
range of sentences sometimes imposed by judges and well short of any outer limit required by
the eighth amendment. Thus, the deprivation is far less than under some clinical systems, in which
a positive prediction of dangerousness may lead to life-time confinement. See Burt, OfMad Dogs
and Scientists: The Perils of the "Criminal-Insane,"123 U. PA. L. REV. 258 (1974). This is not to
assert by any means that von Hirsch, Dershowitz, Morris, or others are thereby wrong in their
criticism, but only that their target has moved.
81. See text accompanying notes 271-309 infra (discussion of the views of H.L.A. Hart and
Herbert Packer).
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making.8 2 Others say that it is simply self-evident that we cannot
punish offenders for "being a risk." 83 Nevertheless, all these
arguments are based on intuitive or empirical premises that some will

share and others will reject. The challenge then is to determine
whether we can give a more rigorous account of the offender's right to

equality and show why it should outweigh whatever social interest is
involved in incapacitating for a marginally longer period the offender
who is believed, on the best evidence available, to be the more likely
recidivist.
Of course, models for punishment exist that can supply such'an
explanation. In particular the recently revived interest in retribution
as a justification for punishment seems in part owing to the ease with
which it can give the desired answer. 84 But there is a difference
between saying simply that all offenders should be treated alike in
terms of their relative culpability and explaining the origin of this
moral imperative to critics. It is this gap between assertion and
justification that recently popular supporters of a retributively
oriented system of sentencing, notably Professor von Hirsch in Doing
Justice, seem not quite able to bridge. Even more unfortunately, the
new retributive model brings with it undesirable byproducts. These
include the dangers of a harsher, more vengeful system of punishment
and the risk that a "just-deserts" principle will increase rather than
82. The need for the criminal law to be reinforced by the common morality if it is to achieve its
preventive end is stressed by both Hart and Parker. See text accompanying notes 288-89, 299-300
infra. The danger of further alienating the offender so that he sees himself permanently in the role
of a social outcast has been stressed wisely by Judge Motley. Motley, 'Law and Order" and the
Criminal Justice System, 64 J. OF CRmt LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 259, 269 (1973).
83. A. VON HIRsCH. supra note 2, at 125. Although this analysis tends to ignore the role of the
triggering offense as justification for the punishment, I share a sense of intuitive unfairness with
these writers. Consider for example two hypothetical defendants, the accountant and the
prostitute, each convicted of tax fraud for failing to report large sums of cash they have acquired.
The lower class defendant seems to have lost at both ends. Society has denied her the
opportunities available to the middle class defendant, and thus, the inducements for her to turn
to crime are greater. In turn, the penalties upon conviction are also greater. Not having prior
verified employment, a high school diploma, or satisfactorily planned living arrangements, the
prostitute's Salient Factor Score will be materially lower than that of the accountant; yet, it is
difficult to say that she is more dangerous to society. In any event, this result is inconsistent with
a sense shared by many that along with higher rank should come higher responsibilities. If so,
then the middle class defendant is more culpable. See United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp.
496, 501 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (sentencing memorandum stating that despite Biblical teachings
to the contrary, defendant not held to different standard of responsibility because of his social
position).
This argument about the unfairness of such punishment disparities does not convince the
utilitarian, who reasons that greater penalties naturally are needed when there are relatively
greater inducements for committing the offense. The second part of this article will set forth a
different argument directed at those who take this position.
84. In addition to sources cited at note 39 supra, the recent literature on retribution is set
forth in A. VON HRSCH, supra note 2, at 160-61.
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reduce disparities, given its inherent subjectivity." Thus, this article
presents in its concluding section an .alternative model for the
allocation of punishment; one, it is hoped, that has fewer undesirable
corollaries and that gives a fuller justification of why reasonable
individuals should recognize the primacy of equality in any
satisfactory model of punishment. Finally, although the model rests
largely on a method of analysis borrowed from the philosopher John
Rawls, the article argues that at least in the limited context of the
ethics of punishment the model is relatively immune from the
philosophical rebuttals that have been directed at Rawls.8 6
From the foregoing roadmap, it becomes clear that our focus has
broadened ambitiously beyond a critique of S. 1437. In order, we will
turn from the procedural to the substantive issues of prediction, from
an examination of the new macro-level of decisionmaking that a
categoric risk approach to prediction entails, to the jurisprudential
issues that will remain even if the methodology employed is as precise
and narrow as possible. Despite the organizational schizophrenia that
such a transition may seem to involve, important linkages exist
between these two sets of issues. Both are implicated by S. 1437 and
yet largely ignored by it. More importantly, given the limited
likelihood that we will soon achieve a jurisprudential consensus on the
ethics of punishment, there may be a second best answer: Raising the
visibility of the process, which can sometimes render moot the deeper
problems of substantive theory. Once made politically visible, the
trade-offs between the goal of predictive efficiency and the value of
equality may be quite different from those reached in a political
vacuum by even the wisest of criminologists.
I. THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY
The proposed Sentencing Commission is a rare animal, in effect a
judicial administrative agency without precedent. 87 Not only is it
85. See notes 349-57 infra and accompanying text.
86. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Professors Nozick and Sen criticize Rawls'
approach, which is discussed in text accompanying notes 362-90 infra.
87. The closest parallel within the judicial branch probably is the Judicial Conference, which
occupies a pivotal position in the formulation of the federal rules of procedure and evidence. See
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970) (statutory authorization). There are, however, significant differences.
First, unlike the Sentencing Commission, the Federal Rules Enabling Act rests the ultimate
authority for the promulgation of federal rules with a superior body, the Supreme Court. Second,
congressional oversight is maintained by a variety of means, such as the power of either House of
Congress to "veto, amend or defer" a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 2076 (Supp. V 1975). Third, a highly informed constituency exists to critique any
proposed change in these rules of civil practice: the practicing bar. Commentators have
forcefully criticized the lack of visibility surrounding the drafting of even these rules. See notes
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virtually immune from the controls normally placed on administrative
agencies by the APA, but it also is exempt from the special means of
legislative oversight and control that Congress has attached to the
previous grants of judicial rulemaking power. 8 To appraise the
significance of the autonomy given to the Sentencing Commission,

9

we begin by considering the kinds of decisions it will likely have to
face in developing a guideline system. The initial purpose of this
survey is to identify the junctures where value-laden decisions exist
and where increased public visibility might affect the outcome. Of
course, one always can oppose any form of categoric prediction on a
variety of broad ethical or political grounds, but that is not the
purpose of this survey. Although the survey may seem hypersensitive
about the methodological issues of prediction, its aim is the political
domestication of categoric prediction, not its elimination. In
particular, this article explores the possibilities for developing some
role for public interest groups in order to tame this most elusive of the
wild horses earlier referred to. If one generalization seems justified
about recent analyses of the behavior of administrative agencies, it is
194-97 infra and accompanying text. Yet, at least the Judicial Conference consults extensively
with outside experts and concerned groups, such as the relevant ABA Committees. Although
some consultation is mandated by S. 1437 and encouraged in general by its legislative history,
no analogous "sentencing bar" of experienced practitioners exists. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., sec. 124, § 994(m) (1978); CoMi. REP., supra note 3, at 1169-70.
88. See Weinstein, Reform of Federal CourtRulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 905
(1976) (in depth discussion of these oversight techniques). Judge Weinstein advocates that
Congress should in the future "retain the power to reject any proposed rule or amendment by
joint resolution within a limited period." Id. See also Lesnick, supra note 65, at 583-84
(concluding that a workable model of genuine congressional review, although not yet devised, is
necessary).
In the original May 2, 1977 version of S. 1437, section 994(g) provided that guidelines
promulgated by the Commission would take effect within 180 days "unless within that time one
House of Congress vote[d] to disapprove them." This provision was subsequently deleted. See
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 994(g) (1977).
89. A spurious issue arises whenever it is suggested that the autonomy of any agency within
the judicial branch be restricted. Inevitably, some claim such restrictions violate the separation
of powers doctrine by rendering the judicial branch less than co-equal. On the state level a few
decisions have found judicial rulemaking to be beyond the legislature's power. See Winbery v.
Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 245-46, 74 A.2d 406, 409 (under state constitution, rulemaking power of
state supreme court not subject to overriding legislation because this would foster continuous
conflict between two departments; court rule requiring appeal within 45 days held to prevail over
state statute setting one year time limit), cerL denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
On the federal level, this argument has long been authoritatively rejected. See Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1940) (Congress has power to regulate practice and procedure
of federal courts); Weinstein, supranote 88, at 927-31 (federal courts recognize that rulemaking
is a legislative power although in large measure delegated to courts). Moreover, sentencing
seems a unique context in which the conscience of the community, rather than that of the court,
should control. The decision as to the amount of punishment normally to be prescribed, as such,
is more substantive than procedural.
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that agencies perform differently, and probably more satisfactorily,
when their performance is monitored by such outside observers.
Although it is far from clear that the success in influencing marginal
change within federal administrative agencies by activists such as
Ralph Nader can be duplicated at the macro-decisionmaking stages of
our criminal justice system, this article will map the intersections
where such influence might be exerted. Indeed, if greater accountability cannot be structured into the system, there are already signs of a
reaction against categoric prediction as a mode of decisionmaking. At
least one subcommittee of the American Bar Association has taken a
stand against the Sentencing Commission, partially on such grounds,
and other committees currently appear divided on the issue.9 0 Even if
based on misperceptions of how categoric prediction works, this
opposition remains symptomatic, suggesting the need for greater
sensitivity to the concerns of those troubled by prediction based on
status.
A distorted picture results, however, from an approach that simply
attacks the lack of visibility surrounding the decisions made at this
new macro-level. Such criticism ignores the even greater problems
involved in structuring discretion and assuring accountability at the
micro-level. Nowhere is accountability more lacking than in a
decentralized system of individualized sentencing hearings before a
cross-section of strong-willed judges. Rather than merely criticize a
proposed solution to a perplexing problem, this section examines the
problems of these two levels and suggests forms of oversight that both
levels need.
A. THE MACRO-LEVEL: BUT WHO WILL GUARD THE GUARDIANS?
Although a variety of guideline systems are possible, it is a useful
organizational device to follow the structure already developed by the
Parole Commission and subdivide the process of guideline drafting
into two components: first, guidelines dealing with the offender, and
second, guidelines dealing with the offense. Under this latter heading,
we will also consider the question of how to balance these two
components.
90. Opposition to the Sentencing Commission concept has been formally expressed by ABA's
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants. To date both the ABA's Criminal
Justice Section and its Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services have declined to
endorse the Sentencmig Commission proposal in S. 1437, but have taken no formal stand in
opposition. The ABA itself has not taken a position on the Sentencing Commission. Interview
with Ms. Laurie Robinson, American Bar Association's Section on Criminal Justice (Apr. 1978).
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RANKING OFFENDERS: ISSUES IN THE USE OF
BASE EXPECTANCY RATE DATA

Base expectancy rate tables are not new. 91 Criminologists generally
recognize the table developed by E.W. Burgess for the Illinois parole
board in 192892 as the first table placed in operation. Although the
Burgess table appears to have been fairly accurate, evidence exists
that its adoption coincided with a gradual increase in the time actually
served by the average Illinois prisoner, 93 an observation that has also
been made with respect to the Parole Commission's system. 94 Other
attempts to develop prediction instruments during this early era,
however, have been characterized by Leslie Wilkins as a tragedy for

criminology. 95 Naive in design and seldom validated on groups other
than the original control group, they were methodological nightmares
that frequently employed highly subjective criteria that different
raters would score differently. 96 At that time, little was understood
about the phenomenon of prediction shrinkage or the tendency for
positively correlated factors to overlap.
To judge the potential of categoric prediction systems based on
these early blundering efforts is roughly comparable to criticizing
airline safety by pointing to the errors of "Wrong Way" Corrigan.
Still, more recent efforts also involve what seem to be highly dubious
judgments. Since 1970 the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia has used a statistical prediction scale to evaluate
probationers that is largely borrowed from the state of California. 9
That scale, known as the BE61/Atable, classifies offenders into high-,
91. See L. WILKvs, THE EVALUATION OF PENAL MEASURES 63-73 (1969) (review of early

efforts).
92. Id. at 65-66. There were precursors, but Wilkins describes this as the "first prediction
table in the form in which it is now recognized." Id.
93. See Bruce, Harno & Landesco, A Study of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole in the
State of Illinois, 19 J. As INST. CRmi. L. & CRMINOLOGY No. 1, pt. H at 67 (1928).
94. One study by the Parole Commission's researchers showed, based on early experience
with the base expectancy rate table, that its use increased the average time of incarceration. In
short, "focusing the parole board members' attention upon the issue of 'risk' "through the use
of a prediction table or similar means made them more risk averse. See Hoffman, Gottfredson,
Wilkins & Pasela, The Operational Use Of An Experience Table, CRMBNOLOGY 214, 224, 227
(Aug. 1974). Structuring discretion in this way, then, may have some predictable results.
95. L. WILKIns, supra note 91, at 62.
96. Id. at 62-73. In particular, Wilkins criticizes these studies for their use of "soft" data such
as personality ratings and other forms of subjective judgments. Id at 73. Some of the variables
used until recently in the Salient Factor Score seem equally subject to this criticism. See notes
158-60 infra and accompanying text.
97. Hemple & Webb, ResearchingPredictionScales for Probation,40 FED. PROBATION 33, 33
(June 1976).
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medium-, and low-risk categories based in substantial part on
socioeconomic data. It had been recommended for use in all federal
probation offices by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, a decision that, symptomatically, seems as questionable as it
was invisible. Not surprisingly, a 1972 validation study in the District
of Columbia found that the scale had malfunctioned: Regardless of
their ranking on the scale, probationers who had a history of opiate
use were failing on probation at an alarmingly high 74% rate. 8 Apparently conditions in the District of Columbia were sufficiently different
from those in California that what worked out West did not appear to
do so back East. 99 The contemporary significance of this finding is
important because many federal probation offices now use the Salient
Factor Score as a means of evaluating offenders awaiting sentence
even though that table was validated on a different populationparolees and released prisoners. 00
The aftermath of this discovery of the limited geographic validity of
the BE61/A table is even more intriguing. In seeking to discover what
local factors correlated with recidivism, District of Columbia
probation officials developed a hypothesis based more on theory than
empiricism. Drawing on the well-known opportunity theory of
Cloward and Ohlin,' 0 ' they hypothesized that persons enjoying either
legitimate or illegitimate economic opportunities would be good
probation risks.10 2 On investigation they did indeed find that
offenders who had completed high school and offenders who were
professional gamblers appeared to succeed on parole at virtually a
10.0% rate, a fact that tentatively corroborated their thesis. Although
such a limited investigation of possibly causative variables seems
almost a textbook example of methodological imprecision, the District
of Columbia probation officials actually modified the BE6 1/A table to
give a more favorable score to those who were gamblers.'0 3
98. Id. at 34-35.
99. This is but one manifestation of the problem of prediction shrinkage. See note 53 supra.
One wonders whether other federal probation offices also following the recommendation of the
Administrative Office to use the BE61/A table ever paused to conduct similar local validation
studies. If not, the undetected distortions in other districts may be equally as great as those
found by the District of Columbia researchers. Today, the BE61/A table remains in use in a few
federal probation offices, but for the most part it has been superseded by the Salient Factor
Score.
100. I have been informed by several probation officers and by the authors of a forthcoming
Federal Judicial Center study that the use of the Salient Factor Score at the sentencing stage is
now fairly standard. See also Project, supranote 45, at 878 n.334 (noting that the Salient Factor
Score is now in use in the Southern District of New York in presentence reports).
101. R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN. DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY (1960). The authors argue
that youths in particular turn to crime not because they are maladjusted or sick, but because
legitimate opportunities have been denied them.
102. Hemple & Webb, supra note 97, at 35.
103. Id.
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Such a result borders on self-parody. Even more noteworthy for our
purpose than the methodological imprecision here is the tunnel vision
focused exclusively on the goal of enhanced prediction. Something
morally absurd occurs when we recommend more favorable treatment
for offenders such as gamblers who have engaged in more, not less,
illegal activities than the average. Pursued further, such illogic might
justify a special dispensation for members of organized crime, who
have, after all, the most illegitimate opportunities available to them
and as superior criminals should fail on probation less frequently
than others.
Two points of general significance emerge. First, those who have
technical expertise may lose sight of the need for a moral coherence
within the criminal law. Followed blindly, the goal of efficiency seems
likely to conflict eventually with the moral underpinnings of our
criminal justice system. 10 4 Second, the process by which such a comic
result transpired is equally important: The Adminstrative Office of
the United States Courts disseminates a virtually invisible policy
among a highly decentralized, basically autonomous structure of
district court probation offices.10 5 Next, without any requirement of
prior local validation, officials throughout the country put into use a
prediction table, honestly believing it to be the scientific approach.
Predictably, one local office and perhaps others decides to freelance
and, for the right reason, adopts the wrong modification. Unfortunately, throughout this process it seems doubtful that either defense
counsel or the sentencing judge will ever understand the real basis
104. For example, some prediction tables use arrest records as a variable showing propensity
for parole failure regardless of the subsequent disposition accorded the arrest. Seemingly, this
practice conflicts with the presumption of innocence our criminal justice system prides itself on.
At least one table considers whether anyone in the offender's family has a prior criminal record,
thus offending our intuitive sense that guilt through association is wrong. For examples of such
tables, see McGee, Objectivity in Predicting Criminal Behavior, 42 F.R.D. 193, 195 (1968);
Stem, Courts and Computers: Conflicts in Approaches and Goals, 58 JUDICATURE 222, 226-27
(1974); Institute on Sentencing for United States DistrictJudges, 35 F.R.D. 381, 403-04 (1964).
105. At present, there are 92 federal chief probation officers. COMM. REP., supra note 3, at 14.
Few mechanisms exist by which uniformity or consistency of approach can be achieved among
them. The Judicial Conference has a Committee on the Administration of the Probation System,
chaired by United States Senior District Judge Wollenberg, and the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts has a Division of Probation. In conjunction, these two bodies have
approved the standard guidebooks for federal probation officers. See THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT (Publication 105) (1977) and THE SELECTIVE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT (Publication 104) (1974) [hereinafter cited as PUBLICATION 105 and PUBLICATION
104, respectivelyl. Guidebooks fall short of being operating manuals, however, and local
practices appear to differ. More importantly, neither a manual nor a judicial committee can
perform the monitoring function that seems essential and that is within the capacity of an
administrative agency such as a Sentencing Commission. See notes 213-22 infra and
accompanying text.
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upon which probation recommendations are determined, despite the
fact that judicial reliance on such recommendations is generally
heavy. 10 6 In short, existing procedural remedies, such as disclosure of
the presentence report, have been shortcircuited. Although defense
counsel may strive to rebut or clarify the statement made in the
presentence report, the attorney never learns the basis, extrinsic to
that report, upon which the critical probation recommendation has
been made. If the concept of accountability is sometimes hazy at its
margins, it may be easier to start with the idea of unaccountable
discretion; here, we have a paradigm.
Yet, the implications that such a case study generates cut both
ways. On the one hand, it is obvious that technicians sometimes can
reach strange value judgments. On the other hand, such an example
implies that categoric risk prediction systems come into use even in
the absence of a formalized macro-level body. Thus, centralizing
these decisions within an entity such as the Sentencing Commission,
which can at least potentially be supervised, may be more a part of the
answer than part of the problem. The dangers we perceive in such a
commission may in effect be outweighed by the unseen dangers that
already exist.
Once such a centralized agency is created, as S. 1437 proposes, and
amateur night in the design of prediction tables thereby draws to a
close, what dangers remain? Concededly, little in the construction of
the Parole Commission's Salient Factor Score could be cited as
evidence of methodological laxness, but once again there are
instances in which a methodological decision intersects with questions
of value. Three such points of intersection deserve special attention
because they will be encountered in the design of any base expectancy
rate table: first, the selection of relevant outcome criteria; second, the
decision of which criteria, among those having a validated correlation
with that outcome criterion, should be employed; and finally, the
choice of weighting system to be used. In addition, another close
encounter between values and methodology has yet to be faced even
by the Parole Commission: How does one revalidate a prediction table
on releasees who have been held for different periods by the operation
of the table?
Defining the Outcome Criterion.
In any statistical prediction
system, independent variables are selected for observation in order to
measure their correlation with the dependent variable. Thus, the first
106. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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step must be to define the dependent variable used to measure
recidivism: What will serve as our proxy for recidivism? 107 If the
answer is parole failure within a designated period, as empirical
criminologists appear to agree, the next question is whether all parole
failures should be treated alike for the purposes of determining the
correlation between the independent and dependent variables, 1 8 or
whether some forms of parole failure should be weighted to give them
a special emphasis. For example, both the parolee who has passed a
bad check and the parolee who commits an armed robbery have failed.
Should we distinguish these two types of parole failures, however,
because one poses a greater danger to society than the other? As a
rule the empirical criminologist does not seek to measure the severity
or even the frequency of the offense behavior leading to parole failure.
Yet, an informed public might ask whether the criminologist is
measuring the most important relationships or only the most easily
observed ones.
How much time should pass before we deem an offender a parole
success? The technician's bias probably is to use a relatively short
period because it simplifies data handling and enables him to draw
conclusions sooner. The public interest may be different. The shorter
the period used, the greater the likelihood that we are singling out
only the incompetent criminal, who is probably the least dangerous
criminal given his inability to escape detection. 0 9 To validate the
Salient Factor Score, a two-year period was used. 1 0 As a control, it
would be interesting to know if the lines between risk categories would
have been blurred had a five-year period been used.
How broadly should we define parole failure? Advocates of a
stricter approach include in their definition not only reconviction but
107. See T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964) (fuller
treatment of the issues associated with selection of the outcome criterion); Gottfredson, supra
note 32, at 172-74 (same).
108. Criminologists seem to have reached a consensus that base expectancy rate tables do
not have much utility in identifying the violence-prone or dangerous offender. See N. MORRIS,
supra note 2, at 66-73; McGee, supra note 104, at 196.
109. Some criminologists have warned that a possible fallacy lies in the "implicit assumption... of homogeneity of the offender population." Avi-Itzhak & Shinnar, Qudntitative Models
in Crime Control, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 183, 212 (1973). By this, they mean that conceivably "... . offenders divide into two classes - those who are always caught and those very clever ones who
are never caught." Id. at 212. They add: "Since more than 80% of crimes remain unsolved, the
assumption of two classes is not impossible." Id More likely, they think, is a broad continuum of
different classes, but even if this is the case they acknowledge that some "slight bias" remains in
any prediction system that treats offenders as homogeneous and therefore measures relative risk
based on recorded reconvictions. Id.
110. Hoffman & Beck, ParoleDecision-Making: A SalientFactorScore, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 195,
196 (1974), reprinted in SELECTED REPRINTS, supra note 33.
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also parole revocation. Because parole revocation can occur for a
variety of technical, noncriminal reasons-such as failure to report to
one's probation officer-the revocation may possibly be the product
of a biased discretion. The inclusion of such technical revocations
therefore brings into question the objectivity of the data utilized
because discretion may be exercised more harshly when the parolee is
perceived to be a higher risk. 1 1' In the District of Columbia validation
study noted earlier, not only did the researchers classify technical
revocations as failures, but they also classified any person against
whom a warrant for violation of probation had been issued as a
failure-even if the court had refused to revoke probation at the
requisite hearing brought on by the warrant.112 The researchers
justified this extraordinary step, which is tantamount to treating
arrest records as convictions, by saying that the District of Columbia
courts were too lenient and frequently only warned the probationer.'1 3
Of course, what they perceived as unwarranted judicial leniency might
also be viewed as judicial skepticism about such technical revocations; these courts may have perceived a problem of biased, or at
least erratic, exercise of discretion by the parole officer.
A more sophisticated problem is discernible in the validation of the
Salient Factor Score, which also counted technical revocations as
failures. The control and validation samples used by the Parole
Commission were composed of both parolees and prisoners released
at the expiration of their terms." 4 Because only the parolee can have
his parole revoked, and thus only he can be deemed a failure even
without being accused of some criminal act, the population samples
lacked uniformity. The result is to tilt the scoring of failures against
the parolee group, which was not only subject to revocation but was
under greater supervision than the releasee group and thus probably
more vulnerable to detection for truly illegal activities."' Yet,
111. Gottfredson points out that the behavior of the "parole agent or the paroling authority"
is involved in the parole revocation decision as much as the behavior of the parolee, and
sometimes even the behavior of the victim is a critical variable. Gottfredson, supra note 32, at
173.
112. Hemple & Webb, supra note 97, at 35.
113. Id.
114. Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 195-96.
115. The Parole Commission's researchers were fully aware of this disparity in the degree of
surveillance between parolees and releasees, but justified counting technical parole revocations
as failures because the only alternative would result in unevenness of an opposite sort: "parolees
would be subject to less risk of being classified as having unfavorable outcome than
unsupervised releasees." Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 205 n.6. Granting that objective
truth is unknowable, or at least indeterminate in this situation, the question becomes on which
side we choose to err. Do we choose to risk overestimating the predictive power of
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paradoxically, those released only at the end of their terms were
necessarily those originally perceived as more dangerous, and thus
were never granted parole. Why is this distinction between these two
classes relevant? If, as seems likely, the releasee group never received
parole because of evidence of prior culpability,, their lesser exposure
to failing the outcome criterion of "parole success" because parole
revocation was inapplicable to them could result in understating the
predictive value of their prior culpable acts, which led the parole
authorities originally to deny them parole. In turn, any such
understatement of the predictive power otherwise obtainable from
culpability-oriented criteria results in increasing the base expectancy
rate table's reliance on criteria that are unrelated to culpability, such
as the socioeconomic variables. It would probably be an overstatement to say that the Parole Commission by not excluding
technical parole revocations was thereby comparing apples and
oranges, but a public concerned about a status-sensitive prediction
system could at least ask if the Commission was not perhaps mixing
Northern Spys and Golden Deliciouses.
This step might seem to be the
Selecting the Salient Factors.
easiest: simply utilize all factors that show a positive correlation above
some conventional statistical cutoff.11 6 At first glance the only issue
seems to be whether the researchers have investigated every possible
independent variable that might have a causal relationship with parole
failure, the dependent variable used to measure recidivism. In fact,
however, researchers have never followed such a pure, rigorous
approach, and understandably so.
The District of Columbia researchers hypothesized that only a
limited number of factors might account for the local shrinkage of the
BE61/A table, and they investigated only these. 117 In contrast, the
Parole Commission researchers cross-tabulated a wide variety of
factors with parole failure." 8 These were quickly winnowed down to a
relatively small number that showed a statistically significant positive correlation with parole failure." 9 But the Parole Commission
socioeconomic variables or, conversely, to risk overestimating the power of data relating to the
offender's prior culpability, which may occur if we ignore "technical" parole revocations? Many,
I think, would choose the latter once the issue is framed in this manner.
116. See generally Gottfredson, supra note 32 (fuller discussion of the problems at this stage).
117. Hemple & Webb, supra note 97, at 34-35.
118. The Parole Decisionmaking Project studied some 66 variables, eventually isolating nine
predictive variables. See Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 197. In a subsequent Sentencing
Guidelines Project, the researchers studied 205 variables. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 35, at 120-32 (list of items of information collected).
119. Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 197.
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researchers did not stop here; they further eliminated other variables,
found to have a positive correlation with the outcome criterion, because they were "judged to pose ethical problems for use in individual
parole selection decisions."'1 20 Examples of variables excluded are an
arrest record not leading to a conviction' 2' and apparently race. 122 Of
course anyone who believes that moral considerations must be
balanced against the goal of predictive efficiency will understand
immediately the justification for such decisions. But, at this point, the
designers of the Salient Factor Score are no longer performing a
limited actuarial function. Fairness, like beauty, is in the eye of the
beholder. If we say race may not be considered, can we meaningfully
distinguish other factors, such as education level or employment
record, which tend to overlap with race? Trade-offs between fairness
and efficiency are probably inevitable, but the real question here is
who should make such decisions, because once the question of
fairness is broached we are outside the special expertise of the
statistician. The legitimacy of such a predictive system should depend
at a minimum on reaching these trade-offs in a politically accountable
way.
The complexity of this trade-off process comes into clearer focus
when we examine the salient factors in more detail. Of an original 66
factors studied, the designers of the Salient Factor Score chose nine
variables for use.' 23 These can be grouped into three categories:
(1) those that distinguish offenders in terms of their reported prior
criminality, such as prior convictions, prior incarcerations, and prior
parole revocations;' 24 (2) those that distinguish offenders in terms of
socioeconomic characteristics, such as education, employment
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Project, supra note 45, at 877 n.329. This Project notes that race was excluded both on

ethical and mathematical grounds because it proved redundant given its high degree of overlap
with other variables. Id Some may question whether the ethical issue has been resolved or only
defined by this statement.
123. Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 197. See generally UNITED STATES PAROLE
COMMISSION RESEARCH UNIT, SALIENT FACTOR SCORING MANUAL (1975), reprinted in RESEARCH
REPORTS, supra note 72, at I, 1-4 (report nine) (detailed discussion of the nine variables used in
the Salient Factor Score-how they were interpreted, defined, and scored).
124. See RESEARCH REPORTS, supranote 72, at 1,1-4 (items A, B, and E on the Salient Factor
Score respectively; the "prior incarcerations" variable does not generally include pretrial
confinement). While few issues surround the use of this data, it may surprise some to learn that
even expunged juvenile adjudications are considered in determining the defendant's parole
prognosis. See idat I, 2-3. In contrast, Publication105, supranote 105, at 32, advises probation
officers not to refer to expunged juvenile court dispositions in the presentence report.
In the Sentencing Guideline Project, prior convictions, prior incarcerations, and information
relating to offense severity outperformed all variables relating to social stability. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 149.
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record, and marital status; 125 and (3) those that distinguish offenders
in terms of types of culpability, but not degree of culpability, such as
age at first commitment and history of "drug involvement." 126 This
last category of variables, although touching on culpability, does not
add information relating to the offender's overall level of blameworthiness, but only adds a special weight to certain crimes that were
already counted under the first category above.
Issues of fairness proliferate around all three categories, but chiefly
the latter two. 127 Even in the case of the first category, counting
prior incarcerations and parole revocations may prejudice lower
income or minority group members who may be distinguished from
other offenders of equal prior culpability because an earlier biased
decisionmaker denied them probation or revoked parole on technical
grounds.
Similarly, use of age at first commitment as a variable may work
against those non-middle class youths who are less likely to benefit
from police or prosecutorial discretion. In addition, some crimes,
such as drug offenses, may be race sensitive. 28 Finally, the heavier
125. See RESEARCH REPORTS, supra note 72, at I, 5-7 (items G, H, and I respectively). If the
offender had completed the 12th grade or received an equivalency diploma, he received one
positive point. See id at I, 5. In keeping with the static character of categoric risk prediction,
educational achievement after commitment to prison did not count. Id The Parole
Commission's Research Director has informed me that postincarceration educational
achievement did not correlate significantly with parole success. Apparently, it is not the diploma
but the behavioral pattern associated with remaining in high school until graduation that
evidences social stability. Interview with Dr. Peter Hoffman (Mar. 22, 1978).
Verified employment or fulltime school attendance for six months during the two-year period
prior to commitment also improved the offender's score by one point. RESEARCH REPORTS, supra
note 72, at I, 6. However, when the subject claimed employment that was not verified, the
Scoring Manual advised the hearing examiner to "normally score 0," subject to reopening on
appeal if the caseworker forwards verification. Id An offender who planned to live with his
spouse or children when released also received one point. Id- However, a common law wife was
treated as a spouse "only if a stable past relationship is evident," an inherently subjective
concept. Id; see note 127 infra.
126. See RESEARCH REPORTS, supra note 72, at I, 3-5 (items C, D, and F respectively). The
variable relating to a "history of heroin or opiate dependence" is, I suggest, the most subjective
of these factors. "Dependence" was defined as "any physical or psychological dependence, or
regular or habitual usage." Id. at I, 5.
127. Two reliability studies conducted during the Parole Decision-Making Project found that
"unreliable" items of information in both samples included those relating to living
arrangements, drug use, and employment history over the prior two years. See J. BECK, S.
SINGER, W. BROWN & G. PASELA, THE REUABILrrY OF INFORMATION IN THE PAROLE DECISIONMAKING STUDY, 9-11 (1973) (NCCD Research Center Supplemental Report Twelve). In short,
this sort of data seems the most questionable from both a moral and methodological standpoint.
Difficulties encountered with these variables included: "seldom sufficient information"
(employment history); "lack of information" (drug use); and information "subjective ... and
difficult to code" (living arrangements). Id- at 9-10.
128. Different crimes have different racial breakdowns in terms of the offender who commits
them. For example, from a study of 17 selected cities in 1967, the racial breakdown of offenders
convicted of armed robbery was 85.1% "Negro" and 14.9% "White"; in the case of forcible rape,
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weighting given certain crimes by the Salient Factor Score, such as
auto theft and drug possession, seems inconsistent with the low
ranking these offenses will generally receive on the offensive severity
axis of the Parole Commission's guideline table. The net result of
treating the same factor harshly on one axis and leniently on the other
may be statistically sound, but it is morally incoherent.
All these issues pale in comparison with the use of socioeconomic
variables that tend to distinguish between the socially stable and the
socially disfavored-the loners and the nomads. Of course, some
argue that evidence of social instability, even when it does not amount
to blameworthy conduct, should be-and perhaps always has beenconsidered by the sentencing judge in order to incapacitate the more
dangerous. The dilemma thus posed troubled the framers of the
guideline matrix. They have written:
[We] decided -that in investigating this new area, it was
preferable to err on the side of statistical over-inclusiveness;
but this decision was not lightly made for we initially saw the
potential for sharp conflict between our moral and
pragmatic values. Pragmatically, we wished to consider any
and all factors which would enhance the predictive utility of
any guideline model. Morally, we looked towards an
operational guideline system which would be based only
upon statistically valid factors and weights which were
simultaneously proper from an ethical standpoint. Thus, it
was not without a good deal of debate and soul-searching...
that we eventually opted for inclusiveness on virtually all
129
factors to be considered.
Obviously, this is a tentative and transitional justification. We should
err on the side of predictive efficiency, they say, because we are
initiating a new methodology, and we should see at least how high a
level of prediction is possible. For the future, however, the decision on
which side we should err when faced with a conflict between our moral
and pragmatic values really translates into a procedural question:
Who should decide? The soul searching engaged in by experts might
the same breakdown was 70.1% and 29.9%, respectively. See M. HINDELANG, C. DUNN, L.
SuTTON & A. AuMICK, SOURcE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 195 (1973) (LEAA Grant

No. 72-SS-99-6006). This research shows that once we deviate from a normative ranking of
crimes in terms of relative severity, the problem of the racial overlap of our criteria enters again
by the back door.
129. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 23-24. See also Hoffman & Beck, supra note
110, at 197.
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be equally well conducted in public, and public scrutiny might, as one
court has already recognized, result in a different answer. 130
At this point, critics might respond that even if a majoritarian
choice should be made, the legislature has already made it in the form
of S.1437, which mandates the consideration of many of the same
socioeconomic variables utilized by the Salient Factor Score. 3 ' This
response, however, misconceives the nature of the sentencing agency.
Its task is not static; rather, it is meant to "possess the flexibility to
change with changed circumstances."' 3 2 So too will the potential
trade-offs between moral and pragmatic values constantly change
over time, indeed varying kaleidoscopically as prediction tables are
revalidated and altered to meet new circumstances.' 33
Examining the trade-offs faced by the designers of the Salient
Factor Score clarifies this point. If we view the Salient Factor Score
from a cost-benefit perspective, we can weigh the benefit achieved in
terms of increased predictive efficiency against the cost to the moral
coherence of the criminal law arising from the use of status-sensitive
criteria. Although a precise cost-benefit calculus is impossible, it is
certainly relevant to ask how much benefit was gained from using
status-sensitive criteria. Surprisingly, and perhaps symptomatically,
this question cannot be answered adequately because the designers of
the Salient Factor Score have not told us, 3 4 but we can say that
130. In Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court
examined the guideline matrix and noted that such a table narrowed the decisionmaker's field of
vision, "minimizing the influence of other factors and encouraging decisive reliance upon factors
whose significance might have been differently articulatedhad Section 4 been followed." Id. at
1113 (emphasis added). Because section 4 is the notice and commeft provision of the APA, the
court is saying here that public participation in the rulemaking process leading to.the adoption of
the guideline system might have changed its appearance.
131. See note 78 supra.
132. SENTENCING GUIDDL NES, supra note 35, at 11. This "[aidaptability to changes in

population concentrations, societal attitudes to given offenses, or prison conditions" is, the
advocates of a sentencing agency assert and I think correctly, one of the major advantages of this
approach over reliance on the legislature. Id. By accepting this model, we obviously intend that
the sentencing agency maintain the discretion to adapt and thus continually face the question of
trade-offs between moral and pragmatic values. Id. at 23.
133. For example, a given socioeconomic variable originally might show a high correlation
with parole failure coupled with little tendency toward racial sensitivity. Years later, on a
subsequent revalidation, researchers might discern a decline in its predictive ability
accompanied by a growth in its tendency to produce a higher risk group populated
disproportionately by minorities. In short, the variables in a base expectancy rate table are
dynamic; once validated, they do not remain justified forever.
134. See Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 197-202 (fullest description of the predictive
power of each of the nine variables used in the Salient Factor Score). Although this study shows
the level of efficiency of each of the nine variables (though not on a "stepwise" basis), it fails to
show the racial impact of any of these criteria on the offender pool. For a discussion of the
"stepwise" problem in measuring the utility of a prediction instrument, see text accompanying
notes 163-70 infra.
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culpability-oriented criteria seem to have substantially outperformed
neutral socioeconomic criteria. Looking at the validation data on the
Salient Factor Score, one finds that the criteria that most sharply
differentiate between outcome groups were those that relate to the
offender's prior criminality-number of prior convictions and
incarcerations. Of the nine variables used, not only did the absence of
a prior conviction correlate with the highest rate of parole success
.(88.5%), but the margin produced between those who shared and
those who lacked this factor was also the greatest. Those with two or
more prior convictions had a 60.1% success rate, thus producing a
28.4% margin vis-a-vis those with no prior conviction. 35 Similarly,
prior incarcerations produced a 24.3% margin,' 3 6 and parole
revocations resulted in a 21.1% margin. 13 7 In sharp contrast, the effect
of using a defined education level alone was to differentiate between a
72.8% expectation of parole success in the case of those meeting the
education criterion versus a 64.2% expectation in the case of those
failing to meet it.13 8 This yields only an 8.6% margin, one third that of
prior convictions; moreover, the so-called high-risk group isolated by
this criterion still will have nearly a two-thirds chance of parole
success. Similarly, the employment variable produced only an 11.3%
margin. 3 9 Here again it should be stressed that the three socioeconomic criteria-education, employment, and marital status-each
isolate a higher risk group that will be treated more adversely but that
140
still has over a 60% expectation of parole success.
A likely response to this critique of the efficacy of such
socioeconomic criteria is that it fails to consider the cumulative
impact of such criteria. In short, this argument stresses that we should
look not at the isolated impact of a single criterion, but at the
135. Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 197. This focus on the marginal difference in the
probability of recidivism between the two classes differentiated by any criterion seems essential.
In assessing the utility of a prediction device, criminologists have recognized the need to balance
the benefit in terms of true positives identified against the cost in terms of false positives that
are overpredicted. The best known measure is probably the Berkson Mean Cost Rating, which
estimates the cost in terms of the proportion of successful candidates rejected. See id. at 200;
Inciardi, Babst & Koval, Computing Mean Cost Ratings (MCR), 10 J. OF RESEARCH IN CRMIE AND
DELINQUENCY 22 (1973).
136. Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 198.
137. Id.
138. Id at 199.
139. Id
140. The higher risk group distinguished by each of the education, employment, and living
arrangement variables had a 64.2%, 60.9%, and 62.9% chance of success on parole respectively.
Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 199. Of course these percentages may be artificially high,
given the short two-year period used to define parole success, but then the parole success
statistics of the lower-risk groups also defined by these criteria may be equally inflated.
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aggregate efficiency of all the criteria. There is some merit to this
point. When one looks at the aggregate impact of the Salient Factor
Score's eleven point scoring system, one finds that it yields a range of
outcomes in the validation sample running from a high of 100% rate of
success on parole for a perfect score of eleven, to a low of a 50.0%
success rate for a score of two. 141 Concededly, this is a much wider
margin than any single variable yielded, 142 but this argument fails to
answer the critical question: What is the specific cost-benefit tradeoff that results from using racially or status-sensitive criteria? The
possibility is real that because of the overlap among predictive
variables, little marginal utility results from adding such morally
questionable criteria to a prediction system that otherwise is based on
1 43
culpability-oriented variables.
As we have seen already, the two most highly predictive criteriaprior convictions and prior incarcerations-identify 88.5% and 80.9%
success 'rates respectively. 144 When we add to the predictive ability of
these two factors the cumulative impact of the other four criteria
earlier characterized as culpability-related, 145 their aggregate predictive efficiency may fall only slightly short of that of the Salient
Factor Score as a whole. In brief, the three neutral socioeconomic
criteria may add little marginal predictive efficiency.
141. Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 201. Two slight qualifications of this statistic are
necessary. First, for a score of zero there was a 25% chance of parole success; however, only four
individuals in the validation sample and none in the construction sample received this score.
Second, a score of one yielded a 53.2% success rate. Id The mode in both samples _i.e., the
single most frequent score) was 4, which correlated with a 60.3% parole success rate in the
construction sample and a 66.3% rate in the validation sample. It seems likely, then, that a
categoric risk prediction system will operate to the prejudice of individuals whose success on
parole still can be predicted as probable, but who are placed by the table in its lowest-ranking
risk groups. In addition, relatively small marginal differences between groups may be magnified
out of proportion. See note 142 infra.
142. The margin here is 50.0% as compared with 28.4% for prior convictions. See text
accompanying note 135 supra. Of course, this comparison is somewhat unrealistic because the
population in the 11 point score group was very low. As in the case of a Bell Curve, the majority
of the population tended to cluster around the mean (scores three through six), where the
difference in parole success rates was relatively small. Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 201.
Roughly a 15 percentage point difference separated the probability of parole success for an
offender with a score of three from an offender with a score of six. Id The Salient Factor Score,
however, is constructed to place substantial emphasis on this slight difference. It places the
offender with a score of three in the bottom "poor" category of the Salient Factor Score, and the
offender with a six score in the "good" category, which is two levels higher. One can question
whether such a disparity in treatment is justified by anything other than the administrative need
to subdivide the offender population. See id at 202.
143. See notes 163-70 infra and accompanying text (discussing problem of "overlap"). See
generally Wilkins, supra note 34.
144. See Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 197-98; text accompanying notes 134-136
supra.
145. See notes 124-26 supra and accompanying text.
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This speculation about the limited marginal utility of the
socioeconomic variables is corroborated by the evidence collected by
Dr. Herbert Solomon, a Stanford statistician.' 4 Dr. Solomon
employed a multivariate analysis technique and discovered that 93%
of the variation in parole outcomes could be explained by using just
four items of information, one of which was not even employed in the
nine variable Salient Factor Score.' 47 To Dr. Solomon this merely
meant that the analysis technique he utilized was a more efficient
approach to parole prediction because those four predictors, if
present, indicated odds in favor of parole success of almost 16:1.148
More important to the value-conscious observer, however, may be Dr.
Solomon's demonstration that a virtually equivalent level of predictive efficiency to that of the Salient Factor Score can be achieved
without using employment history or education level variables.
Despite an outpour of research published by the Parole Commission
and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (N.C.C.D.) on the
subject of parole prediction,' 49 no researcher has yet addressed this
question of the relative efficacy of culpability-oriented versus
socioeconomic predictors.'5 0 Yet, from a value-conscious perspective,
the question seems both obvious and urgent. Once again, then, we
encounter a juncture where the interests of the expert and those of the
moralist diverge. If so, a mechanism may be needed by which the
value-conscious layperson can compel the new actuarial criminologist
to address the questions that the criminologist deems of lesser
significance, but that special interest groups within society have a
right to ask.
146. Solomon, Parole Outcome: A Multidimensional Contingency Table Analysis, 13 J. OF
RESEARCH IN CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 107 (1976).

147. Id. at 109. One of the four variables was the planned living arrangements variable, which
subsequently has been eliminated from the Salient Factor Score because of its subjectivity. See
note 159 infra. The variable used by Solomon but not by the Salient Factor Score related to
whether the offender previously had been paroled. See Solomon, supra note 146, at 109.
148. Solomon, supra note 146, at 109.
149. As of September 1977, the Research Unit of the Parole Commission has released 15
research reports. See RESEARCH REPORTS, supra note 72 (Reports 1-12). Earlier, the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency produced 13 supplemental reports and a final summary as
part of the Parole Decisionmaking Project. See note 72 supra. See also SELECTED REPRINTS,
supra note 33 (other studies by the participants). None of these reports or studies, however,
deals with the question here at issue.
150. Data in the Sentencing Guideline Project indicates, however, the predictive superiority
of culpability-oriented data over socioeconomic variables. Both pilot studies involved in that
project found the same six "most influential variables": "(1) number of offenses of which the
offender was convicted; (2) number of prior incarcerations (juvenile and adult); (3) seriousness
of the offense at conviction; (4) weapon usage; (5) legal status of the offender at the time of
offense; and (6) employment history." SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 149. Of these
factors only employment history can be described as a neutral socioeconomic variable.
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Finally, any cost-benefit analysis of the use of socioeconomic
criteria should consider whether the enhanced predictive efficiency
obtained through its use is effectively employed. Here an irony
emerges: Using prior convictions alone we have an outcome range of
88.5% parole success for offenders with no convictions to 60.1%
success for those with two or more convictions. 15 ' Adding all nine
factors together, the margin is enhanced so that the outcomes range
between 94.7%, the success rate for a Salient Factor Score of ten on52
the eleven point scale, and 50.0%, the rate for a score of two.
Reasonable individuals might disagree about whether such an
extension of our predictive capacity is worth the price paid, but the
surprising fact is that the Parole Commission does not truly utilize
this enhanced predictive capability in its guideline matrix. To do so
would require assigning different guideline ranges for each single
point on the eleven point scale. Because this is administratively
cumbersome, the designers compressed the eleven point scale into
four risk categories: "poor" (0-3); "fair" (4-5); "good" (6-8); and
"very good" (9-11). 11 3 Thus, it is necessary to look at the weighted
averages of parole success for these four categories actually used;
these are 55.4%, 68.4%, 79.1%, and 91.2% respectively." 4 In effect,
only an immaterial enhancement of predictive capacity has occurred-amounting to less than 3% at the top and 5% at the bottombeyond the original 88.5% - 60.1% breakdown that a prior conviction
5
record alone revealed.
Of course, additional advantages come from using multiple criteria.
Administrative convenience requires us to break down the total pool
of offenders into more numerically equal groups than a single criterion
is likely to achieve. A hypothetical predictive system that produces a
2% "high risk" group and a 98% "low risk" group would lack utility.
What is needed is a system that differentiates more subgroups with
more equal populations, but even this goal might be approximated by
less drastic means. For example, we can add to prior convictions the
factor of prior incarcerations, which was scored in a tripartite manner
and which yielded three risk categories having, respectively, an 80.9%
success rate (if no prior incarceration), a 66.4% rate (if one or two
prior incarerations), and a 56.6% rate (if three or more)." 6 Together,
151. Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 197.
152. Id. at 201. The success rate on the construction sample for a score of two was 40.0%; the
50.0% rate is from the validation sample, which involved a substantially larger cross-section.
153. Id at 202.
154. Id These are the scores for the larger validation sample. For the construction sample,
the scores were 49.8%, 60.8%, 77.4%, and 93.0%, respectively. Id.
155. Id. at 197.
156. Id. at 198.
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these and the other culpability-related factors potentially would
demarcate a number of intermediate categories. In short, at the cost
of arguably compromising the moral integrity of our system of
allocating punishment, the Salient Factor Score achieves only a fourcategory ranking instead of the tripartite one that prior convictions
and incarcerations alone could give us. Greater predictability is
achieved, but predictability is a means, rather than an end in itself.
Much of the enhanced predictability attained by the Salient Factor
-Score is simply not put to meaningful use.
There remains, however, a more serious justification for the
extensive effort made by the developers of the Salient Factor Score to
utilize multiple factors rather than simply the one or two variables
most strongly correlated with parole success or failure. The data
available at the sentencing and parole stage is notoriously unreliable.
Even if we are confident at the macro-level that we know what factors
correlate with recidivism in principle, it does not follow that such an
ideal system can be implemented at the micro-level of individualized
sentencing and parole hearings. In a high percentage of cases the
Parole Commission's researchers found that the essential data on
which the Salient Factor Score rating depends were simply lacking or
garbled. 5 7 Thus, the proverbial danger of putting all one's eggs in the
same basket arises if the Salient Factor Score were to use only two or
three factors. Inevitably, a key variable often would be omitted or
misstated in the presentence report, and thus sentencing disparities
would persist.
Persuasive as this argument may be for increasing the number of
variables to reduce the impact of misinformation, it does not fairly
apply in the case of socioeconomic criteria. As these researchers
themselves found, data relating to the offender's social stability was
"often subjective, usually outdated and.., never the normal object of
criminal investigation,"'5 18 as was data relating to prior criminal
conduct. Because such socioeconomic data most often is not verified,
it is the weak link in the chain, and promises to raise, rather than
lower, the likelihood of error in prediction. Partly in recognition of the
problematic accuracy of such information, the Parole Commission
revised the Salient Factor Score in 1977 to delete two of the most
subjective variables: (1) the marital status or satisfactory living
arrangements variable; and (2) the high school education level

157. See J. BECK, S. SINGER, W. BROWN & G. PASELA, supra note 127, at 14-15.
158. SENTENCING GUIMELINES, supra note 35, at 26.
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variable.1 5 9 Still remaining, however, is the employment record

variable, which may prove the most racially sensitive variable at
sentencing, given the disparity between minority and overall
unemployment rates. 160
This purging of most of the socioeconomic criteria from the Parole
Commission's guidelines does not moot the issues of the fairness or
efficacy of their use. Those issues are reborn with S. 1437 in the more
racially sensitive context of sentencing. Section 994(d) of the bill
instructs the Sentencing Commission it creates to consider the
following criteria when framing guidelines: (1) education; (2) vocational skills; (3) drug dependence; (4) previous employment record;
(5) family ties and responsibilities; and (6) community ties. 161 Such
consideration is mandated whether or not the factors relate to
recidivism. 162 Still, an obligation to consider these variables is not
159. See 42 Fed. Reg. 31,786-88 (1977). Several reasons appear to have been responsible for
the elimination of these variables. First, the living arrangements variable called for a subjective
assessment of frequently "sketchy" information. J BECK, S. SINGER, W. BROWN &G. PASELA,
supra note 127, at 11. The Scoring Manual instructions were also far from objective. See note
125 supra. More importantly, however, according to the Parole Commission's Research Director,
inmates had learned the importance of this factor and were contriving fictitious planned living
arrangements in order to earn a favorable point. A variable that the subject could manipulate
was unsatisfactory. Interview with Dr. Peter Hoffman, Research Director of U.S. Parole
Commission (Mar. 22, 1978). The education level variable had a racially sensitive impact and
yet appeared to add little additional predictive power on a marginal basis (i.e., the aggregate
predictive power of the Salient Factor Score, given the other predictive variables, was not
materially enhanced). The decision to eliminate this variable, however, may have been as much
the consequence of another factor as it was the result of its racial sensitivity and limited utility:
Substantial inmate dissatisfaction existed over the failure to give credit for high school
equivalency diplomas earned in prison, which apparently did not correlate positively with parole
success. Id See also note 125 supra.
160. The Sentencing Guidelines Project also relied on the employment variable, principally
"to tap the social stability dimension." SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 26. The
Project justified its use because it was more "available" and less "subjective" than other
measures of social stability, and also that it seemed "the least class-linked of those data items
comprising the social stability dimension." Id. Although this latter statement recognizes that
serious issues of fairness do surround the use of such data, the disturbing feature in this
justification for using employment as a variable is that it was supported not by empirical
research on the actual offender population, but only by prior studies. A British Home Office
study had concluded that employment was the least class sensitive of the variables indicating
social stability. See F. SMION, supra note 54, at 67-71, 145-47, cited in SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
supra at 26 n.26. This reliance on the conclusions of an English commentator seems a questionable cross-cultural comparison, given the existence of higher unemployment rates in the United
States among minority groups. See note 70 supra.
161. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 124, § 994(d) (1978); see note 78 supra.
162. Consideration of factors that do not correlate positively with parole success may violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment under the relaxed test of McGinnis
v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973), discussed in notes 69 &75 supra.No rational relationship would
exist between such factors and any legitimate state interest; therefore, its discriminatory impact
would not be constitutionally justified. This would not be true if the factor related to culpability
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equivalent to an obligation to adopt them; accordingly, whether these
factors are given substantial, little, or no weight will remain within the
low-visibility discretion of the new Sentencing Commission.
Scoring: Simple or Stepwise?
As noted earlier, one of the
nagging problems of statistical prediction is that independent
variables tend to overlap; that is, they cross-tabulate among
themselves as well as with the dependent variable being investigated. 163 To the statistician this presents a dual problem of
efficiency. First, the statistician wishes to avoid collecting more
information than he can usefully employ, because an increase in
aggregate predictive capability does not result from the addition of a
variable that fully overlaps with another independent variable.
Furthermore, by focusing on the most positively correlated factors, he
may miss others of relatively low but nonoverlapping predictive
power.
The statistician guards against this problem by using what is known
as a stepwise regression technique for analyzing data, which seeks to
determine the incremental predictive power of each independent
variable studied. In practice, the statistician first identifies the most
powerful item of information in the field of information available to
him, then searches for the next item which, when added to the first,
yields the highest aggregate predictive power. 164 This process repeats
itself in successive passes through the field of information until the
statistician is unable to find any item that adds marginal predictive
power.
The relevance of this technique to our focus on the fairness of
prediction based on factors unrelated to culpability is that it provides
a means for determining the real marginal contribution of socioeconomic variables. Does an overlap exist that reduces their utility? What do they add to the existing base of culpability-related
variables? Here a surprising fact emerges: The Salient Factor Score is
not based on a stepwise regression analysis. Thus, although we know
rather than to status, because retribution is a purpose of sentencing that the Supreme Court has
recognized as legitimate. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (death penalty not per
se cruel and unusual punishment). Arguably, however, a discriminatory intent must still be

shown even when status is a factor, under the test expressed in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 238-39 (1976). Here the Court held that adverse racial impact in the use of employment
tests did not amount to constitutional discrimination in the absence of proof of discriminatory
intent.
163. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 150-52; Wilkins, supra note 53, at 828.
164. See Wilkins, supranote 34, at826-29 (description of stepwise process). See also SENTENC.
ING GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 152 (example of a "stepwise" system used to predict the
sentencing judge's decision).
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that the Salient Factor Score's employment criterion distinguishes a
lower-risk group, of whom 72.2% will succeed on parole, from a
higher-risk group, of whom only 60.9% will succeed, 165 we do not know
whether the aggregate predictive power of the table is thereby
166
increased by as much as 10% or as little as 1%.
Instead of using a stepwise regression technique, the framers of the
Salient Factor Score used a simpler technique known as the Burgess
method, which simply assigns one point to any factor positively
correlated with parole failure. 167 Why? First, they found that such a
16
method was more resistant to the problem of prediction shrinkage.
Second, because the overall quality of the accessible data was
recognized to be frequently poor and uneven, they believed the
Burgess technique, which gives equal weight to a potentially broad
number of variables, was more reliable and consistent than stepwise
methods that tend to employ fewer variables and thus are more
69
susceptible to distortion.
Once again then we encounter a sensitive decision. Is the Burgess
method better than a stepwise one? The answer to this question
depends on how one defines the term "better." If one is primarily
concerned about the overall reliability of the system, it may be the
better method. But if one is more concerned about the fairness of the
system, a stepwise method may be preferable. 70 The perspective of
the statistician and the lawyer tend to conflict here. The lawyer may
wish to distinguish between types of errors and decide that some
errors are more serious from this value-conscious standpoint than
165. See Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 199.
166. We do know, however, that 93% of the variation in parole outcomes predicted by the
Salient Factor Score can be achieved without the use of an employment history variable, at least
according to Dr. Solomon. See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra.
167. See Wilkins, supra note 34, at 830. This decision not to employ a multivariate technique
has been at least implicitly criticized by Dr. Solomon. See text accompanying notes 146-48
supra. Dr. Solomon suggests. that other multivariate techniques existed in addition to those
considered by the Parole Commission's researchers and rejected in favor of a Burgess scoring
method.
168. Wilkins, supra note 34, at 831.
169. Id, at 831-33.
170. Hoffman and Beck make the following assertion, one which I think is open to debate
depending on one's perspective on "fairness": "On a macroscopic level, the fairest policy is the
one which makes the fewest errors overall." Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 203. This is the
critical normative assumption underlying categoric risk prediction systems. On such a level they
are clearly more accurate than individualized systems. Although I agree with this argument as a
justification for preferring categoric prediction over a system that gives the judge unfettered
discretion, I believe there is a philosophic counterargument that certain nonrandom kinds of
errors may be more important than the total amount of error. Why it might be less important to
minimize the total amount of error than to ensure that the costs of error are distributed equitably
among all groups within society is a theme developed in the final section of this article.
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others, even if they occur less frequently. Again, the issue is in which
direction we prefer to err: Simpler techniques, such as the Burgess
method, may be more reliable in general but are more prone to ignore
the "overlap" phenomenon than regression techniques. Thus, when
combined with socioeconomic variables, the Burgess method may
result in our using criteria we consider questionable without obtaining
any significant benefit in terms of predictive efficiency. Even if
overlaps between variables did not exist today, the issue would not
disappear. Overlaps can develop in the future. Therefore, a truly final
cost-benefit decision with respect to the use of status-sensitive
criteria cannot be made. Again, here is a juncture where sensitive
decisions involving potential conflicts between values and efficiency
will reoccur.
The Revalidation Problem.
Prediction tables tend to shrink
over time and between localities, 171 and therefore should be subject to
periodic revalidation. 172 To be sure, some criminologists have
asserted that a nonshrinkable table is possible. But such a goal-like
the quest for the philosopher's stone and the Northwest Passagemust be viewed with some skepticism considering the evidence to
date. Again, this revalidation step seems to be yet another juncture
where public visibility is important.
A threshold problem arises here: How do we find a control group on
which to test the continued validity of the Salient Factor Score when
we are already subjecting offenders to it? By its very existence such a
guideline system tends to eliminate any unaffected control group on
which its continued accuracy can be tested. Probably a majority of
criminologists believe that "prison experience is criminogenic: prison
breeds crime."'' 73 If so, and if we assign longer sentences to those
perceived to be higher risks, we succeed in making these offenders
even higher risks upon release than other prisoners confined for
shorter periods. The net result again could be a self-fulfilling
prophecy: Revalidation will confirm the perception that those
possessing certain signs of social instability are higher risks not
necessarily because of any inherent accuracy of this hypothesis, but
possibly because such persons have been made higher risks through
171. See Gottfredson, supra note 32, at 173.
172. Id. at 183 (stating that a "continuous cycle of... repeated validation ... is needed");
Hemple & Webb, supra note 97, at 37 (suggesting a revalidation "every year or two").

173. Beck & Hoffman, Time Served and Release Performance: A Research Note, 13 J.

OF

RESEARCH IN CRIME AND DELINQUINCY 127 (1976), reprinted in SELECTED REPRINTS, supra note

33.
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longer confinement. Presumably a pure "control" experiment is not
possible, because it is not politically feasible to release people who are
honestly believed to be high risks simply to verify a theory.
Although the Parole Commission has not acknowledged this
dilemma, there are signs that is has anticipated the argument that
base expectancy rate tables cannot be revalidated on a population
already subjected to them. A study coauthored by the Commission's
research director 174 concluded that the "theory that longer prison
terms will result in dramatically higher recidivism rates upon release"
could be discounted. 175 But the evidence underlying this conclusion is
mixed and subject to varying interpretations. As with earlier studies,
the researchers found: "In general, the percentage of cases with
favorable release outcome tends to decrease as one moves within a
risk category from the group serving the least amount of time to the
group serving the most amount of time." 176 Because the relationship
was neither uniform nor consistent, however, and only was deemed
statistically significant in some cases, 177 the researchers felt the
evidence did not support the theory that incarceration is criminogenic. Still, when one examines more closely the data published
by the Parole Commission, this conclusion seems tenuously related to the evidence. With one exception, those confined the longest
in all risk categories studied performed more poorly on parole than
those released the earliest. 17 For example, for that class of persons
whose Salient Factor Score was 3-4, those confined 3-19 months
succeeded at a 70.9% rate; those confined 20-35 months, at a 62.7%
rate; and those confined for longer periods at a 59.7% rate. 79 In other
174. IM. (Hoffman is the Parole Commission's Research Director).
175. Id at 132.

176. Id. at 130.
177. IM
178. Id at 130-32. Each risk category was divided into three groups depending on the length
of confinement: shortest, medium, and longest. In category V (offenders having a high Salient
Factor Score of 10-11), those confined for the shortest term had a 94.4% performance rate and
those confined the longest a 96.7% rate. The middle group had a success rate of 98.1%. In
category IV (Salient Factor Score of 7-9), performance was again highest for the middle group at
91.7%, but the group confined for the shortest period of time had a better success rate (87.7%)
than those confined the longest (78.0%). Id.
179. Id. at 131 (category II). The Beck-Hoffman study apparently made little attempt to
control experimentally the factor of age level. Because crime is age specific, with younger
offenders far more likely to become recidivists, the possibility that those confined longer may
have been released at an older average age tends to undermine their conclusion that the length of
confinement does not influence the likelihood of future recidivism. It is possible both that length
of confinement is positively related to recidivism and that human maturation processes are also
at work which after some point make older offenders less risky. The two factors may then
partially offset each other. Rather than use experimental controls, the Beck-Hoffman study used
"statistical" controls (i.e., a large enough sample to approximate the effect of experimental

1032

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:975

cases the relationship was less striking, but again the issue may
resolve itself into the degree of sensitivity we should have about this
problem. 180 If we are already troubled about the Salient Factor Score,
the evidence here does not allay our fear that in the future it may be
revalidated based in some part on a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Beyond the recurring theme about the need to make value
judgments, a second problem is discernible on which lawyers have a
special perspective: conflicts of interest. A basic conflict is likely to
exist within any agency that is both an operating agency and the major
research arm for the federal criminal justice system, as the Sentencing
Commission will be in this area. 81 Although the careful
methodological studies released by the Parole Commission and the
N.C.C.D. have provided a model for empirical scholarship about the
criminal justice system, it must be recognized that once a prediction
controls). Some studies that have been controlled for offender age level have found length of
confinement to have had at least a slight positive effect on probability of recidivism. Id. at 128.
Even if the Beck-Hoffman study were accepted as proving that prison experience is not
criminogenic for federal offenders, its findings would not necessarily apply to state prison
populations. The offenses set forth in the federal criminal code are relatively limited, and thus
the federal prison population may not be fairly representative of the broader cross-section of
offenders in state prisons. Also, the federal system may divert more offenders through probation
and thus have a more hardened residual prison population.
Also present in this study is the characteristic problem of "over-aggregation" to which
statisticians seem especially susceptible. Although prisoners as a group might not become more
prone toward recidivism because of longer prison experience, it does not follow that there are
not sub-groups within that population who do. Most obviously, for example, women offenders
might respond to longer prison terms very differently than do men. Whether in fact women do
respond differently is less the issue here than is the question of why this possibility was not
addressed before a generalization was advanced. In overview, a value-laden question seems once
again to have been submerged under methodological convention.
180. The data on whether incarceration is criminogenic is, in short, inconclusive, but the
significance one attaches to such results may vary depending on one's professional perspective.
Dr. Hoffman informs me that, from a statistician's perspective, because the thesis that longer
imprisonment is criminogenic has not been proven, it should be treated as false. Hence the
sample used in the revalidation process should not be seen as biased. To the contrary, from a
lawyer's perspective, it might be asserted either (1) that the burden of proof should rest on those
who are seeking to establish the efficacy of their predictive system; or (2) that any system that
measures the time of incarceration on a basis unrelated to the traditional standards of the
criminal law (i.e., on a basis unrelated to blameworthiness or the need for general deterrence),
and that uses racially sensitive variables, should have to meet a particularly high standard of
proof. Finally, from a political perspective, society may wish to be hypersensitive about
predictions based on status. In short, given that decisions must be made under conditions of
uncertainty, different perspectives employ different standards for making those decisions,
depending on whether the decision is viewed as a purely scientific one or one involving political
or legal dimensions.
181. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 124, § 995(a)(13)-(15) (1978). These sections
authorize the Sentencing Commission to undertake research, data-gathering, and training
programs and to serve as a "clearinghouse and information center for the collection, preparation
and dissemination of information on Federal sentencing practices." See id.
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system is put into effect, powerful pressures build to justify action
taken. Inevitably, agency embarrassment would result if it could be
shown that a base expectancy rate table had systematically
overpredicted in a particularly sensitive way for a number of years. At
least in other agencies, the combined influences of such pressures and
the natural tendency toward wish fulfillment, which exists whenever
exciting new theories are tested, have led in the past to a tendency to
ignore alternative hypotheses and on occasion even to suppress
evidence. It is such dangers that the FOIA and the other elements of
the APA guard against. The possibility of deliberate misbehavior may
be small, but over time an unconscious process sometimes develops
by which frightening results-such as racial bias caused by
inadequately validated criteria-can be collectively repressed. For
such reasons in part, some system of checks and balances at this new
macro-level seems necessary.
THE ARCHITECTURE OF GUIDELINES: THE PROBLEMS OF
DEFINING OFFENSE SEVERITY, BALANCING THE AXES,
AND THE QUESTION OF MULTIPLE TABLES

We turn now from problems connected with ranking the offender to
the problems of ranking the offense on the vertical axis of the Parole
Commission's guidelines, and to the relative balance that should exist
between the offense and the offender in the allocation of punishment.
Historical Versus Normative Guidelines: The Fly in Amber Problem.
Given the high statutory maximums that characterize our
criminal justice system, there are two basic options by which any
agency seeking to even out disparities can determine a relative
ranking of offenses. First, it can construct a normative scale, a scale
that ranks offense X as either morally more repugnant or socially more
injurious than offense Y but less so than offense Z. Here, the
arguments for public visibility require. little elaboration because
issues in this area are more comprehensible to the layman: Are white
collar criminals receiving overly lenient sentences; is the recidivist
being dealt with adequately? At this point at least, the structure of
S. 1437 seems adequate, because late in its drafting the Senate made
the notice and comment provisions of the APA applicable to the
agency's rulemaking activities. 8 2
The second option is to engage in historical averaging of past
sentencing practices. In short, one determines the average sentence
182. See id. § 994(r). This provision did not enter S. 1437 until the final committee draft
(Nov. 15, 1977).
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for a given crime over the recent past and, in the aggregate, thereby
achieves a ranking ostensibly representing an objective expression of
the judiciary's collective opinion. The Parole Commission essentially
followed such a descriptive rather than prescriptive course,' 83 and the
recent Sentencing Guidelines Project has pursued it even more
systematically.' 84 In both cases, however, the reason for taking such
an approach had to do more with the political illegitimacy of
permitting experts to make such obvious value judgments than with
the inherent desirability of using historical averages.
Appropriate as such deference to prior practice was in an
experimental project that lacked any legislative mandate to rank
offenses normatively, there is a potential problem here. The
momentum a successful research project develops may cause it to be
adopted by the Sentencing Commission, and S. 1437 mandates that
the Commission at least consider such historical averages.' 85 For
several reasons, however, this approach is objectionable.
First, such a descriptive model of historical averages can have the
effect of freezing sentencing practices in perpetuity like a fly in amber.
183. See Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, supra note 45, at 38-39. See also P.
O'DoNNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURrs, supra note 2, at 23, 53 (criticizing this approach). Dr.
Hoffman has told me that he considers it inaccurate to portray the Parole Commission's
guidelines as "historical" ones that are only "descriptive" of past sentencing practices rather
than "prescriptive," because the Commission has consciously modified its guidelines on several
occasions based on its normative judgments as to offense severity. It is debatable, of course, at
what point a few such adjustments convert guidelines founded on historical practices into
normative ones; arguably, such guidelines, even as adjusted, are considerably different from
those that might have been developed had the starting point been a pure normative ranking.
Interview with Dr. Peter Hoffman, Research Director, U.S. Parole Commission (Mar. 22, 1978).
In any event, my point is only to identify another sensitive low-visibility decision in the process
of structuring judicial discretion. This same choice of starting points-past averages or
normative rankings-will be faced repeatedly as more and more states turn to a guideline
system.
184. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 106. The Project's authors state:
The research which undergirds the guidelines developed and the guidelines
themselves are essentially descriptive, not prescriptive. They summarize expected
sentences in a given jurisdiction on the basis of recent practice, and they indicate
the relative weights given to what apparently are the most important factors
considered. They do not tell what either the sentences or the criteria ought to be.
This is at once an important limitation and a major strength."
Id In the Denver pilot project these descriptive guidelines accurately predicted in 90% of the
cases whether the sentencing judge would imprison the offender. Also, in 85% of the cases the
sentence imposed fell within one year of the range set by the guidelines. Id. at 81. Note, however,
that the focus of the predictive effort has changed; now the system is predicting the judge's
behavior, not the future conduct of the offender if released.
185. S.1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 124, § 9940) (1978) (instructing the Commission to
take into consideration the average sentences imposed in such categories of cases prior to the
creation of the Commission and the term actually served).
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If this happens we may attain consistency at the price of fairness,
because there are aspects of prior sentencing practices that we may not
wish to memorialize forever. The frequently heard allegation that
sentencing is racially biased is but one such example. 186 Do we wish
also to perpetuate past attitudes toward crimes like marijuana possession? Applied literally, the descriptive sentencing model has a
reactionary impact.
Moreover, such a frozen sentencing model undercuts the flexibility
and capacity to respond to changed circumstances; these are among
the chief attractions of the administrative agency model. 8 7 For
example, if a particular crime reaches epidemic level, the Commission
in theory could respond with tougher penalties much more quickly
than could the legislature and much more comprehensively than could
either individual judges or appellate courts.
Finally, a methodological problem accompanies the use of historical averaging to rank offenses. An element of double counting
can creep into the system when we combine historical averages with a
Salient Factor Score that measures the offender's likelihood of
recidivism. In a guideline matrix, one axis rates the crime and the
other, the criminal. Past sentencing averages do not, however express
only the courts' view of the relative severity of the offense.
Unquestionably, courts also base the sentences they impose on the
character of the offender before them. If the offense severity axis
necessarily incorporates some judgment about the relative dangerousness of individual criminals who commit certain crimes,
because that axis is partly based on an average of past sentencing
practices, and we then balance that axis against another that is
expressly aimed at judging the offender and not the offense, we
achieve a balance between the relative roles of the crime and the
criminal in the allocation of punishment that may tilt more in the
direction of the criminal than the crime. Thus, the balance may
unintentionally aggravate the problem of the status sensitivity of the
variables used to evaluate the offender.
It is of course premature to predict how a Sentencing Commission
will behave in this area. A "strong" one will probably opt for
normative guidelines; a "weak" one may seek the safety of following
precedent and point to S. 1437's mandate to consider historical.
averages. Although this approach would misinterpret the bill's

186. See note 74 supra.
187. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
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intent, 8 8 the need for political accountability again seems clear.
Balancing the Axes: The Overlap Issue.
What relative roles
should be given to the two axes? At first, it might seem obvious that
each should be weighted equally, and this is certainly the impression
that the matrix diagram initially conveys. In fact, the guidelines
adopted by the Parole Commission are not a direct function of either
axis, but instead have a high degree of overlap. Thus, a person
convicted of a low-severity offense might receive the same sentence as
someone who is convicted of a considerably more severe category of
offense but who has a better Salient Factor Score. 189
Inevitably, the designer of a guideline system must consciously plan
the balance between the two axes, and a continuum of options is
available. At one extreme the designer may simply use offender
characteristics to subdivide the guideline range for a given offense
severity level. Under such a "step" design, the sentencing ranges
between different offense severity levels do not overlap, much as the
individual step treads on a stairway do not. At present, no jurisdiction
has adopted such a system, but the new California determinate
,sentencing law points in this direction. 90
More likely, however, will be a different "step" design under which
the sentencing ranges for different offense levels do overlap. The
degree of this overlap is an issue of some jurisprudential importance,
because it in effect signals the position that a particular sentencing
structure occupies on the continuum between a retributive model
focused on the crime and an incapacitative model focused on the
criminal. The two simplified examples below will hopefully illustrate
this point:
188. Comm,. REP., supra note 3, at 1168 (expressly stating that "lilt is not intended that the
Sentencing Commission necessarily continue to follow the average sentencing practices of the
past"). The requirement of S. 1437 is only that the Commission inform and educate itself as to
these past practices. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., see. 124, § 994(1) (1978).
189. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
190. California's new determinate sentencing law supplies an illustrative counterpoint to the
Parole Commission's guideline system. Under the California statute the degree of possible
overlap between sentencing ranges for different crimes has been legislatively curtailed. See CAL.
PENAL CODE §§1170-1170.6 (West Supp. 1977). For most felonies the California law now
prescribes three time periods, and within this narrow range the California Judicial Council
formulates guidelines to determine whether the higher, lower, or middle sentence should be
imposed. For example, the crime of forcible rape is punishable by a three, four, or five year
sentence, id. § 264, while the crime of second degree murder is punishable by a five, six, or
seven year sentence. Id- § 190. Thus, the possibility that an offender committing a crime of
lesser severity but having a poor parole prognosis would receive the same or longer sentence as
an offender committing a crime of higher severity with a better parole prognosis is in most
instances reduced. For an introduction to the Byzantine complexity of the California statute, see
Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing In California:The New Numbers Game, 9 PACIFIC
L.J. 5 (1978).
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Table II
A "High Overlap" Incapacitation Model
Offense Severity

Level
High

'A ys
/ yrs.

7 yrs.

X
Medium

Low

I'l yr.

5 yrs.

6 mos.

4 yrs.

Offender Prognosis
Rating

A "Nonoverlap" Retributive Model
Offense Severity
Level
High
.

Medium

Low

13 yrs.

lyr.

. 5 yrs.

8 yrs.

5 yrs.

3 yrs.

Offender Prognosis
Rating
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In effect, the steeper the angle of inclination by which the steps of
each guideline range rise, the more we are moving away from a "just
deserts" model and toward the more indeterminate model favored by
the advocate of incapacitation.
Either design has its characteristic dangers: If there is little or no
overlap between the treads, then rapidly escalating sentence lengths
result as one moves up the offense severity scale. On the other hand, a
high degree of overlap is inconsistent with any common sense scale of
proportionality, and again raises the danger of allocating punishment
in a manner linked to status. Because this choice, or any of the choices
in between, involves an important balancing of values, this article has
argued that the process of choosing should be subjected to greater
public scrutiny.
Unity or Multiplicity. One, Two, Many Guideline Tables?
Logically, the first issue confronting a Sentencing Commission is how
many guideline tables to adopt. 191 By proliferating guideline tables we
do magnify the dangers of sentencing disparities, but it is difficult to
resist totally the arguments for multiplication. For example, a crime
considered of the highest severity in New York may not be so
considered in California. Also, given the phenomenon of prediction
shrinkage, the same factors on the Salient Factor Score are not
necessarily predictive to the same degree in all parts of the country.
Additionally, regional needs for deterrence and incapacitation may
differ.
The counterargument is that uniformity of application is an
important value in the administration of criminal justice. But how
strong is this value? If, for example, unemployment rates were at some
point high and persistent in one part of the nation-such as Detroit
during a downtrend in the automobile industry or Appalachia during a
lengthy coal strike-would it be fair to use an employment variable in
such a locality when it provided no distinctive information? To use
such a variable here approaches adopting a guideline that Appalachian coal miners deserve a marginally longer sentence than
average offenders. Arguments can also be advanced that separate
guideline tables should be used in the case of first offenders, women,
juveniles, or narcotics-induced offenses, and indeed the Parole

191. Hoffman and Beck acknowledge that "there maybe more homogenous subgroups within
the total sample... " covered by the Salient Factor Score. For these subgroups, "separate
ISlalient [Flactor IS]cores might be developed .... thus increasing overall predictive power."
Hoffman & Beck, supra note 110, at 203.
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Commission currently does so in the latter two cases. 1 92 It is difficult
to decide at what point we should stop on this slippery slope that
begins when we move from a single table to a few and ends with every
offender claiming a right to an individualized guideline table. Once
again, however, it is an issue about which the expert's claim to any
special competence seems tenuous.
A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

The foregoing is simply a partial checklist of the issues that a
Sentencing Commission should confront. In part, this article raises the
issues to highlight a different question: Whether the safeguards
attending the process of resolving these issues are adequate. To
answer this question, we might begin by noting that the existing
rulemaking agency within the judicial branch that most closely
parallels the contemplated Sentencing Commission is the Judicial
Conference.' 9 3 As a precedent, however, the recent history of the
Judicial Conference is not reassuring. Almost uniformly, recent
commentators have criticized its method of operation, citing a pattern
of excessive secrecy, an unwillingness to listen to the views of
interested groups, and a tendency not to disclose its deliberations
until after significant decisions have been made. 94 To some degree,
more safeguards are already built into S. 1437 than apply today to the
Judicial Conference. First, the Senate has made applicable section
553 of the APA, thus requiring prospective notice and an opportunity
to comment on proposed rules. 195 The Senate also inserted wellintentioned annual reporting requirements into the bill, although their
192. See Hoffman & DeGostin, supra note 45, apps. I, II & m[[. The use of the Salient Factor
Score on female offenders presents particularly troubling issues about the over-generalization of
its predictive ability. Because the Salient Factor Score was devised and validated on a heavily

male dominated population, there is little assurance that it performs equally well on women.
Inherently, factors predictive of male parole failure need not perform as well on females. Indeed,
a reasonable hypothesis might be the reverse. For example, the absence of an employment
history may show social instability in a male, but may correlate frequently with a highly stable
maternal background for some females. In fact, the unmarried "welfare" mother may face
negative incentives in seeking employment under the current structure of welfare regulations.
That feminists have not recognized these issues is again testimony to their invisibility.
193. See note 87 supra.
194. See MacKenzie, Dark DoingsAmong Judges, SATuRDAYREVEw, May 28, 1977 (probably
the harshest of these critiques decrying the "passion for secrecy" within the Judicial
Conference). Mr. MacKenzie was formerly the Supreme Court reporter for the Washington
Post. For more diplomatic assessments, see Lesnick, supra note 66, at 581-82, and Weinstein,
supra note 88, at 962-64 passim. Proposals by Senator Ervin and others that the Judicial
Conference conduct its meetings in public and give advance notice of its agenda apparently have
been rejected. See O'Keefe, Current Legal Literature, 63 A-B.A.J. 1143, 1145-46 (1977).
195. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 124, § 994(q) (1978).
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effectiveness is open to considerable question. 196 And last, it imposed
an obligation to consult with other interested agencies, including the
federal Public Defender's Office. 1 97 More glaring, however, are the
omissions: (1) the Freedom of Information Act, 19 8 (2) the "government in the sunshine" section of the APA,' 9 9 and (3) the judicial
review provisions of the APA.' 00
For the political reflex to work, the legislature must hold the
Sentencing Commission to the standards of an administrative agency.
To understand how a redesign along such lines might affect the
behavior of the agency, it is useful to consider a point best made by
Leslie Wilkins. Early researchers in criminology frequently were
confounded by the fact that the parole boards did not utilize the
elaborately developed predictive instruments specially designed for
their use. 20 ' This involved a misperception on the part of these
researchers: They simplistically believed that the parole board had
the same needs and interests as the research worker.20 2 In fact,
although the research worker tends to assume that everyone else
shares his goal of the best possible theory, Wilkins notes that the
public decisionmaker is interested less in accuracy than in "how
others will see his decision-will they (i.e., his public critics) regard
them as reasonable, fair, expedient, or unfair?" 203 He then adds: "In a
word, the assessment of a public decisionmaker is in terms of a value
system, not a rationalsystem. 20 4 Given the presently limited prospect
that existing constitutional doctrines will provide any satisfactory

196. See id. §§ 994(n), (p). In particular, subsection (p) seems intended to deal with the
problem of discriminatory impact since it requires judges to report data on "age, race and sex"
of the offenders they sentence. This requirement, however, misses the mark because it ignores
the specific impact of individual variables on the Salient Factor Score. Far more sophisticated
data must be recorded before any meaningful conclusions can be reached from them.
197. See id. § 994(m).
198. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976); notes 65-68 supra.
199. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
200. Id §§ 701-706. Both Judge Weinstein and an ABA committee have favored "some
method of appellate review at the behest of interested persons" when judicial guidelines are
promulgated. They have urged also that such review be divorced from the application of the
guidelines in any specific case because the facts will always be somewhat unique. Instead, review
should be on a generic basis "since the guidelines are designed to be implemented outside the
context of any particular case." Weinstein, supra note 88, at 960 (citing ABA PROPOSAL,
RECOMMENDED COURT PROCEDURE TO ACCOMMODATE RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS

(1976)).
201. Wilkins, supra note 55, at 223.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 224.
204. Id. (emphasis in original).
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remedy in this area, 20 the best remaining hope of those concerned
about the value of equality in dispositional decisionmaking seems to
be a strategy that forces the new agency to be more responsive to, and
more conscious of, its public critics. The administrative agency model
facilitates this process of politicization.
Alone, however, the administrative agency model is hardly
sufficient to achieve this goal. The public at large is neither
sophisticated about the criminal justice system nor particularly
interested in the ethics of punishment.2 6 Still, because of the overall
importance of the value of equality in our society, a constituency
concerned with these issues might be developed. Such a wishful
prophecy, however, points out long term needs that probably
overshadow even the desirability of conforming the structure of the
205. Put simply, the rational basis test of McGinnis seems satisfied by most prediction tables

that have been adequately validated. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). In
comparison to clinical or other individualized approaches, such categoric risk prediction lowers
the number of false positives. Thus, even if we say the least restrictive alternative must be used,
it is arguable that the prediction table already represents that alternative. See Coffee, supra note
13, at 1447-50. The limitations imposed by McGinnis on an equal protection challenge are
paralleled in the due process context by Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974). In
construing the Federal Youth Corrections Act requirement that the sentencing judge make a
finding of "no benefit" from treatment under the Act's special provisions before he sentenced an
eligible youth as an adult offender, the Court found the Act did not require an express finding
supported by a statement of reasons. Although the decision avoided the constitutional issues of
whether a statement of reasons is necessary at sentencing, id at 431 n.7, the decision seemingly
reaffirmed the traditional orthodoxy that a sentencing judge's discretion is largely unconfined.
Thus, it seems probable that prediction tables might be subjected to successful due process
attack under existing case law standards only if they are used without adequate prior validation
on the relevant offender population. In reaching this conclusion, however, it is necessary to
distinguish a recent case. In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 98 S.Ct. 1370 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that a pension plan's carefully validated mortality table that used gender as a factor
and thereby operated to the disadvantage of women-who live longer as a class and had to
contribute more under the pension plan-violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. If a
mortality table can be discriminatory in its choice of concededly accurate variables, it can then
be asked: Why is not a prediction table that uses racially sensitive variables equally
discriminatory? Aside from the inapplicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to sentencing, the
answer basically is that base expectancy rate tables do not expressly use race or gender as
variables, but only use factors that tend to overlap with these suspect classifications. The line
between General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1977), and Manhartis the line between a
plan that discriminated permissibly on the basis of a physical disability uniquely associated
with gender (i.e., pregnancy) and a plan that expressly uses gender as a variable. Strained as this
distinction may seem to many, it places variables that are merely racially sensitive on the
permissible side of that watershed. See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1975).
206. Judge Marvin Frankel has summarized well the problem of the inherently low public
visibility surrounding dispositional issues: "The subject lacks political 'sex appeal.' Neither
prisoners, nor judges nor prison and parole officials, nor all of them together, loom weightily in
legislative lobbies. When the spasms subside, things go on in the accustomed ways." Frankel,
supra note 63, § E, at 21, col. 1-2. He adds, however, that "a measure of sympathetic, if critical,
patience from an interested public" is part of the needed answer. Id.
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Sentencing Commission to that of a conventional administrative
agency. First, an institutionalized watchdog seems necessary; at this
macro-level, it should be the analogue of the adversarial safeguards
that protect the offender at the micro-level of individualized hearings.
How could it be achieved? The answers that currently can be given are
vague and largely unsatisfactory. The ABA, the Federal Public
Defender, and similar public institutions could allocate more of their
staff and budget to such an oversight responsibility. Greater
congressional oversight is also possible.207 Finally, there is even a case
for separating some of the Sentencing Commission's nonoperating
responsibilities-chiefly its research and monitoring duties-and
placing them in a different, more detached body having no potentially
conflicting duties. This step would appropriately recognize the
problems that exist when an agency both makes and reviews the
a
impact of the same decision. A formalized ombudsman is 2°also
8
possibility.
visionary
highly
a
moment
the
at
if
conceivable,
Second, a process of developing an educated constituency
concerned about dispositional decisionmaking is a necessary
concomitant to formalized oversight. Here it is only possible to exhort
public interest law firms, foundations, and academics to reexamine an
area that may now be in an epochal transition.
Like water and oil, values and technical expertise do not mix well.
To expect decisionmakers to respond with greater sensitivity to
problems of values in this area will ultimately require a public
consciousness that today is still at an embryonic stage.
207. Judge Weinstein has urged with respect to the promulgation of all federal judicial rules
that "Congress should retain the power to reject any proposed rule or amendment by joint
resolution within a limited period." Weinstein, supra note 88, at 963. He suggests a six-month
period. See also Lesnick, supra note 65, at 583-84. The "one House" veto or delaying power is
another possible measure, but it can easily result in deadlock between the two Houses. See 28
U.S.C. § 2076 (Supp. V 1975).
Judge Weinstein makes clear that his proposals are intended as a supplement, not an
alternative, to greater public participation in the rulemaking process. Weinstein, supra note 88,
at 959, 963-64.
208. Potentially, the Federal Public Defender seems the best candidate for the oversight role.
Giving it such a role would also make possible the fulfillment of the recommendation made by
Judge Weinstein, generalizing an ABA committee proposal that judicial review of proposed rules
should be implemented outside the context of any particular case. Weinstein, supra note 88, at
960 (citing ABA PRoPOsAL, RECOMMENDED COURT PROCEDURE TO ACCOMMODATE RIGHTS OF FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1976)). The appropriate standard of judicial review presents a difficult
issue that this article will largely bypass; nevertheless, rather than simply specifying a general
standard (substantial evidence or the like), Congress might give more specific substantive
directions. For example, the draftsmen might include a provision instructing the Commission to
avoid the use of criteria having a discriminatory impact unless they relate to relative
blameworthiness or unless they materially increase predictive efficiency. This type of legislative
direction would amount to a statutory "less restrictive alternative" test.
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B. THE MICRO-LEVEL: CAN DISCRETION BE
CONTROLLED WITHOUT A GUIDELINE SYSTEM?
Given the problems inherent in a Sentencing Commission, the
obvious questions that follow are whether such a guideline-drafting
agency is truly necessary, and whether sentencing disparities can be
controlled by more traditional methods, such as appellate review.
This section suggests that the prognosis is poor for any remedy that
does not follow the administrative agency model.
CONTROL OVER THE DATA-GATHERING PROCESS AND
THE SENTENCING BUREAUCRACY

We have today a system of trial by jury and sentencing by yenta.
Virtually any form of gossip, however stale, unsupported, or tenuous
in its relevance, on occasion will find its way into the presentence
report.20 9 The professionalization of the probation bureaucracy
coupled with the increased access to recorded information afforded
by computerization has intensified this problem of informational
quality. Presentence reports now contain allegations derived from
school, public, and clinical records that previously were shrouded by
the sheer logistical difficulty of obtaining records.
Reference to this trend usually generates a vague Orwellian sense of
unease, but the critical point lies elsewhere. Because the exposure of
different individuals to institutionalized recordkeel'ing varies greatly,
probably depending on factors such as location, social class, race, and
sex, the process is profoundly uneven. A methodology that simply
directs the probation bureaucracy to collect all the data available, as
most presentence manuals encourage, is a methodology that succeeds
only in compiling a lot of information about some people and less
about others. 210 The net result is not only impressionistic and possibly
biased in its effect, but it is also profoundly incongruent with what
dispositional authorities are attempting to decide. As the Parole
Commission recognized in developing an essentially comparative
methodology, the public decisionmaker is not as interested in
understanding the individual as a complex human being as he is in
assessing relative risk and offense severity against some benchmark
norms.
The popular conception that sentencing disparities are the product
of differing judicial philosophies-some "hard," some "soft"-is only
209. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 1374-96, 1399-1404.
210. Id. at 1398-99.
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partially accurate. In the main, judges tend to be idiosyncratic,
sometimes hard, sometimes soft."' This behavior is partly attributable to strong judicial personalities, resulting in individualistic
styles of sentencing, but it may also be the product of unstandardized
informational inputs that deny judges the means of seeing the basic
similarities and differences among cases. Further compounding the
question of what causes sentencing disparities is the possibility that
variations in styles and approach among different probation officers
may have a significant impact. As noted earlier, respected criminologists have suggested the probation officer may often be the critical
variable in the sentencing equation. 212 Whether the probation officer
has a law enforcement perspective or a social welfare one; whether he
writes his presentence report in a vivid, novelistic prose style or in a
cold, bureaucratic one; whether he edits out unverified information or
leaves the reliability of the data for the judge to determine-these and
other factors are likely to have an impact on the sentencing judge's
impression of the defendant, which is at least as important as whether
defense counsel was conscientious at sentencing. Viewed in this
broader perspective, the often erratic performance of the sentencing
judge may be explained frequently by factors external to him. The
lawyers' tendency toward a culture-bound vision of the legal system,
however, leads to the belief that the sentencing process is one in
which the only participants are lawyers and judges. Thus, the lawyer
as reformer relies on remedies like appellate review, which ignore the
impact of these extrinsic variables.
How should we respond to the problems of unequal and uneven
data available at sentencing? Here the model of a Sentencing
Commission offers the best hope. Although a Parole Commission
must rely to a great extent on information generated at the sentencing
stage, it has no control over this stage and so cannot act effectively to
upgrade the reliability of the information. A Sentencing Commission
can do so, for example, by adopting rules and policy statements
covering such matters as (1) the form and content of presentence
reports; (2) the kinds of verification a probation officer should obtain
before including speculative, uncorroborated information in the
presentence report; 213 and (3) the question whether certain classes of
211. A. PARTRIDGE &W. ELDRIDGE, supra note 10, at V (chapter summary). These authors
concluded after an elaborate empirical inquiry that "[vlery few judges are consistently severe or
consistently lenient relative to their colleagues. Almost all the judges are relatively severe in

some cases and relatively lenient in others." Id. See also id at 36-40 (explanatory tables).
212. See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
213. The obligation of the probation officer to verify certain questionable items of
information has been set forth in a string of cases beginning with United States v. Weston, 448
F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972). See Coffee, supra note 13, at 142529 (discussing right of defendant to require verification).
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stale or unreliable information, such as records of arrests not followed
by a disposition, old school or clinical records, and out-of-date police
files, should not be entirely excluded from the presentence report.214
Clearly, administrative rules dealing with these questions have the
potential of achieving more precisely tailored and balanced answers
than does a court examining them through the prism of constitutional
law. Moreover, it represents a more flexible approach, because unlike
a court exercising constitutional power or a sporadically active
legislature, an agency can retreat and seek a different accommodation
if the real cost of its reforms proves too high.
The Sentencing Commission may be, then, the serendipidous
answer to a problem its draftsman perhaps only vaguely contemplated: how to control the sentencing bureaucracy. There remains,
of course, the question whether S. 1437's Sentencing Commission has
the jurisdiction to exercise such a power, and if it does, whether it will
use it. Here, only a qualified "yes" may be given. Obliquely, S.1437
authorizes the Commission to "monitor the performance of probation
officers with regard to sentencing recommendations";2 15 to "issue
instructions to probation officers concerning the application of
Commission guidelines and policy statements";21 6 and to "devise and
conduct periodic programs of instruction" for all persons "connected
with the sentencing process. 217 On the other hand, S.1437 adopts
the provision found in 18 U.S.C. §3577 that the type of information
admissible at sentencing is unrestricted, a provision that some courts
have read to authorize the receipt of arrest records not followed by a
disposition at sentencing. 21 8 As revised, this new provision can be read
consistently with a power in the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate regulations covering the information usable at sentencing,
but an ambiguity remains.21 9
214. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 1377-96 (discussion of this issue).
215. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess, sec. 124, § 995(a)(9) (1978).
216. Id. § 995(a)(10).
217. Id. § 995(a)(11).
218. See id. § 3714 ("Admissibility of Evidence in Sentencing Proceedings"); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3577 (1970); Smithv. United States, 551 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1977) (utilizing section 3577 to
justify judicial reliance on records of arrest not followed by a conviction). But see United States
v. Haygood, 502 F.2d 166, 171 & n.15 (7th Cir. 1974), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 1114 (1975)
(defendant's failure to object allowed trial court to inquire for sentencing purposes into pending
charge on a separate offense; in dicta, court of appeals indicated that had defendant objected,
future prosecution of pending charge would be barred).
219. S. 1437 will rephrase 18 U.S.C. § 3577 so that information may not be received at
sentencing "to the extent that receipt and consideration of such information for purposes of
sentencing is expressly limited by a section of this title relating to sentencing or by any other
federal statute." S.1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 101, § 3714 (1978). Ifone reads section 3714
consistently with the authority given the Sentencing Commission by other sections of S.1437,
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The need for the Sentencing Commission to look beyond guidelines
to the nature of the informational inputs at sentencing is best
evidenced by the current absence of any institution seeking to
rationalize practices in this area. At present, the only force inducing
any degree of consensus and consistency among the approximately
30,000 presentence reports filed annually in different federal courts is
by the Administrative Office of the United
the manual prepared
.States Courts. 2 0 Manuals, of course, have inevitable limitations;
they
-give precatory advice when mandatory rules may be needed. In
addition, the rules they do create typify the low visibility decisionmaking that occurs in this area. Although few outside the sentencing
bureaucracy may ever read the Administrative Office's manual on the
preparation of presentence reports, its impact-both in the decisions
it makes and in those it fails to make-may well outweigh the effect of
most of the appellate court decisions on sentencing information. In
redrafting this manual, the Administrative Office recently made a
number of sensitive policy choices that once again were reached
22 1
without their effect, or their very existence, being widely perceived.
one can conclude that the Commission has the authority to standardize the information inputs at
sentencing notwithstanding the limitations in section 3714. See id § 3614, sec. 124, § 995(a)(9),
995(a)(10), 995(a)(11). In short, the authority granted the Commission can be read to constitute
"[an]other federal statute" within the meaning of the above quoted language of section 7314. Id.
§ 3714. On the other hand, the use of "expressly limited" can be read to rebut any such implied
power. See id
220. See PUBLICATION 105, supranote 105. The most recent data available on the number of
presentence reports filed annually shows that 29,492 full reports and 1,943 "limited" reports
were filed in 1974. M. HNDELANG, C. DUNN, L. SUTrrON & A. AuricK, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 615 (1975).

221. The Staff Committee that supervised the preparation of Publication105 was chaired by
a federal judge and consisted of seven probation officers, three officials of the Parole
Commission, two officials of the Bureau of Prisons, and four employees of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts. See PUBLICATION 105, supranote 105, at ii. The absence of a
representative from the Federal Public Defender, civil liberties groups, the practicing bar, or
academics (legal or non-legal) seems both noteworthiy and symptomatic, particularly given the
effort made in Publication105 to interpretrecent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Id
In a June 1977 cover letter enclosing a copy of Publication 105, the Assistant Chief of
Probation of the Adminstrative Office outlined the "sensitive" decisions reflected in the manual.
See Letter from Donald L. Chamlee to the Committee on the Administration of the Probation
System (June 28, 1977) (committee is composed of federal judges) (copy on file at the
Georgetown Law Journal).Recognizing that disclosure of the presentence report was "perhaps
the most sensitive issue" faced in preparing the manual, Mr. Chamlee somewhat apologetically
conceded that the "treatment of this subject may be controversial where disclosure is frowned
upon." Id (emphasis added). This statement underscores the difqcult position of the
Administrative Office, which, being exclusively responsible to the federal judiciary, may have
been influenced by a fear that a more expansive interpretation of rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure would have irritated federal judges unsympathetic to the purpose of that
rule. Mr. Chamlee also concedes that the "Recommendations and Plan" section of the
presentence report, which need not be disclosed under rule 32(c), "contains some items which
arguably could be disclosed." Id; see notes 228-32 infra and accompanying text.
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This result might have been different if the exercise of discretion had
been in the form of a proposed rule subject to the notice and comment
provisions of the APA.
The hand that writes the manual rules the sentencing bureaucracy;
that function should be performed by the Sentencing Commission. It
is not reassuring that the Administrative Office is effectively an
employee of the judiciary, while in contrast the Sentencing
Commission will be principally appointed by the President. 222 If one
needs an effective watchdog, one does not hire an employee of those
who are to be watched do the job. Bureaucracies, if they are regulated
at all, tend to be controlled best by those who set the standard
operating procedure. It is this role that an administrative agency such
as a Sentencing Commission can perform and an appellate court
cannot.
To sum up, if sentencing is a decisionmaking process in which
performance is a function of the quality of the informational inputs, a
difference between relying on a Sentencing Commission and relying
on appellate review without more becomes clear-only the former
approach affords prospective controls over the informational inputs.
TRIAL JUDGE SOVEREIGNTY: THE FORCE OF INERTIA

Institutional resistance to sentencing reform is another factor that
must be considered when assessing the merits of a Sentencing
The point here is not that Publication105 is a regressive document. In many ways, it contains
progressive changes, particularly with regard to the use of juvenile records, and the position of
the Administrative Office generally has been on the side of enforcing recent judicial precedents
expanding the right of disclosure. See note 230 infra (further discussion of issue). It seems likely,
however, that if Publication105 had been subject to public comment and scrutiny, as proposed

regulations of the Parole Commission and the Bureau of Prisons are at present, it would have
been a different document. In particular, I think civil liberties groups might have sought to
institutionalize the verification requirement set forth in United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626
(9th Cir. 1971), discussed at note 56 supra, and to curtail current evasions of the disclosure
obligation. See notes 228-31 infra. In marked contrast to Publication105, the need for a verification requirement applicable to presentence reports has been recognized and highlighted in several recent model sentencing codes. For example, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals provided in section 5.14(7) of its Standards on Corrections (1973),
as follows:
All information in the presentence report should be factual and verified to the
extent possible by the preparer of the report. On examination at the sentencing
hearing, the preparer of the report, if challenged on the issue of verification, should
bear the burden of explaining why it was impossible to verify the challenged
information. Failure to do so should result in the refusal of the court to consider
the information.
222. See S. 1437,95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 124, § 991(a) (1978). The President shall appoint
four members with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the Judicial Conference is
instructed to submit a list of seven nominees from which the President shall select three. Id. The
separation of powers issue thus raised by granting a nominating power to the Judicial Conference
is beyond the scope of this article. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118 (1976).
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Commission approach. 223 Because guidelines involve greater intrusion
on judicial autonomy, it is not surprising that they have been resisted
by the Judicial Conference, which suggests instead that reliance be
placed on greater substantive appellate review.2 24 If we look at the
recent empirical research on sentencing, however, a common pattern
emerges: Those reforms that do not place clear boundaries on the
sentencing judge's discretion seem to have had little effect.
The best example of this tendency for reform to be frustrated in
practice is the experience with sentencing councils. Under a
sentencing council procedure, the sentencing judge and two fellow
judges from the same bench all review the presentence report and
confer. 225 The intent, of course, is that such collegiality will produce
consensus, and at least the more extreme disparities will be evened
out. In fact, this has not happened to any substantial extent. In a
thorough statistical study, Zeisel and Diamond found that in the
districts they studied, the actual reduction in sentencing disparities
attributable to sentencing councils bordered on the trivial.226 Judicial
independence, it seems, persists.
Disclosure of the presentence report is a second recent reform that
has experienced a substantial bureaucratic nullification in actual
sentencing practice. In theory, the obligation to disclose certain
portions of the presentence report, now embodied in rule 32(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, should tend to upgrade the
reliability of the information used at sentencing. Upgrading should
occur by inducing the probation officer to filter out speculative or
unsupported charges that he knows defense counsel will contest and
that he may find embarrassing to defend. 227 There are fragmentary
223. Considerable comment has recently focused on this theme of judicial opposition to the
curtailment of sentencing discretion. See Robin, JudicialResistance to SentencingAccountability,
21 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 201 (1975); Zalman, A Commission Model of Sentencing, 53 NOTRE
DAmE LAW. 266,284-85 (1977). These criticisms underscore the need for according a fairly strong
presumption to the guidelines of any Sentencing Commission.
224. See P. O'DoNNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CuRsis, supra note 2, at 94. The Judicial
Conference instead has favored amendment of rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to permit discretionary appellate review. Id. at 64.
225. See Zavatt, Sentencing Procedure in the United States District Court for the Eastern
Districtof New York, 41 F.R.D. 469 (1966); M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 70-71; P. O'DoNNELL,
M. CHURGIN & D. CuRTs, supra note 2, at 17-18.
226. Diamond & Zeisel, Sentencing Councils:A Study of Sentence Disparityand Its Reduction,
43 U. Cm. L. REv. 109, 147-49 (1975) (finding the average disparity between judges,
approximately 40%, reduced by only about 10% through use of sentencing councils).
227. Certainly, this was the intent of Congress when adopting rule 32 in its present form. The
House Report to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89
Stat. 376, states simply: "itis essential that the presentence report be completely accurate in
every respect." H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975).
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indications that this has sometimes occurred,2 28 but, as a forthcoming
Federal Judicial Center study has found,22 9 the disclosure obligation
often has been outflanked by a variety of means. The more damaging
or speculative information now is being included in the confidential
23 °
recommendation section of the report that need not be disclosed.
Alternatively, such information may be relayed by supplemental
communications to the court or during ex parte conferences between
23 1
the probation officer and the sentencing judge. To their credit some
federal judges have objected, but these judges seem to be the
exception rather than the rule. 23 2 In the meantime, defense counsel
cannot challenge what he does not see.
228. The Chief Probation Officer of the District of Columbia Federal Probation Office has
advised his staff to cease "our previously accepted practice of placing so-called 'confidential'
information on the Recommendation page of the pre-sentence report" (the page that need not be
disclosed under rule 32(c)). Memorandum from James R. Pace to District of Columbia
probation staff (June 17, 1977) (emphasis added) (copy on file at the Georgetown Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited as Pace Memorandum]. At the same time he advised his staff that "all
allegations regarding a defendant's alleged criminal acitivity, either involving the pending case or
unrelated illegal behavior, should not be commented on by the pre-sentence writer unless the
information in question can be verified." Id. (emphasis in original). The Memorandum further
"nstructs the staff that if law enforcement sources for such information are unwilling to agree to
appear in court and document charges in the event the defense counsel contests them, "... you
should omit the information in question .... "
It seems, then, that as a greater obligation to disclose more information is recognized, more
internal editing and screening of unverified information will occur.
229. Since the summer of 1977, two former students of mine, Stephen Fennell and Phillip
White, both members of the Class of 1978 at Georgetown University Law Center, have been
conducting an elaborate study for the Federal Judicial Center of current practices in federal
probation offices with respect to rule 32(c). They have accummulated extensive statistical and
empirical data through interviews and questionnaires, which I will not attempt to summarize
prior to its publication.
230. See note 228 supra (discussion of this phenomenon). The Pace Memorandum also
indicates that the District of Columbia's cessation of using the undisclosed Recommendation
page for the most damaging information was "prompted by the position of the General Counsel
for the Administrative Office," and by "at least one of the judges of this court." Pace
Memorandum, supranote 228. That the General Counsel of the Administrative Office took such
a position suggests that the problem is not an isolated one. Messrs. Fennell and White, the
authors of the forthcoming Federal Judicial Center Study, have informed me that in their study
they found similar practices fairly common.
231. Again, I rely here principally on conversations with Messrs. Fennell and White, who
visited a number of Federal Probation Offices during the summer of 1977 as part of the Federal
Judicial Center Study. Also found in the Pace Memorandum was a suggestion that the probation
officer might notify the court "via a separate memo" when it acquired "damaging information of
a 'hearsay' nature" that had to be excluded from the main presentence report because it was
unverified. Pace Memorandum, supranote 228 (emphasis added). Under this approach, it would
be left to the courts to request to see the supplemental information. Obviously, there is
considerable question whether such an approach complies with rule 32 (c) unless defense counsel
is given an adequate summarization of the information or unless one of the exceptions under rule
32(c) applies.
232. The Pace Memorandum notes that at least one judge in that court had objected to the
inclusion of confidential information on the undisclosed Recommendation page. See note 228
supra; Pace Memorandum, supra note 228.
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A last example of institutional inertia is the fate of recently adopted
rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Adopted after
much study and debate, 23 3 that rule permits a new form of plea
bargaining under which prosecution and defense make an agreement
as to sentence length, and then present it to the court for ratification.
The judge may accept the bargain by adopting the sentence
contracted, or he may reject it23 4 and recuse himself. 235 This
procedure attempts to protect the defendant from an illusory plea
bargain under which he surrenders his right to trial in return for only
an expectation of what the court might do-a trade, some have
warned, in which the defendant often gives up something for
nothing. 23 6 Again, what has happened in practice? By circulating a
questionnaire to United States Attorneys throughout the nation in
early 1977, one researcher has come to the conclusion that the new
rule has had virtually no impact.237 Reports of anything approaching a
rule 11(e) plea agreement occurred only in a few isolated instances.
233. For the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1975 Amendments to rule 11, see 62 F.R.D.
271, 277 (1974). See also United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 1976) (judicial
promise of sentence within agreed-upon range improper when rule 11(e) procedure not
followed); Note, Revised Federal Rule 11: Tighter Guidelines for Pleas in Criminal Cases, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 1010 (1976) (review of changes in new rule); Note, Restructuring the Plea
Bargain,82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972) (urging elimination of unregulated plea bargaining; advising
that pre-plea stage be restructured to include advocacy proceeding in which judge takes
responsibility for concessions defendant receives for plea).
234. FED. R. CRmL P. 11(e)(5), 11(e)(4).
235. See United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 204 (2d Cir. 1976) (judge "steeped" in
knowledge of defendant's guilt and who has expressed opinion of punishment probably should
recuse self from presiding at trial).
236. See Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975)
(arguing in part that the economic pressures on the defense attorney induce him to accept and
indeed seek valueless bargains under which only trivial concessions are made by the state, such
as the dropping of a token number of counts from the indictment); Finkelstein, A Statistical
Analysis of Guilty PleaPracticesin the FederalCourts, 89 HARv. L. REV. 293 (1975) (arguing that
a significant percentage of those who plead guilty would not in fact have been convicted at trial).
237. In 1977 a questionnaire was circulated to 90 U.S. Attorneys, of which only 20
responded, some incompletely. See Zokoff, The Use of Sentencing Recommendations in Plea
Bargains:A Survey (unpub. 1977). Generally, those who responded indicated thatjudges in their
District saw the rule 11(e) procedure as "an invasion of the sentencing provinces of the judge."
Id. at 5. Several reported that although requests had been made by defense counsel to use the
rule 11 (e) procedure, they had been uniformly denied. 1d. at 4, 5, 7, 10. Instances of actual use of
the rule 11(e) plea agreement procedure were extremely rare. The response from the U.S.
Attorney for the District of Connecticut noted that the procedure had been used once during
1976 (case load of roughly 250 cases) and only in an "extraordinary" situation. Id. at 5. An
Assistant U.S. Attorney in Kansas reported that it has been used twice before a local court rule
prevented its further use. 1d at 6. Several U.S. Attorney Offices-those in Baltimore, Maryland,
the Northern District of West Virginia, and Wyoming-reported procedures roughly paralleling
rule 11(e) under which the prosecution either concurred in, or failed to object to, a sentence
recommendation from the defense counsel. Id. at 7-9. But these procedures lack the protection
of rule 11(e) under which the bargain is finalized before the plea of guilty is made.
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More typical were the U.S. Attorneys' statements that federal judges
they dealt with would not permit such an intrusion on their autonomy.
Elsewhere, U.S. Attorneys themselves barred participation in such
plea agreements.2 38
Behind the uniformly limited impact of these three reformssentencing councils, rule 32(c), and rule 11(e)-a common pattern is
discernible that we will label "trial judge sovereignty." Judicial
prerogatives appear zealously guarded even if those behind the throne
might actually have the decisive influence on the outcome of the
sentencing decision.
THE LIMITS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Against this backdrop, the competing merits of substantive
appellate review versus a guideline system look uneven. Studies of
state systems of appellate review find such review to have at best a
modest impact, generally limited to egregious cases. 239 Commentators
tend to agree that appellate review alone seldom yields clearly
articulated standards or criteria to guide the sentencing judge in
future decisions. 240 Requiring the judge to explain his decision has
similarly been found to produce boilerplate reasons, cited to
rationalize a result actually reached on other grounds.24 1 Indeed, by
particularizing the case at hand by stating, for example, that the
defendant seemed "manipulative and unrepentant," the sentencing
judge who wishes to protect his autonomy can utilize the statement
requirement as a means of insulating his decision from effective
review. Eventually, a laundry list of approved reasons for variation
from the normal range might develop that the intransigent judge could
use to justify desired results in all cases of less than extreme variation
238. See United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting the "longstanding" opposition of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York).
239. R. DAWSON, SENTENCING 217, 388-89 (1969); Dix, Judicial Review of Sentences:
Implications for Individual Dispositions, 1969 LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER 369, 403-05; Note,
Appellate Review of PrinaiySentencing Decisions:A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453
(1960).
240. P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 64; see SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 6 ("appellate courts tend to reach decisions on an ad hoc basis
without always considering whether or not there should be a considered overreaching policy
behind them").
241. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 10, at 928-35. The authors conclude: "Merely requiring
reasons from the sentencing judge or from the review board is unlikely to help much...."Id. at
934. See Hoffman &DeGostin, supranote 36, at 198 (noting that "the mere statement of reasons
has not had a great impact on disparity, and that the reasons given are usually pro forma or brief
rationalizations of the sentence after the fact" (citing Rubin, Disparity and Equality of
Sentence-A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55, 57 (1966)).
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from the sentencing norm. The most careful recent study of appellate
review systems concluded that even when the sentencing court in
good faith tries to explain its reasons, the appellate review process is
still normally informed only by "intuitive and hence vague Gestalt
perceptions." 24 2 The basic problem, Zeisel and Diamond argue after
in-depth examination of Massachusetts and Connecticut sentencing
review procedures, centers around the absence of any common point
of reference from which the reviewing body can calibrate whether the
reason advanced justifies a sentence increase or reduction, and if so,
by what amount. "Word reasons" will suffice as full explanations, they
decided, only when they establish "rules that translate circumstances
into points on the sentencing scale." 243 In short, the best analogy is to
the old story of seven blind men studying an elephant; each reports a
different salient feature. The sentencing judge is, of course, not blind
and may see the entire elephant, but the appellate court receiving his
cursory statement of reasons is in the position of someone hearing the
blind man's tale. Unless we can standardize the sentencing judge's
statement of reasons into a more inherently comparable document,
such as a sentencing scale, the reviewing court will be reading
descriptions of trunks and tails without knowing that it is the same
animal involved in both cases.
Such a conclusion brings us full circle to the point made earlier that
sentencing is a decisionmaking process which, to be controlled, must
be analyzed as a problem in cognitive psychology and not simply in
terms of the-reach of the due process clause. Due process conceivably
can require a statement of reasons, but even at its highest watermark
it cannot compel the sentencing scale and tariff system that Zeisel and
Diamond's research suggests is necessary. The constitutional
perspective may therefore point us toward the wrong remedy to the
extent that it acts as a set of intellectual blinders. From the
considerations surveyed in this section, guidelines in the form of a
sentencing scale appear essential if our goal is not simply to
"constitutionalize" sentencing but is also to achieve a methodologically stable decisionmaking structure. In turn, although guidelines do not strictly require a Sentencing Commission for their
implementation, it nonetheless seems clear that in a multi-circuit
judiciary such a guideline-drafting agency provides the most direct
route to the goal of consistency in decisionmaking.
242. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 10, at 938.
243. Id- at 933. While successful English experience with appellate review of sentences is
frequently cited by advocates of this reform, Zeisel and Diamond have concluded that the
English system is in reality a guideline system in which the generally accepted "tariffs" for
various crime-offender combinations are taken from the treatise of a leading commentator. Ict at
934. "All power to the academics," however, seems the least accountable of possible solutions.
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SUMMARY

A guideline-drafting agency such as a Sentencing Commission
poses both opportunities and dangers that are without real precedent.
So far, this article has argued that the opportunities probably
outweigh the dangers, particularly if the visibility of the process can
be raised. To reject wholly the use of categoric techniques in a
criminal justice system that must assess offenders on a mass basis
seems increasingly to place oneself in a position equivalent to that of
the Luddites in their losing battle with the knitting frame. As with the
machinery attacked by the Luddites, the base expectancy rate table is
the sentimental, but not the real issue. Rather, the real problem
centers around controlling the social consequences that flow from
these prediction techniques. Just as accepting the inevitability of the
knitting frame in 19th-century England did not imply the necessary
acceptance of mass unemployment, so too can we distinguish between
categoric prediction and prediction based on status.
Beyond this obvious point about the need to consider and control
fully the consequences of any major change in criminal justice practice
and ideology, a subtler observation should be made about the
significance of guidelines. "Structuring discretion" sounds like a
neutral goal, and perhaps it can be. There are distinct possibilities,
however, that the process of structuring discretion may tilt it in
directions no one intended. In particular, the behavior of legal
decisionmakers under a guideline system may be altered in two highly
significant respects.
First, it has been observed that lawyers as a class focus instinctively
on issues involving the fairness of allocations.24 4 In contrast, such
issues tend to be downgraded to a "second order" status by social
scientists who characteristically prefer to concentrate on the
attainment of maximum efficiency. Thus, when social scientists
"structure" legal decisionmaking, their unconscious bias may be to
reduce the emphasis given to issues of distributive fairness. There
may be less inquiry into whether a decision that maximizes efficiency
has an unfair or disproportionate impact on some discrete subgroup
within the total population affected. For example, the continued use
244. A respected economist has recently acknowledged that disciplines other than law are
frequently myopic about questions of allocation. Professor Peter Steiner has recently written:
"Reformers, lobbyists and true believers ignore the problem of redistribution, while economists
label it '2nd order,' which is our technical phrase for something we are about to neglect. Lawyers
embrace redistribution; they can revel and cavort in the quicksand where others sink." Steiner,
Legal Success and Legal Failure,22 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES 19, 20 (1977). Why o lawyers so
focus on issues of allocation? They implicitly know, Steiner has asserted, that "process is vital to
the integrity of the outcome." Id- This phrase defines the problem of accountability that this
article has sought to raise with respect to categoric risk decisions.
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of the Salient Factor Score to evaluate the parole prognosis of female
offenders, despite the fact that the table was validated on a heavily
male sample, 245 presents an issue of "over aggregation": Are women
offenders being wrongly lumped into a broader pool and thus judged
by criteria having no proven relevance to them? Such an issue, once
raised, is one to which lawyers can respond with enthusiasm and apply
their well-developed notions of equity and procedural regularity. For
many social scientists, however, this is a question of only second order
significance because, given the low percentage of women offenders,
little increase in aggregate predictive power is likely if adjustments are
made.
Second, as one commentator has recognized in a related context,
attempts to quantify a legal process tend to result in the "dwarfing of
soft variables. 2 4 6 Quantification may be achieved, but often at the
cost of draining the decisional process of its most meaningful inputs,
namely those types of information that cannot be reduced to
standardized, fungible units of data.247 Characteristically, such soft
variables will relate to the "volition, knowledge, and intent" of the
individual under examination, 248 and thus the danger in formally
structuring the decisionmaker's discretion is that the process will tend
to downgrade these jurisprudentially critical considerations.
Such a tendency toward dwarfing soft variables can be observed in
the Parole Commission's recent experience. As noted earlier, the
Salient Factor Score is focused on objective variables, such as the
number of prior convictions or parole revocations, rather than on
"softer" variables, such as the gravity of those prior incidents.2 4 9

245. See note 192 supra.
246. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:Precisionand Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329, 1361 (1971).
247. Professor Tribe writes: "The syndrome is a familiar one, If you can't count it, it doesn't

exist. Equipped with a mathematically powerful intellectual machine, even the most sophisticated
user is subject to an overwhelming temptation to feed his pet the food it can most comfortably
digest." Id at 1361-62.
248. Id at 1365-66.
249. See notes 123-26 supra and accompanying text.
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More inmportantly, the intent and volition of the offender are almost
wholly ignored. Yet, uniformly, recent model sentencing codes have
agreed that in order to reach ajust sentence, the dispositional decisionmaker must focus on exactly these soft variables. 2 0 To be sure, a
guideline system does not inherently require that these variables
be ignored, but, if only some 5 to 6% of the Parole Commission's
decisions are presently being made below guideline ranges that
ignore these soft variables, 251 then a tendency toward such "dwarfing"
seems apparent. In essence, these soft variables require the dispositional authority to make a moral judgment about the offender's
intent or volition. If, as appears, that moral judgment is minimized by
a guideline system, then we have an operational methodology that is
at least out of synchronization with our normative theory of
punishment.
This conclusion does not mean, however, that the goal of
structuring judicial discretion must be rejected and sentencing
guidelines abandoned. The new criminologist has built an impressive
machine, and the goal therefore should be to control rather than
destroy. Here, that means seeking to structure the soft variables that
250. For example, among the criteria that section 7.01(2) of the Model Penal Code directs the
court to consider are the following "soft variables," which clearly cannot be compressed within the
framework of a standardized sentencing matrix:
(b) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or
threaten serious harm;
(c) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;
()" The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur,
(i) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to
commit another crime.
§ 7.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The current draft of the proposed
Uniform Sentencing and Corrections Act also adopts the first three of these factors and adds that
it shall be a mitigating factor if the offender lacked "substantial judgment in committing the
offense" because of his youth or old age, or if "substantial grounds exist tending to excuse or
justify the defendant's conduct, though failing to establish a defense." Uniform Sentencing and
Corrections Act §3-108 (Tentative Draft March 1, 1978). The Judicial Council of the State of
California has similarly adopted sentencing rules that place special emphasis on the volition and
intent of the defendant. Under its rule 423 ("Circumstances in Mitigation"), it is a mitigating
factor if the defendant "exercised caution to avoid harm to persons or damage to property," if he
"mistakenly believed his conduct was legal," or if he "was motivated by a desire to provide
necessaries for his family or himself." CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, SENTENCING RULES FOR THE
SUPERIOR COURTS, RULE 423 (effective July 1, 1977). See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMiSSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, STANDARDS ON CORRECTIONS §5.2(3) (1973); TASK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, supra note 2, at 44-45.
MODELPENAL CODE

251. See note 47 supra.
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we value back into the decisionmaking process. In this light, issues
that might seem only tangentially related to questions of values may
turn out to have a significant impact on them. For example, an
unrecognized advantage of a Sentencing Commission structure over
the current Parole Commission system of de facto appellate review
may be that the former provides a much superior vehicle for
accommodating this kind of compromise between values and
methodology. Both because the sentencing judge can be more reliably
instructed to deviate from the normal guidelines when a soft variable
is present than can an administrative hearing examiner, and because
appellate review would exist under such a structure to ensure that
issues of volition and intent were not ignored, a Sentencing
Commission system is likely to outperform any administrative review
system, such as the Parole Commission's.252
So far, only the argument for greater accountability has been
advanced, but ultimately this is an incomplete prescription. At some
point a more rigorous explanation must be given of why it is unfair to
use status criteria when we are neither imposing punishment
disproportionate to the severity of the offense nor, let us assume,
using an unsound methodology. Can we articulate a reasoned position
that rests on more than an intuitive sense of unfairness?
It is to this problem that we now turn.
IV. DEFINING THE ROLE OF EQUALITY IN THE AGE OF THE
PREDICTION TABLE: CAN PREDICTABILITY AND FAIRNESS
BE BALANCED?
The development of validated prediction tables may prove a
traumatic event in the history of jurisprudential thought about
punishment. Until recently jurisprudential scholars have tended to
focus more on who may be punished than on how much one may be

252. Under a sentencing commission structure, the special function of the sentencing judge
might in fact be to focus on such soft variables by determining whether mitigating or aggravating
factors specified by the legislature or the commission were present, thus justifying departure from
the presumptive guidelines promulgated by the commission. In contrast to the parole release
determination, there would then be an opportunity for appellate review of his decision, at least
when he found such a factor present. S. 1437, however, does not contain a list of factors similar to
those set forth in the Model Penal Code. See note 250 supra.
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punished. 25 3 Preoccupied by the insanity defense, 2 4 they have
debated vigorously the case of the individual whose culpability is
mitigated by a diminished capacity for responsibility, but have failed
to give much attention to the case of the individual who is admittedly
guilty but still insists that punishment disproportionate to his degree
of culpability violates his rights. Nevertheless, just as the insanity
defense once focused jurisprudential concern on developing a theory
of criminal responsibility, so may the prediction table equally rivet
debate to the allocation of punishment.
Legal theorists have neglected punishment allocation in some
measure because of the influence of a distinction drawn by H.L.A.
Hart, long the leading scholar in this area. In a seminal essay Hart
argued that different principles apply depending on whether one
was debating the "justifying aim" of punishment or the rules for its
distribution.2 55 By separating the issue of justification from that of
253. John Rawls was probably the first modem jurisprudential philosopher to focus on why,
under a utilitarian theory of punishment, we are not justified in punishing the innocent even
though in a given case the social utility of the deterrence thus obtained would outweigh the cost to
the innocent defendant. See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in PUNISHMENT 58, 60-62 (J. Feinberg
& H. Gross eds. 1975). Rawls sought to demonstrate that crude utilitarian arguments always
proved too much and, unless constrained, would justify arbitrary results. A more sophisticated
utilitarian position, he said, would acknowledge that unless legal excuses, such as insanity, were
recognized, far more social anxiety and insecurity would be produced than increased deterrence,
because the innocent as well as the guilty would be aware that they were subject to sanctions
whenever it benefited the majority to apply them. See id
The justification of legal excuses such as the insanity defense, diminished responsibility, and
the absence of mens rea is one of the focal points in the highly respected work of former Oxford
Professor of Jurisprudence HL.A. Hart. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
(1968). On the American scene, the late Herbert Packer of Stanford elaborated the arguments
supporting the view that even a system keyed to crime prevention must limit its reach by
recognizing legal excuses-that it must focus on past conduct rather than future propensity. See
HL PACKERTHE LIMITS OFTHE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); text accompanying notes 294-309 infra.
254. In response to attacks by utilitarian critics, Professors Hart and Packer lately have
focused on the insanity defense and mens rea requirement as preconditions to the imposition of
punishment. Lady Barbara Wootton, a British magistrate and author, has been the most
outspoken critic. She has attacked in particular the'idea that intent should be a prerequisite to
punishment in a criminal justice system that focuses on the "forward-looking aims of social
protection." B. WOOTTON, CRIME ANDTHE CRIMINALLA, in RESPONSmILrrY 139 (J. Feinberg& H.

Gross eds. 1975) (quoting H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 27-28 (1968)). Wootton has argued
succinctly that legalistic requirements of personal responsibility are intellectual antiques, bearing
no reasonable relation to the goal of prevention. Under her formulation, mental condition is
relevant not to the issue of guilt, but to the choice of the treatment or sanction most likely to
prevent future infractions. See B. WOOTTON, supra at 144-47; B. WOOTTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND

SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1958) (examining roots of antisocial behavior from sociological perspective);
text accompanying note 284 infra. Hart has responded in detail to Lady Wootton, who appears to
have succeeded in defining the parameters of the recent jurisprudential debate over punishment.
See H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 178-80; Gross, Introduction, in RESPONSIBILITY, supraat 9-11
(overview of the Wootton-Hart exchange).
255. H.L.A. HART, Prolegomen to the Principles of Punishmen in PUNISHMENT AND RE-

SPONSIBILITY, supra note 253, at 3-4, 8-13. This same distinction has also been made by Rawls. See
Rawls, supra note 253, at 58.
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allocation and by giving a priority to justification, with all its corollary
questions of legal excuses, mental defenses, and the role of mens rea,
Hart shaped the contours of debate for the next decade. His brief and
essentially common sense account of the issues of equality and
proportionality in turn may have led others to dismiss these questions
as unworthy of serious analysis.25 6 In any event, until recently they
have experienced a period of at best benign neglect and at worst
express subordination. Indeed, Hart himself argued that when a
conflict arose between his answer to the issue of justification (for
Hart-prevention) and his answer to the issue of allocation (basically,
that like cases be treated alike), the former should prevail.25 7 In short,
the goal of prevention outweighed the goal of equality.
Following Hart's lead, jurisprudential debate over punishment has
centered on the tension between the preventive justification of
punishment and the limiting concept of responsibility. 2 8 As a partial
consequence, an ironic time lag is now discernible: Although the
current popular dissatisfaction with sentencing stems principally from
problems perceived at the allocation level, contemporary theorists are
still directing their proposals for change at the theories justifying
punishment, not at the allocation problem itself. Today, most
observers agree that any attempt to individualize punishment
according to the character of the offender will yield frequently
arbitrary disparities as its predictable byproduct. 2 9 Yet, although this
criticism is aimed at deficiencies at the allocation level, critics as
diverse as James Wilson 260 and the American Friends Service
256. Hart analyzes the distribution issue in two steps: who maybe punished and howimuch may
one be punished. H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 11. In his Prolegomenon to the Principles of
Punishment, Hart discussed the justification of legal excuses at length, asserting that their value
lies in the security they provide to law-abiding citizens that society will intervene only in the lives
of those who have freely broken its commands. Id. at 13-24. With respect to the question of
amount, Hart briefly advocates a proportional system of penalties according to a "commonsense
scale of gravity." Id. at 25. Not to recognize the principle of proportionality, he argues, would
confuse common morality and as a result reduce public respect for the law, thereby interfering
with our goal of prevention. Id. at 24-25. Thus, his justification for an allocative principle of
proportionality is essentially utilitarian, focused as it is on maximizing crime prevention.
257. See text accompanying notes 275-79 infra.
258. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 253, at 71-136; Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and
DiminishedResponsibilityDefenses: 7Tvo Children of a DoomedMarriage,77 COLUht L. REV. 827
(1977) (review of the recent legal literature). See also United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969
(D. C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (mental disease ordefectbars imposition of criminal responsibility if as
result thereof defendant lacks substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness of conduct and to
conform to legal requirements). The recent works of the American Friends Service Committee
and Professors Morris, von Hirsch, and van den Haag indicate that the emerging debate will
concentrate on the issue of amount. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
259. See notes 1 & 10 supra.
260. See note 2 supra.
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Committee 26 1 have argued in response that we should therefore
change the justifying aim of punishment from rehabilitation to
deterrence, in large part to minimize irrational disparities at the
allocation level. This view inverts Hart's rule of priority by evaluating
the justifying aims of punishment in terms of the allocative results
they yield. Judging theories by the results they produce may be
inevitable. Certainly, this practice helps explain the current popularity of retributive theories of punishment, which seem intended to
maximize equality among offenders. But can we not formulate an
allocative model for punishment that achieves the same result more
directly, with less subterfuge?
The initial problem with such a quest is that the meaning of equality
in this contest is not self-evident. To illustrate: Consider the almost
universally held allocative principle that like cases should be treated
alike. Does this mean we should consider individuals who have
committed the same number and grade of offenses as the relevant
class of similarly situated persons, even though they are unlike in
terms of their statistical likelihood of future recidivism? Or do we
consider individuals to be similarly situated if they share the same risk
level in terms of their statistical propensity to commit future criminal
acts, even though one may have committed less culpable or fewer
offenses than the other? Intuitively, most of us would argue for the
first definition of equality because we view the issue from a
retrospective frame of reference, but an adversary who takes a
prospective view could make a serious argument for the second
definition. We need, then, something more in a theory of punishment
than an ability to produce the desired results. As Hart pointed out,
discussions of this type are haunted by the tendency to define critical
controversial words in a way that cuts off the debate semantically, but
'26 2
fails to convince-what he termed the "definitional stop fallacy.
The real issue here is whether allocative fairness should be decided by
looking forward or backward in defining who is similarly situatedforward to future risks or backward to past culpability.
This issue is hardly new. Long before utilitarianism was a gleam in
any philosopher's eye, Plato argued that a backward-looking model
that tried to match punishment with the harm caused was pointlessly
punitive; it was as futile, he said, as "lashing a rock."26' 3 The
utilitarians agreed, and argued that punishment should be imposed so
that it advances the social welfare at the lowest possible cost to
261. See note 1 supra.
262. H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 5-6.
263. Id at 163 (quoting Protagoras).The past deed in his view is relevant only as a symptom
and hence could not in itself constitute the measure by which punishment was to be allocated. Id
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individual freedom. 2" The allocative rule resulting from such a costbenefit analysis is simply to use the least drastic means: If two
techniques will produce the same level of social protection, employ
the one that causes less human suffering. In our own time, this starting
point has led to widespread acceptance of the idea that we should
differentiate between high-risk and low-risk offenders in assigning
punishment 26 5-a goal that validated prediction tables have now made
feasible.
The opposite perspective also boasts a rich historical heritage.
Immanuel Kant was the prime opponent of the utilitarian justification
of punishment. He synthesized the retributionist's rebuttal, arguing
that punishment was necessary to restore the social balance thrown
out of equilibrium by the offender's misbehavior.26 6 Because the
offender has gained an unfair advantage over his fellows, this
argument continues, society must punish him in proportion to the
severity of his offense in order to uphold the social contract by which
all have agreed to restrain their own self-interests.2 67 Even if it
achieved no utilitarian end, the demand for punishment was for Kant
inexorable: Society must impose the punishment deserved or else
8
become the equivalent of coconspirator in the original offense. 26
Although this rule seems harsh and inflexible today, the new
retributionists have recognized that it is also in one respect humane,
because the offender can only be punished to the extent warranted by
his offense. To punish him more, whether to rehabilitate him or to
deter others, violates Kant's categorical imperative: treat each man as

264. Bentham recognized the need to consider the offender's suffering as one of the costs to be
balanced against the social benefits to society. J. BENTHIAMPrinciples of PenalLaw, in 1 WORKS
398 (1843), quoted in F. ZMIRING & G. HAWImNs, DETERRENCE 42 (1973). Recent respected
commentators also have postulated this idea as one of the fundamental principles of a "morally
tolerable" system of punishment. See F. ZMIRING & G. HAWKINS, supra at 42-43, 51-61.
265. See PRISONERS INAMERICA (L. Ohlin ed. 1973) ("High risk offenders may be required to
serve fixed periods of time. Low risk offenders should be released to community-based programs
as soon as possible"), quoted in N. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 63.
266. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2, at 47-49 (concise summary of Kant's position); F.
ZIMING& G. HAWINS, supranote 264, at 35-37 (same); Gardner, supranote 39, at796-97 (same).
267. Von Hirsch expressly adopts this position in Doing Justice,supranote 2, at 47-49, 160 n.4.
268. In a frequently cited passage, Kant argued:
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its
members-as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island
resolving to separate and scatter themselves through the whole world-the last
Murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out.
L KANT, PmLOSOPHY OF LAW 198 (Hastie trans. 1887), quoted in F. ZWIRING & G. HAWKINS, supra
note 264, at 16.
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an end in himself, rather than as a means.26 9 In short, such a model
imposes a retributive limit on punishment, because no excess of social
benefits over social costs would be permitted to justify punishing the
offender as a means to some greater social good. To a generation wary
of the abuses perpetrated in the name of rehabilitation and
dissatisfied with the disparities between the sentences assigned
equally culpable middle class and poor offenders, this idea of a rigid
maximum limit has definite attractions. Not surprisingly, then,
Kantian notions of a retributive limit have surfaced in virtually all of
the recent models offered to control punishment allocation.2 7 °
Superficial and short as this account of the disagreements between
utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment has been, it is
sufficient to set the stage for what follows. This article will next
examine the issue of equality as it is raised by the prediction table in
light of the contemporary jurisprudential theories of punishment.
What answers would these theories give to the fairness of such a
system? Sequentially, the following models will be examined: (1) the
basically utilitarian model that has been articulated independently by
Professors H.L.A. Hart and Herbert Packer; (2) the increasingly
important model of the economists; (3) the transitional model offered
by Norval Morris, which has one foot in the utilitarian camp and the
other in that of the retributionists; and (4) the essentially retributive
model set forth by Andrew von Hirsch in Doing Justice.This examination will serve as a prelude to an attempt to design an alternative model,
one that is hardly a synthesis of these warring views but that does
attempt to incorporate elements of each and achieve a degree of
coexistence between the forward-looking perspective of the utilitarian,
focused on prevention, and the backward-looking viewpoint of the
retributionist, with its orientation toward proportionality.
A. THE HART-PACKER MODEL
As Ronald Dworkin recently observed, H.L.A. Hart is the modern
successor to Jeremy Bentham and is the leading architect of
contemporary legal positivism, which remains our "ruling theory of
269. Id. at 195, quoted in F. ZIMUNG & G. HA~WKiNs, supra note 264, at 36 ("Punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good .... For
one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another").

270. See text accompanying notes 327-47 infra (discussion of the models of Dean Morris and
Professor von Hirsch). The idea of a retributive limit to punishment also has been articulated at
length by Professor Dershowitz. See Dershowitz, PreventiveConfinemenL"A SuggestedFramework
for ConstitutionalAnalysis,51 TExAsL. REv. 1277 (1973). See generallyInre Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d410,
503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (life sentence invalid because grossly disproportionate
penalty for indecent exposure committed by prior sex offender).
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law."' 271 On our more specialized level, a careful critic has appraised
Hart's respected volume of essays, Punishment and Responsibility,
and concluded that it sets forth "what is probably the most widely
accepted model of punishment at the present time. "272
To describe Hart only as a utilitarian is to risk oversimplification.
Attuned to the modern temper, Hart has searched for limits that can
be imposed consistently on the utilitarian model in order to restrain it
from justifying socially intolerable results. At the same time, however,
'Hart adopts an orthodox utilitarian view in arguing that the general
justifying aims of punishment must be the "forward-looking aims of
deterrence, prevention and reform .... 27 3 Even at the allocation
level, the distribution of punishment is to be determined chiefly "by
the utilitarian criteria of prospects for rehabilitation, need for
preventive confinement, and concern for general deterrence. ' 27 4 At
this level, Hart does recognize the claims of equality and proportionality among offenders as having a "modest place, ' 275 but he warns
that to permit them to outweigh his forward-looking aims would be "to
subordinate what is primary to what is ancillary. ' 27 6 In fairness to Hart
and in recognition of his extraordinary lucidity, it seems appropriate
to quote his argument here at the point where the two perspectives
collide:
[Tihe injunction 'treat like cases alike' with its corollary 'treat
different cases differently' has indeed a place as a prima
facie principle of fairness between offenders, but not as
something which warrants going beyond the requirements
of the forward-looking aims of deterrence, prevention and
reform to find some apt expression of moral feeling.
Fairness between different offenders expressed in terms of
different punishments is not an end in itself, but a method
of pursuing other aims which has indeed a moral claim on
our attention; and we should give effect to it where it does
27
not impede the pursuit of the main aims of punishment.
271. R. DWORKm, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ix (1976) (describing Hart's approach as the
"most powerful contemporary version of positivism").
272. Gardner, supra note 39, at 800. Gardner describes Hart's system as "impure legalistic
utilitarianism," because it incorporates elements of retributive theory but "emphasizes utilitarian
considrations more heavily." Id
273. H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 172.
274. Gardner, supra note 39, at 800.
275. H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 173.
276. See id at 172.
277. Id (emphasis added). Hart characterizes the idea of anyinherentproportionality between
the crime and the punishment as a "semi-aesthetic idea which has wandered into the theory of
punishment." Id
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As an example of an instance in which "sacrifices of principles of
equality between offenders ' 278 may become necessary, Hart points to
the practice of exemplary sentences. When a given crime becomes
frequent, judges are entitled, he says, to punish offenders more
severely than similarly situated offenders were punished in the past,
or than other contemporaneous offenders will be punished for
committing equally serious but less prevalent crimes.27 9
Hart assumes here a traditional utilitarian posture: the suffering of
the individual is outweighed by the good to society; equality and like
values become significant only when other concerns are not
implicated or are in equipoise. Thus, the prediction table does not
offend the Hart model. To the degree that it raises our predictive
efficiency, and enables us to achieve more prevention at a lesser cost,
Hart's approach might even be interpreted to require the use of such
devices.
If Hart had stopped at this point, it might be difficult to describe his
work in this area as original. His real contribution, however, is in responding to the straw man arguments against utilitarianism by seeking
to develop a more sophisticated justification that recognizes the need
for placing limits on the goal of prevention. 2 0 The retributionist's
traditional reply to the utilitarian's assertion that the general welfare
outweighs the individual's was that such an argument proved too
much; from such a premise, one could justify deliberately hanging an
innocent man because the deterrent effect of such an execution after
the charade of a seemingly fair trial might well produce a net social
benefit by preventing more aggregate suffering than it visited upon
the innocent scapegoat.28' From such a reductio ad absurdum
argument, the retributionist could then contend that more was
required to justify punishment than the demonstration that it
increased the general social welfare. Punishment, he would conclude,
had to be deserved. In an early essay John Rawls dealt with this
innocent man hypothetical and suggested that the appropriate
rejoinder of the utilitarian would be to deny that such a corrupt
charade would produce a net benefit. 8 2 In the long run, he asserted,
the secret would leak out, thereby undercutting the deterrent effect
278. Id
279. Id See also id at 24-25 (exemplary sentence for especially prevalent though not
necessarily grave offense imposed as warning to others justifiable because "some sacrifice of
justice to the safety of society is... often acceptable... ."); text accompanying note 335 infra
(further discussion of this problem of the exemplary sentence).
280. See HLL.A. HART. supra note 253, at 10.
281. See idi
at 5-6.
282. Rawls, supra note 253, at 61-62.
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and diminishing the psychological security of the innocent, who would
then realize that the ability to avoid punishment was only partially
283
within their control.
Such arguments may have an unreal sound, suited more to an
academic tea party in the philosophy department than to courts of law,
where no one has yet begun to urge the execution of the innocent. Yet
at the time of Hart's writing, a similarly extreme utilitarian argument
was being debated widely and had met with considerable acceptance
in Great Britain. Abolish all mental defenses, argued Lady Barbara
Wootton, because the defendant's state of mind is both essentially
unknowable and irrelevant to the deterrent effect of punishment.28 4
Indeed, by rejecting all excuses that might absolve one from criminal
liability, the deterrent effect of the law would be enhanced, she insisted,
because clever criminals would know that, if caught, they could not
masquerade as insane to escape punishment.
For Hart, who profoundly disagreed with this argument, the issue
thus raised was how a utilitarian concerned primarily with prevention
could justify the criminal law's preoccupation with states of mind and
intentions. His answer was similar to Rawls': mental defenses and the
recognition of legal excuses are consistent with the utilitarian calculus
because they increase the individual's sense of personal security and
foster a reassuring collective belief that each man controls his own
fate. In short, the general welfare is increased when individuals know
that punishment will be imposed only for acts committed with free
will, even if this standard is hazy and sometimes lets true criminals
escape. 2 5 Hart's elaboration of this theme is impressive and
sometimes eloquent. But does it ultimately work? Professor Dworkin
has criticized the argument because it rests on the debatable
empirical premise that the injury caused by a marginally higher crime
rate resulting from the recognition of mental defenses is less than the
psychological insecurity that would result if such defenses were
abolished. 8 6 The accuracy of Hart's calculus is questionable, and
283. See i& Hart endorsed this argument when he said that the "apprehension and insecurity"
thereby awakened in the general population would exceed any shortrun deterrent benefit. H.L.A.
HART, supra note 253, at 11-12. Professor Packer also elaborated on this psychological security
theme. See text accompanying note 303 infra.
284. See B. WooTrON,supranote 254, at 139. See also H.L.A. HART, supranote 253, at 178-180
(discussing Wootton's arguments for abolishing mental defenses); note 254 supra.
285. See LL.A. HART, supra note 253, at 181-82 (arguing that the mens rea requirement
guarantees us "the ability.., to predict and plan the future of the law" and "maximizes the power
of the individual to determine by his choice his future fate [and] to identify in advance the space
which will be left open to him free from the law's interference").
286. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 271, at 10. For his concise summary of Hart's position on
punishment, see id at 8-11.
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many welfare economists would respond that questions involving such
interpersonal comparisons of welfare are inherently unanswerable.2 8 7
Hart tentatively advances a second argument for limitations on the
preventive rationale. To be effective, the law must maintain some
degree of congruence with common morality. Treating individuals
simply as "alterable, predictable, curable or manipulable things"
detracts from the moral power of the law. 288 Again, however, this is an
empirical proposition and does not resolve our concern over
prediction tables, because it is far from certain that the morality of the
man in the street is offended by treating apparently dangerous
criminals more severely. The dominant public attitude toward
offenders quite possibly is reflected by the familiar phrase "lock-emup-and-throw-away-the-key." In any event, Hart, more a utilitarian
than a natural law theorist, retreats from this notion of tying a theory
of punishment to the prevailing common morality, writing that the
"principle of responsibility... may be sacrificed when the social cost
28 9
of maintaining it is too high."
Hart's approach may prove a more lasting contribution than any
specific solution he offers. In overview, he recognized the necessity of
what Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick terms "side constraints" on
the pursuit of end goals. 2 0 Although Hart rejects retribution as a
justification for punishment, he concedes that it and other principles
such as equality can function as side constraints on the unqualified
pursuit of justifying aims. 29 ' But, unlike natural law theorists such as
Dworkin and Nozick, Hart seeks a utilitarian justification for such side
constraints.
Whether Hart succeeds is open to question, but his approach has
immediate relevance to our concern with the fairness of the prediction
tables, or with any punishment system that distributes punishment
partially in accordance with the individual's social status. In order to
object to the use of a prediction table under Hart's approach, one
must first identify a side constraint that Hart would recognize as
qualifying our pursuit of the end goal of prevention. Such a
287. The problem of interpersonal comparisons of welfare is inherent in any attempt to
ascertain the net utility of imposing costs on some in order to obtain benefits for others. See A.K.
SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 89-104 (1970).
288. H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 183.
289. Id at 185.
290. Nozick has argued persuasively that we can develop an ethical model less likely to run
afoul of internal contradictions if, instead of "incorporating rights into the end state to be
achieved," we "place them as side constraints upon the actions to be done.. . ." R. NozIcK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, 29, 28-33 (1974). The model for punishment allocation developed
in this article is a side constraint structure as.opposed to one that postulates a desired end state.
291. H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 10.
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requirement is not easily met. Punishment based in part on status,
within carefully defined outer limits, offends common morality far
less, if at all, than does punishing the innocent or the insane. Hart's
other argument for side contraints-the psychological insecurity that
results when punishment is not firmly based on conduct 292 -may
similarly be inapplicable because the majority of society does not
identify with criminals and does not perceive itself to be threatened
by such a system. 293 But Hart's inventory of side constraints is not
necessarily exhaustive. His treatment of retribution as a side
constraint was in a sense topical, responding primarily to Lady
Wootton's challenge to academics to justify what she regarded as the
lawyer's obsession with inherently subjective concepts like mens rea.
Other arguments for imposing side constraints on the preventive
goals of the prediction table can be framed, but for a moment need to
be postponed.
If Hart is the reigning deity of positivism, the American prophet of
this school, at least on the issue of punishment, was Herbert Packer. In
The Limits of the Criminal Sanction294 Packer embellished the Hart
model without substantially changing it. In some respects, however, his
Americanized version appears more doctrinaire in its justification of
punishment and more qualified in its endorsement of side constraints.
Packer is more emphatic than Hart in expressing his belief that
prevention is the objective of the criminal law-he calls the case for it
"unanswerable" and any other system "the merest savagery" 29 5-and
yet he is also less certain that the criminal law must forever restrict its
reach to those who have committed a crime. "Considerable tension
exists," he writes, "between the goal of prevention and the idea that
'296
the criminal law's reach is limited to conduct.
For the time being, at least, Packer was content with the same twopronged justification for limiting punishment to actual offenses that
Hart offered. First, side constraints are needed, Packer said, because
a single-minded pursuit of prevention might "defeat the ultimate goal
297
of law in a free society, which is to liberate rather than restrain";
292. Id at 25.
293. Recall the comments of Judge Frankel that sentencing lacks "political sex appeal."
Frankel, supra note 63, quoted at note 206 supra. The public does not identify with prisoners and
therefore is not rendered insecure by modes of punishment used.
294. H. PACKER, supranote 253. Some commentators have regarded Packer's views as simply
an elaboration of Hart. See Griffiths, The Limits of CriminalLawScholarship,79 YALE L.J. 1388,
1405-13 (1970). This may be an overly harsh assessment, but it still seems essentially correct in
noting the high degree of congruence in their position.
295. H. PACKER, supra note 253, at 66.
296. Id at 97.
297. Id at66. Packerstates evenmore clearly than Hartthat his use of the requirementthatthe

individual be blameworthy"is a limiting principle, not ajustification for action." Id To this extent,
his model, in contrast to the retributionist model, can be characterized as having a side constraint

structure. See note 290 supra.
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thus, individuals generally ought to be able to plan their lives with
some assurance of avoiding entanglement with the criminal law. 298 In
short, this is Hart's psychological security argument. Second, to be
effective the criminal law must be perceived as equitable; it must not
only be fair, it must be "seen to be fair. ' 29 9 In essence, this is Hart's
caution that the law must not deviate far from common morality. For
both men, the relevance of side constraints seems limited to the
question of who can be punished. Their answer: only the guilty. 00
Much more than Hart, Packer was skeptical of the concept of
culpability, writing that it has no "inherent" place, but may, to the
extent it "serves ends" he values (basically the two arguments just
noted), be accorded recognition as a limiting doctrine. 0 1 In addition,
Packer seemingly denies that the offender has any entitlement to be
punished on a basis proportionate to his relative culpability. The
conduct that triggers punishment need not be morally offensive, he
said, nor need the amount of punishment correspond to the degree of
culpability. In a frequently quoted statement, Packer suggested that
the citizen is legitimately entitled only to fair notice that specific
conduct has been criminalized:
The dictates of individual culpability are satisfied if a
person engages in forbidden conduct without having a valid
excuse for it. He is culpable because he has behaved in a
way that the law has told him is unacceptable. If he knows
that the law forbids him to sell oleomargarine, he is culpable
if he sells it, regardless of whether-the law apart-the sale
of oleomargarine is morally good, bad or indifferent. He is
culpable because he has knowingly violated a legal
prohibition .... If he has been warned, punishment is
justifiable, quite apart from the moral quality of the
forbidden act 0 2
This is, of course, the hardnosed position of the lawyer who knows
from experience that the distinction between mala in se and malum
298. H. PACKER, supra note 253, at 68.
299. Id. at 69. Abandon culpability as a precondition for imposing punishment, Packer states,
and the law loses the "unconscious moralizing and habit-forming effects" that increase its
effectiveness. Id.
300. Their achievement can be phrased more broadly. They developed a justification for why
the law should be limited to past conduct, why it cannot be triggered simply by ahigh propensity to
commit a future crime. The problem is that their model relates principally to the rare case of the
defendant who is not responsible for his act and not to the more common case of the offender who

is guilty but claims a right to a limit on the punishment he may receive.
301. H. PACKER, supra note 253, at 67.
302. I. at 261-62.
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prohibitum is unsatisfactory and that innocuous acts often can have
serious consequences. It is also a position, however, that seems
inconsistent with Packer's original emphasis on the psychological
security produced by a system focused on conduct. As explained by
Packer, the importance of fair notice is to guarantee the individual
citizen the ability to arrange his affairs to avoid entanglement with the
criminal law. 303 Yet, any security that fair notice affords him is
substantially undercut by the elimination of blameworthiness as a
precondition to the imposition of punishment. Because the layman in
fact neither peruses statute books nor consults a lawyer before he
acts, the average citizen must be guided by an intuitive sense of
community mores. This sense is fallible, and as a result the citizen
may overstep a line and transgress a statutory prohibition; or, he may
act with some knowledge that he is in a gray area, but assume that his
act, if wrongful, is nonetheless a venial sin that courts will treat
leniently. Such a situation is particularly likely to occur in the case of
regulatory offenses, when the criminal law often is used as an
04
alternative to a taxing system.1
Packer might well call such acts committed with negligent
inattention to a statute reckless and argue that reckless reliance on an
unknown penalty structure is not an expectation that the law is obliged
to uphold. Normatively, such a position would be tenable. Packer's
objective, however, was not to develop a pure normative theory, but to
present a utilitarian rationale for recognizing side constraints. Such an
objective requires a balancing of the actual costs of lost psychological
security against the benefits of increased deterrence. Viewed in this
light, Packer's position becomes self-contradictory because it blends
inconsistent normative and empirical assertions. His minimal fair
notice requirement does not adequately uphold the expectations of
the ordinary citizen upon which his psychological security argument is
303. 1d at 68.
304. For example, a citizen might be substantially deterred from committing a traffic offense
by heavy jail sentences or capital punishment and the lives thereby saved through a reduction of
traffic accidents might under a strictly utilitarian cost-benefit analysis justify the suffering
imposed on selected offenders. But an analogy to the Hart and Packer analysis is suggested here.
The psychological security of the general population would be seriously disturbed by the
imposition of extraordinary penalties for crimes they may in fact frequently commit. Nor are
traffic offenses unique in this regard. Empirical studies show that significant portions of the
general population have engaged in conduct the law views as felonious. See note 429 infra and
accompanying text. One student note has suggested recently that the criminal law should be
structured to anticipate violations. Note, Laws That are Made to be Broken" Adjusting for
Anticipated Noncompliance, 75 Mica L. REv. 687 (1977). An analogous model for punishment
allocation should recognize that crime is commonplace and that it is the characteristic type of
crime, rather than its frequency, that is most likely to change among different populations and
classes.
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founded. More is required. If the goal is psychological security, then
the legal system must not lightly frustrate the individual's expectation
that even if he has crossed the line he will be treated on the basis of
his relative blameworthiness. Put simply, a legal system in which the
layman cannot expect the penalty structure to be roughly commensurate with community mores is one of which he must
continuously beware;30 5 in Packer's phraseology,
such a system is not
30 6
restrains.
than
rather
"liberates
one which
Assessed on its own utilitarian terms, the Hart-Packer model seems
vulnerable to two criticisms: (1) It cannot be demonstrated that the
benefits of controlling the reach of the criminal law by recognizing
limiting doctrines, such as legal excuses, outweigh the costs of a
possibly higher crime rate; and (2) the objective of psychological
security requires more extensive side constraints than fair notice
alone. If participation in illegal activities is as pervasive as many
sociologists now believe, if laws were equally enforced against the
middle class and poor alike, and if the citizen's sole entitlement under
our theory of punishment were fair notice, the resulting system of law
would sadly enough be one in which only a minority of citizens could
feel secure in their daily lives.
A particularly ominous note pervades Packer's justification of side
constraints. He concedes he has advanced only a transitional
model. 30 7 The day may come, he warns, when the "instrumental" role
now played by concepts of culpability will no longer serve the ends of
prevention because we will have attained the power to predict
criminality accurately. He writes:
As we find ourselves gaining more nearly exact knowledge
about the sources and control of deviant behavior, the
pressure from the behavioral position upon this rationale
will become strong and may prove to be irresistible. The
more confidently we can predict behavior and the more
subtly we can control it, the more powerful will be the
temptation to relax the constraints that inhibit us at present
from aggressively intervening in the lives of individuals in
30 8
the name of crime prevention.
305. Those who disagree with this assertion might contemplate briefly the photograph
reprinted in Griffiths, supranote 294, at 1456 n.266 (1928 photograph purporting to show a public
display of the heads of motorists who were beheaded in Peking for exceeding the 15 milesper-hour speed limit).
306. See note 297 supra and accompanying text.
307. H. PACKER, supra note 253, at 66.
308. Id
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When that day arrives, the "tension between the concept of blameworthiness as a prerequisite of punishment and the dictates of the
incapacitative claim" may well have to be resolved by abandoning
"blameworthiness as a condition for the imposition of punishment."3 9
Although Packer neither tells us when this millenium will arrive nor
focuses at all on the methodological problems of prediction, advocates
of an incapacitation model could already infer from such a statement
that even the feeble constraints in Packer's model do not apply to
them.
In the end, it is open to question whether Parker has given us a
justification or an epitaph for limiting principles. The HartPacker model thus leaves open the question whether better
arguments can be advanced to justify stronger side constraints
without abandoning the forward-looking objective of prevention.
B. THE ECONOMISTS' MODEL
In making the transition from the Hart-Packer model to an economic model, we progress from a system that involves relatively
modest side constraints to one having virtually none at all. At least
within the discipline of economics, a consensus appears to be
emerging that (1) criminals respond to changes in the opportunity
costs confronting them in deciding whether to commit crimes, and (2)
the amount of punishment as well as the risk of apprehension
3 10
determines the offender's perception of his own opportunity cost.
Based on these findings, Professor Richard Posner has advanced an
economic theory of the "optimal criminal sanction. ' 311 "The first
task," he writes, "in devising a scheme for punishing a particular
crime is to choose the expected punishment cost. 3 12 As he sees it,
this desired cost is simply the product of the probability of
apprehension times the severity of the punishment if caught.3" 3 Given
this simple formula, Posner next points out that we can choose among
a virtually unlimited number of combinations of probability and
severity which yield the same total. For example, a fine of $1,000 can
be combined with a probability of apprehension of 100%, or a fine of
$1,000,000 can be combined with an apprehension risk of 0.1%; in
each case we achieve the same punishment cost. If this is so, which
combination of probability and severity is optimal? Ideally, Posner
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id at 51.
For surveys of the recent literature, see note 42 supra.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163-72, 176-77 (2d ed. 1977).
Id at 165.
Id at 167.
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writes, the most efficient combination is an apprehension risk
"arbitrarily close to zero" and a penalty "arbitrarily close to
infinity. ' 31 4 This combination is optimal, he reasons, because the
costs of increasing the risk of apprehension-more police, more
prosecutors, more court officials and attorneys-are far greater than
the costs of increasing the penalty-the costs of increasing prison
capacities. It is therefore more efficient, Posner believes, to achieve
the desired punishment cost by increasing the severity variable.
As Posner acknowledges, his theory points toward a policy of
"combining heavy prison terms for the convicted criminal with low
probabilities of apprehension and conviction" 31 5-in short, a scapegoat system in which an unlucky few receive severe exemplary
sentences. Is this unfair? Although such a formulation allows many to
"go scot-free ... [while] others serve longer prison sentences than
they would if more offenders were caught," he argues that this "ex
post inequality" among offenders is no more unfair than the typical
lottery, which by its very nature "creates wealth inequalities among
the players. ' 316 Both the lottery and a system of criminal justice that
combines low probabilities of apprehension with high penalties are
fair "so long as the ... costs and benefits are equalized among the
participants" at the outset.
In overview, this lottery analogy represents only a slight, though
vivid, extension of Professor Packer's fair notice rationale. At the time
one buys a lottery ticket or commits a crime, one has fair notice of the
rules by which the game is to be played; hence, the argument runs,
unless the game is rigged the players have no right to object to the
rules after the play has commenced.
Is there a reply to this argument, acceptable to someone who shares
the economist's perspective? One relevant distinction between a
lottery and a criminal justice system is that the latter is a monopolythe state has the only game in town. Thus, it can engage in price
discrimination. The costs of deterrence for one crime can, for
example, be raised in order to subsidize the deterrence costs for
another crime.318 In this sense the prediction table is analogous to a
discriminatory taxing system.
314. Id
315. Id at 170.
316. Id
317. Id Others, however, have used this same lottery analogy to criticize, rather than to justify,
a system of punishment which serves to instruct the general population. See F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWMvNS, supra note 264, at 47.
318. For example, assume that prison sentences imposed for a given crime deter to some
degree not only the commission of that specific crime but the commission of related cr~mes as well.
One can then posit a situation in which long sentences assigned for one crime-such as bank
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Even more important, Posner's cost-benefit analysis seems
strangely shortsighted. Posner seems to believe that doubling the
amount of punishment doubles the deterrent or incapacitative effect
thereby obtained.3 19 But are the units involved really so fungible that
sending one man to prison for two years produces the same deterrent
effect as sending two men to prison for one year each? For three
reasons this analysis appears faulty. First, unless economists have
recently repealed the law of diminishing returns, the deterrent effect
of additional punishment imposed on the offenders isolated by a
scapegoat system should at some point begin to decline. For example,
more social benefit should be obtained by sending ten men to prison
for one year than one man to prison for ten years.3 20 Second, Posner's
analysis ignores the differences in the incapacitative benefits that
imprisonment produces because of the clearly higher risk of
recidivism posed by some individuals.
Finally, Posner's implicit assumption that the costs in terms of
individual suffering, which the traditional utilitarian has always
conceded must be weighed in the balance, 21 are constant between ten
one-year sentences and one ten-year sentence is highly dubious.
Interestingly, Posner observes that the concept of expected punishment cost is the same as that of an expected accident cost.3 22 But the
leading theoretician on accident costs, Guido Calabresi, argues that
costs should be spread rather than concentrated because cost
323
spreading reduces the aggregate injury sustained.
Relying in part on an empirical generalization that the marginal
value of money declines-that is, that 100 additional dollars are worth
less to a millionaire than to a pauper-Calabresi argues that imposing
costs on a select few is more likely to result in economic and social
embezzlement, typically committed by a lower echelon employee-are used to deter crimes
committed by another class of persons-such as the making of illegal loans, typically committed
by higher level executives. Then the artificially high price assigned to the first crime would be
subsidizing the deterrent cost necessary to prevent the second, which has been assigned an
artificially low price. We would be faced with a discriminatory pricing system made possible by the
monopolistic position of the state as the sole dispenser of criminal justice. Because the state's
monopoly cannot be ended, the fairness of the lottery must be regulated.
319. See R. POSNER, supra note 311, at 167, 170-71.

320. In part, this assertion rests on the cost spreading and marginal utility arguments of
Professor Calabresi, discussed at note 325 infra and accompanying text. In addition, the population we wish to deter cannot make fine distinctions between the costs involved; a sentence of 6.6
years does not produce 10% more general deterrence than does a sentence of 6 years, and may
empirically produce no additional deterrence if the critical variable is the risk of apprehension.
This hypothesis of diminishing returns on increased punishment has been accepted by others. See
A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2, at 136.
321. See note 264 supra.
322. R. POSNER, supra note 311, at 165.
323. G. CALABRESI. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-42 (1970).
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dislocation than spreading the costs over a wider group. In his
judgment this principle is not limited to purely economic costs:
"social dislocations, like economic ones, will occur more frequently if
one person bears a heavy loss than if many people bear light ones. 3 24
The individual "feels his losses less if ... his neighbors ... suffer
similar losses. 3 25 This perception has equal validity as a critique of
both Posner's analysis and the prediction table in general: The cost of
deterrence should be spread rather than concentrated. Within the
context of punishment, however, cost spreading is simply a synonym
for equality among offenders.
We have now surveyed two predominantly utilitarian models of
punishment-the Hart-Packer model and the Posner model. In each
case the value of equality among offenders has been subordinated to
the goal of prevention, but in each case counterarguments consistent
with the principle of utility were advanced to demonstrate that
equality deserves a greater role. It has been contended that in using
the psychological security of the citizenry to justify limiting the
application of punishment to the guilty, the Hart-Packer model must
also recognize the need for a measure of proportionality between the
crime and the punishment if it is to be intellectually consistent. In the
case of Posner, this article has argued in favor of cost spreading on the
traditional utilitarian grounds that it reduces the aggregate costs
charged.
Despite these faults, each model has considerable utility. The HartPacker notion that the pursuit of goals must be kept within side
constraints is a seminal concept. Posner's formalization of expected
punishment cost represents a logical extension of the Hart-Packer
focus on prevention. Determining such a cost in the abstract in turn
permits us to view quite differently the process by which that cost is
then allocated among offenders.
C. THE REHABILITATION OF RETRIBUTION
Within the last few years the concept of retribution has been
brought down from the legal attic, dry-cleaned of its musty, Victorian
odor, and presented as the au courant fashion in sentencing reform.
The reasons for its return are fairly obvious. As evidence accumulated
that individualization in sentencing had been carried to an extreme,
retribution presented an alternative model that could justify radical
reforms aimed at the chief perceived evils-indeterminacy and
324. Id at 40.
325. Id at 40 n.3.
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unfettered discretion. There is almost a perfect fit between these
recently diagnosed evils and the categorical imperatives of a Kantian
system: The utilitarian goal of rehabilitation has led to imposition of
more punishment than would have been assigned under a retributive
system; therefore, critics are attracted to a system under which no
man is treated as a means, rather than as an end, and given more
3 26
punishment than he "deserves.

The earliest full flowering of the idea of a retributive limit to
punishment in recent legal literature was in the writings of Norval
Morris and Alan Dershowitz. 27 Dean Morris' model is of particular
interest because it seeks to reconcile utilitarian and natural law
theories.328 As a thinker who agrees with Hart and Packer that prevention is the primary aim of the criminal law, Morris seems to use the idea
of "just deserts" only as a means of setting an upper and lower limit on
the allocation of punishment.

29

He does not insist that punishment

always be proportional to culpability. In effect, then, his model leaves
a zone of indeterminacy between the floor and ceiling marked by the
retributive concepts he employs; within this zone he rejects the
330
enhancement of punishment based on predicted dangerousness.
Thus, to a degree, we have at last a model that might be used to
express our doubts about the prediction table. Morris seems willing,
however, to tolerate within this zone some treatment of the individual
as a means rather than as an end in order to accomplish deterrent
objectives. 33 1 With Hart, he believes that equality merits only second
echelon status in our scale of sentencing values.332 He accords first
326. See notes 269-70 supra and accompanying text. See also A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2, at
46-49.
327. See generally N. MoRRISsupra note 2; Dershowitz, IndeterminateConfinemenk-Letting the
Therapy Fitthe Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (1974); Dershowitz, supranote 270; Dershowitz, The
Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. OF LEGAL ED. 24 (1970).
328. See in particular Morris' attempt to balance the "preventive purposes" ofthe criminal law
with the concept of "desert." N. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 75-76.
329. See N. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 74, 60. In proposing that the criminal law require a
"retributive floor to punishment," Morris notes with approval section 7.01(c) of the Proposed
Official Draft of the ALI Model Penal Code, which provides in part that imprisonment may be
imposed when "a lesser sentence [would] depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime." Id,
at 77-78. For a criticism of this position, see A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2, at 73-74.
330. N. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 76. He expressly rejects predictions based on individual,
categoric, anamnestic, or intuitive factors. Id
331. Id at 76-77. Morris, however, accepts only a "general deterrent justification" and
expressly rejects "special deterrence" since the latter would amount to incapacitation based on
predicted dangerousness. Id
332. In a recent address, Morris assumed a position on the question of equality in sentencing
once again reminiscient of Hart: "[Elquality inpunishmentis notan absolute principle; itis a value
to be weighed and considered among other values, no more; and there can be just sentences in
which like criminals are not treated alike." Address by Norval Morris, Toward Principled
Sentencing, at University of Maryland Law School (March 10, 1977), at 14-15 (copy on file at the
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priority to the "principle of parsimony,"3 3' 3 writing that "Itihe least
restrictive, least punitive sanction necessary to achieve a defined
social purpose should be chosen."3 3 4 Attractive as this notion is, its
enshrinement as a first principle may in turn require subordinating
the competing ideal that like cases be treated alike. For example, the
principle of parsimony might justify on utilitarian grounds the
imposition of an exemplary sentence in a highly publicized case on the
premise that the greater visibility thereby achieved would provide
more deterrence at a lower cost than could be obtained by simply
increasing the average sentence in all similar cases.3 35 In contrast,
those of a more egalitarian persuasion might still believe that treating
like cases alike is a more important principle than parsimony.
Dean Morris' model occupies an intermediate position on the
current continuum of sentencing proposals because it employs
retribution only as a means to set a floor and a ceiling on punishment.
Such a model responds to the perceived evil of indeterminacy but
only indirectly to the problem of sentencing disparities. One facet of
the disparity problem is the tendency toward inequalities between the
sentences assigned to white collar offenders and those given to lower
income criminals. A retributive model that insists that punishment be
proportional to culpability goes further toward minimizing these
disparities than does the Morris model. For example, although bank
embezzlement and an unarmed night burglary of that same bank are
substantially similar crimes from a retributive standpoint,3 3 6 they may
appear very different to someone whose first premise is the principle
of parsimony. If, under the latter principle, we insist on the use of the
least restrictive alternative to accomplish our objective, the crime of
embezzlement probably justifies less punishment, because the guilty
bank teller will never again have a similar opportunity to embezzle,
and others like him will probably be deterred by the social stigma and
loss of employment incident to apprehension. Hence, neither the
goals of deterrence nor those of incapacitation require that the
quantum of punishment be the same for embezzlement as for
burglary.
It was probably predictable in light of the widespread concern with
sentencing disparities that a retributive model would surface reGeorgetown Law Journal).Perhaps surprisingly, given his opposition to predictions of future
conduct, Dean Morris in this speech also approved the use of the Salient Factor Scores as a step
that pointed "in the right direction." Id- at 22.
333. N. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 60-61.
334. Id.
335. See H.L.A. HART, supranote 253, at 172, 24-25; note 279 supra and accompanying text.
336. See Skinner v. Oklahoma exrel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)(Douglas, J.); note
69 supra.
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quiring that these two cases be treated equally. Such a model has now
been elegantly expounded by Professor von Hirsch in Doing Justice.3 7
As with other retributive models, it begins by rejecting the utilitarian
premise that punishment can be justified simply by showing that the
benefits it produces outweigh its costs.338 It then sets forth a moral
justification of punishment developed in three sequential steps. First,
"[t]hose who violate others' rights deserve punishment." It describes
this idea as the "prima facie justification of punishment."' 33 9 Second,
because punishment adds to the total amount of human suffering, the
moral obligation to minimize suffering counterbalances the first
proposition that punishment is deserved;3 40 this then leaves us with an
insufficient justification. Finally, to the extent punishment deters
others and thus may "prevent more misery than it inflicts, ' '341
punishment is justified because the second proposition no longer
applies. Thus, the original just deserts principle comes back into
3 42
operation.
The net effect of this theoretical progression is to justify
punishment only when both retribution and deterrence overlap. Each
is necessary, but neither is a sufficient condition. In effect, this model
has elevated the role of retribution from that of a side constraint to
that of a justifying aim. In so doing the approach advanced in Doing
Justice eliminates the indeterminacy between the retributive floor
and ceiling that characterized Norval Morris' model. 43 Instead, the
Doing Justice model requires that a strict proportionality be observed
between the punishment and the offender's level of blameworthi344
ness.
In some respects, the Doing Justice model is the mirror image of a
utilitarian approach. For example, a true utilitarian is indifferent
between sentencing two men to five years in prison and sentencing
one man to ten years; at most, the utilitarian would recognize a role for

337. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2. Although written by Professor von Hirsch, the book is
subtitled Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration. The Committee is a fifteen
member group of nationally recognized experts in the fields of criminology, law, philosophy, and

psychiatry.
338. Id at50-51. Interestingly, the committee relies in this instance on a Rawlsianjustification
that points in a somewhat different direction, as will hereinafter be argued.
339. Id at 53-54.
340. Id at 54.
341. Id
342. For an incisive critique of this model, see Gardner, supranote 39, at798-99 n.l 19,802-06.
343. A.VON IRSCH, supra note 2, at 73-74. Von Hirsch specifically criticizes the Morris model
for leaving such an indeterminate zone. See id
344. Id at 69-74.
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equality in breaking a tie-when each option results in the same net
deterrent effect.34 5 The Doing Justice model takes the reverse
position: It gives utilitarian goals a decisive effect only in the tiebreaking situation. Von Hirsch hypothesizes, for example, that if two
types of punishment were equally severe, it would be permissible "to
prefer one kind of sanction over another on utilitarian grounds,"
because the principle of commensurate deserts had been satisfied by
either sanction. 46 Not surprisingly then, Doing Justice expressly
rejects methodologies such as the Salient Factor Score that allocate
3 47
punishment based on socioeconomic criteria.
If we are skeptical of preventive restraint, DoingJustice provides us
with a highly articulate rationale for rejecting such a strategy.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why we should not accept that
rationale. First, there is a somewhat clanking, mechanical sense about
the resurrection of retribution in Doing Justice that may detract from
its persuasiveness. One feels that ideas are being manipulated for
ulterior purposes, that if retribution did not exist it would be
necessary to invent such a useful doctrine. As Leslie Wilkins
commented in an appendix to Doing Justice, "It seems that we have
rediscovered 'sin' in the absence of a better alternative. 3 48 To its
critics the rediscovery of retribution finds its justification in a
subjective, tautological argument which, when reduced to its
essentials, says only that people may be punished because they
deserve punishment.3 49 From this perspective, the retributive
rationale does not proceed from premises to conclusions but simply
assumes what is to be proved-the nature of the justification for
punishment. In so doing, it strays perilously far from the central idea
shared by Hart, Packer, Posner, and the majority of other recent
critics-that prevention is the first goal of the criminal law.
345. See notes 321-22 supra and accompanying text. This is basically the same summary of the
utilitarian position that Rawls makes on a higher level of abstraction. See J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 26 (1971).
346. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2, at 112 rL**.
347. Id at 87-88.
348. Id at 178.
349. For a critique of the idea that it is self-evident that the blameworthy deserve punishment,
see Blindshard, Retribution Revisited, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 59, 74-75
(E. Madden, R. Handy& M. Farber eds. 1968) (arguingthat"this viewthat you should add another
evil to one which already exists, is not only not self-evident; it seems to conflict with one that is").
Of course, the Doing Justice justification of punishment requires that desert and deterrence
overlap; the issue it thus ignores is whether we should eliminate all the area of indeterminacy that
exists in Morris' model between his retributive floor and ceiling or only some elements of it. This
article will suggest that a "side constraint" model produces a different answer than their end
purpose model and permits some indeterminacy to remain. See text accompanying notes 407-09

infra.
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Yet another more important and more practical objection to the
retributive rationale exists: It may prove impossible to confine. Once
Pandora's Box has been opened, the desire to punish the
blameworthy may lead as easily to the assignment of punishment in
excess of that required by the goal of prevention as did the desire to
rehabilitate in the recent past. 5 0 Once retribution becomes a purpose
for punishment rather than an allocative limit on it, concepts of
vengeance and spite, which always lurk at the periphery of the
'criminal justice system, may creep back sub silentio into our criminal
justice ideology.
In fairness to the proponents of the Doing Justice model, they are
emphatic in their belief that less punishment, not more, is needed; in
general, they would set a ceiling on punishment not to exceed five
years.3 51 They concede, however, that the choice of magnitudes is
"somewhat arbitrary" and that the model could justify with equal
validity a higher ceiling. 352 Others who have espoused similar flat-time
systems have suggested higher ceilings. 53 Although the proponents of
Doing Justice supplement their model by borrowing the principle of
parsimony from Norval Morris,35 4 such a principle has no integral
relationship to the structure of their model, which is founded on a
notion that people deserve punishment, not on Morris' premise that the
best system is that which punishes least to achieve its goals. Like
training wheels on a bicycle, this cautionary restraint on the operation
of a retributive model may be discarded by subsequent users.
Despite the modest judicial success enjoyed by proponents of
retributive limits, 355 conservative courts and legislatures may have far
350. Others have suggested that a retributive rationale may lead to longer sentences than exist
today. See Flynn, Turning Judges Into Robots? TRIAL, Mar. 1976, at 18 (concluding that the
"generally conservative leanings of state legislatures" will produce "repressive, long sentences
rather than the hoped for reform"). Early experience confirms this suggestion. In Maine, the
adoption of a determinate flat-time sentencing system seems to have led judges to sentence
prisoners "to more time in prison than they would have under the old system...." Fixed Prison
Terms Gain FavorAs Doubts on ParoleRise in US., N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,1977, § 1, at 1, cols. 1-2.
See also P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURns, supranote 2, at 55 (longer authorized sentences
lead to longer actual sentences). Cf Gardner, supra note 39, at 790-92.
351. A. VON IRhSCH, supra note 2, at 136.
352. Id. at 135-37.
353. See D. FOGEL,"... WEARETHELIVINGPROOF..." 254-55 (1975). Fogel's "Justice Model"
includes the death penalty, life imprisonment, 30-year sentences, and 10.year sentences, as well
as shorter sentences. Id
354. See notes 333-35 supra and accompanying text.
355. See In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal 3d 639, 653, 537 P.2d 384, 394, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 562
(1975) (22 years imprisonment for nonviolent sexual act with child held excessive punishment); In
re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 438, 503 P.2d 921, 940, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 236 (1972) (maximum
sentence of life imprisonment for second offense of indecent exposure ruled unreasonably high
and vastly disproportionate to gravity of crime). But see People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 111-12,

1978]

REPRESSED ISSUES OF SENTENCING

1079

different ideas of the degree of punishment deserved for a particular
offense. Put bluntly, academics (at least since the day of that noted
neurologist, Dr. Frankenstein) have often overestimated their ability
to control their inventions or the uses to which their ideas would be
put. Once retribution is accepted, the effect of a retributive criminal
justice theory on a society already having the longest average prison
sentences in the western world, 35 6 and an extraordinarily high per
capita rate of imprisonment,3 57 may not be that intended by the
proponents of the Doing Justice model. In short, they may find
themselves more captive than master of their brave new ideology. The
purpose here is by no means to accuse the advocates of the Doing
Justice model of intellectual irresponsibility-a conclusion as unjustified as holding Nietzsche responsible for Hitler. Rather, it is to suggest
the comparative advantages of a model that could achieve similar
results without accepting the dangerous notion that offenders deserve
compensatory suffering for its own sake.
A second line of attack on the Doing Justice model has focused on
its treatment of the concept of culpability. Some have claimed that the
model takes an overly restrictive view of that concept, in recognizing
only the severity of the crime and the offender's past record of
convictions while ignoring extenuating or aggravating circumstances
such as the offender's relative deprivation.3 58 Conversely, others have
criticized the Doing Justice concept of culpability as too expansive,
arguing that by introducing such a potentially subjective concept it
defeats the original purpose of the model, which was to reduce
sentencing disparities by minimizing opportunities for the sentencing
judge and parole officers to exercise discretion. 9 Such critics feel
332 N.E.2d 338,341,371 N.Y. S.2d471,475 (1975) (maximum sentence of life imprisonmentand
minimum sentences from one to more than eight years for drug offenses deemed not to rise to
"gross disproportionality violative of constitutional limitations").
356. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN&D. CuRns, supranote 2, at54-55; Coffee, supranote 13,
at 1364-65 nn. 7 & 8.
357. A study conducted in connection with the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice reported that in 1965 1.3 million Americans were under some
form of correctional supervision. Italso estimated thatby 1975 this figure v~ould rise to 1.8 million;
these figures translate into 0.66% and 0.82% of the United States population. See TASK FORCE
ON CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, app. B at 215. More recent figures show that at December 31,
1973, the number of prisoners in state and federal institutions per 100,000 of the population was
97.8. M. HINDELANG, C. DuNN, L. SUTTON &A. AulCIK, supranote 220, at 642. In some jurisdictions, the per capita rate is much higher: District of Columbia (323.8 per 100,000); Georgia (173.2
per 100,000). Id. Given these statistics and the rate of prison overcrowding that already exists, a
retributive model may compound an already excessive tendency toward imprisonment.
358. See Gardner, supra note 39, at 806-14. I fear, however, that if the model suggested by
Professor Gardner as an alternative to the Doing Justice approach were implemented in a largescale criminal justice system, it would degenerate quickly into a new pursuit of individualization.
359. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2, at 171, 172-74 (partially dissenting statement of
Professor Goldstein) (characterizing treatment in DoingJustice of concept of culpability as "just
another discretionary sentencing scheme with a new and protean slogan"). To this writer, Doing
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that the attempt to measure culpability places us again on a slippery
slope leading back to pure individualization. They would prefer,
therefore, to narrow the decisionmaker's focus exclusively to the
crime and never to the criminal.36 0
Because of the problems accompanying a retributive approach-its
potential harshness, the subjectivity inherent in any definition of
culpability, and the limited success that the concept of proportionality
has had to date-the concept of retribution may be better suited as a
side constraint than as a justifying aim. Although retribution may on
occasion provide a useful restraint on a naked pursuit of utilitarian
goals, it cannot safely carry the burden of being the foundation on
which a theory of punishment is to be erected.
If we are sympathetic to Doing Justice's goal of proportionality but
dubious of its retributive means, must we then accept as the sole
alternative the Hart-Packer model with its corollary that the goal of
equality deserves only second echelon status? This article will
attempt to sketch a countermodel, one that turns elsewhere than to
retribution for an adequate critique of the utilitarian justification for
punishment, but which also adopts the central tenet of Hart and
Packer that first priority in a criminal justice theory should be the goal
of prevention.
D. A PROPOSED EGALITARIAN MODEL-WITH APOLOGIES TO
JOHN RAWLS
Any attempt to formulate a wholly original countermodel in this the
third millenium of western legal thought would be an audacious act,
recalling less the heroism of Hercules than that of Don Quixote. Such
an act would also be superfluous, because a well-developed and widely
known model awaits extension to this area. More importantly, this
model is capable of supporting a theory of punishment that is both
egalitarian and forward-looking.
As others have already noted in this context, the leading modern
critic of utilitarianism is John Rawls.3 61 In A Theory of Justice3 62 Rawls
Justice steers a sounder middle course between the antithetical and more extreme positions taken
by Professors Gardner and Goldstein.
360. Id at 172.
361. The relevance of the Rawlsian approach to criminal justice and in particular to the
problem of punishment has earlier been pointed out by Dean Morris and by Professor Griffiths.
See N. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 81-83; Griffiths, supra note 294, at 1455-56. Rawls' model,
however, produces distinctly different results than those advocated by Dean Morris and deserves
a more extensive treatment than it has heretofore received in the literature of criminal law,
primarily because it provides a more rigorous foundation for assertions about values that
otherwise sound like ipse dixits.
362. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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develops an elegant critique of the indifference of utilitarianism to the
problems of allocation. He does so by turning the very tools of
utilitarianism-economic utility theory-against it. This contribution
alone is important because otherwise the arguments of the natural law
theorist and the positivist tend to pass each other like ships in the
night without meaningful interchange. Thus, the balance of this article
will focus on the application of Rawls' techniques to the theory of
punishment in order to develop a countermodel based on the
foundation he laid. 63
In marked contrast to the retributionists, Rawls examines the
failures of utilitarianism using a language in common with it. His
central complaint is that the utilitarian's concepts of efficiency and
social benefit fail to take into account the resulting allocation of these
costs and benefits. 6 4 Thus, if a certain amount of individual libertyX-must be surrendered to produce an aggregate social benefit-Y,
the true utilitarian will argue that as long as Y exceeds X, the
surrender is required. Who pays the cost X is not examined. For
example, if the goal of general deterrence requires that offenders be
sent to prison, the utilitarian is indifferent to whether one offender is
sent to prison for ten years or ten offenders for one year as long as the
same aggregate benefit is achieved in terms of deterrence at the same
total cost. At most, the utilitarian would appeal to notions of equality
to break a tie such as this,3 6 and so on a slightly altered fact pattern
he would prefer jailing one offender for ten years to incarcerating ten
offenders for a year and a day each. This approach is, of course, blind
to the fairness of the allocation.
Rawls criticizes precisely this blindness to allocation. Classical
utilitarianism yields only a concept of efficiency-the greatest good at

363. The model outlined will treat punishment as a problem in distributive justice. Rawls,
however, seems to assign all problems of criminal justice to a different category that he calls
"partial compliance theory." Id at315. Inthis area, he simply refers the reader to H.L.A. Hart, see
id at 241 n.25, and emphasizes that punishment is "not simply a scheme of taxes and burdens
designedto put a price on certainforms of conduct." Id at314-15. Even if the criminal lawis more
than a simple taxing system, one can use Rawls' own concepts in evaluating the fairness of the
tariffs it assesses; indeed Rawls has seemingly acknowledged this elsewhere. See Rawls, supra
note 253, at 62, 63 n.14. Moreover, economists such as Posner have the better side of the
argument when they assert that the criminal law should seek to optimize and reduce undesired
behavior rather than eliminate it altogether, because total elimination would require excessively
high penalties. See R. POSNER, supranote 311, at 164, 166. Rawls' separation of the problems of
criminal justice from those of distributive justice will be considered further in text accompanying
notes 424-33 infra.
364. See J. RAWLs, supra note 362, at 25-26, 77.
365. See id at 26, 77.
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the lowest cost.366 As such, this principle of efficiency, Rawls asserts,
is indeterminate; a number of different allocations of costs and
benefits can produce the same net result. 367 Rawls illustrates his point
using the economic concept of Pareto optimality. 68 Assume that
curve AB below represents the maximum outputs that can result as
the allocation of some scarce resource is shifted between two
contending goods. For example, in the familiar hypothetical, how
should a fixed amount of government spending be allocated between
guns and butter? Each point on the curve represents some maximum
combination of guns and butter that can be produced as a fixed sum of
money is allocated between them.
Table III

A

1

2
GUNS

3
0
4

B

BUTTER

The curve AB can be said to be Pareto optimal as long as no
redistribution exists that increases the available quantity of one good
without decreasing the quantity of the other. Points 1, 2, and 3 on this
curve are equally optimal, while point 4 is suboptimal, because point 2
yields the same quantity of butter with more guns. The AB curve is
therefore efficient but indeterminate because it fails to yield a single
366. See id at 66-75.

367. Id at 69.
368. Id at 67-69, 75.
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best point. Although we know we should choose a point on the AB
curve, we can debate which trade-off is better.
To solve this problem of indeterminacy Rawls advocates reliance on
a principle of justice,3 69 and then offers such a principle-what he
terms the difference principle. Before explaining that principle,
however, it is essential to describe the process by which he derives it.
Approaching the task of developing a satisfactory political theory
by the same social contract route earlier followed by Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau, Rawls argues that principles about the fairness of
social institutions must be assessed from an "original position" in
which those framing the principles are unaware of, and thus
uninfluenced by, their own social rank or position.3 70 Behind this "veil
of ignorance" 371 representative citizens, fully aware of the structure of
society yet blind to their own interests or position in that society,
would choose two principles of distributive justice. 7 2 Under Rawls'
first principle, "each person is to have an equal right to the most
373
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others."
The more important principle for our purposes, however, is the
second one, the difference principle, which holds that "social and
economic inequalities ... are just only if they result in compensating
benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged
members of society. 3 74 In his final restatement of this principle,
Rawls advocates that social institutions "be arranged so that they are
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. ' 37 In other words, not
knowing whether they were slaves or masters, the representative
framers of our social contract would choose principles that abolish
slavery. They would do so even if slavery were shown to maximize
social welfare, for to summarize Rawls' key criterion, an institutional
structure is just if, and only if, it is designed so that its "worst-off
group" is at least as well off as the worst-off group (not necessarily the
same group) under any alternative structure.3 76 As an operating rule,
this criterion means that we should respond to significant issues of
social choice by seeking to attain the best possible position for the
representative worst-off group. In short, allocation has become as
369. Id at 68, 75.
370. Id at 11-12.
371. Id at 12.
372. Id at 14-15.
373. Id at 60, 14.
374. Id at 14-15. The difference principle is given various restatements throughoutA Theory of
Justice. See id at 60-61, 75-80, 302-03.
375. Id at 302.
376. The best concise description of Rawls' position is to be found in R. NOzICI. supranote
290, at 183-97. I here paraphrase his summary. See id at 190.
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important as purpose and effect, because Rawls' system will not
countenance an institution justified simply "on the grounds that the
3' 77
hardships of some are offset by the greater good in the aggregate.
What does all this have to do with punishment? This article's
answer is that punishment is one of those social values such as
"liberty and opportunity, income and wealth and the bases of selfrespect" that under Rawls' system must be "distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution is to everyone's advantage."3 8 Indeed,
this answer seems to follow as the third step in an unavoidable
syllogism, once the difference principle is postulated and punishment
is recognized as an important social institution.
Concededly, Rawls or his disciples might not agree that the rules for
allocation of punishment should be subsumed under the difference
principle. 79 For the moment, however, the critical issue is whether
prediction tables and other status-sensitive devices actually offend
the difference principle. Although such tables may treat lower class or
minority group offenders more harshly than other offenders, it still
might be argued that if the problem of crime were serious enough, the
worst-off group would be benefited more by a reduction in crime than
by the elimination of status-sensitive prediction devices. Indeed,
because crime rates are notoriously higher in urban and ghetto areas,
the least fortunate in society may be the very group most victimized
by crime. The difference principle requires not absolute equality, but
only that any inequality be to the advantage of the worst-off group.38 0
Thus, is it not possible that the worst-off group-on whom the
incidence of crime falls most heavily-would be less concerned about
a discriminatory system than about a higher crime rate?
This is a serious question. To examine it, we need to take a much
closer look at the tools by which Rawls developed his difference
principle. Two are of particular relevance: (1) the "maximin" rule,
and (2) the Pareto optimality concept noted earlier. Together, they
can be used to demonstrate that within a Rawlsian framework,
reasonable individuals would be extremely risk averse when faced
with a punishment structure v4hich utilizes nonculpable socioeconomic criteria, at least if other alternatives could produce the same
social benefit.
The first of these two concepts is best illustrated by the classic
prisoners dilemma problem. 38' To the game theorist, this problem is
377. J. RAWLS, supra note 362, at 15.
378. Id at 62. This statement is the crux, Rawls asserts, of his "more general conception of
justice," of which his two principles are "special case[s]." Id
379. See note 363 supra and text accompanying notes 424-33 infra.
380. J. RAWLS, supra note 362, at 303.
381. I here borrow an example from A Theory of Justice. Id. at 269 n.9.
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known as a two-person, noncooperative, nonzero-sum game.18 2
Assume there are two prisoners, A and B, who cannot communicate
and are being interrogated separately about a crime in which they
were coconspirators. Each knows that if the other confesses and
turns state's evidence and he does not, he will receive a long
sentence-life-and the other a short sentence-two years. If neither
confesses both will go free, and if both confess each will receive a
medium term of five years. Hence, the situation is inherently unstable.
The various outcomes may be plotted as follows:

A

Decision

No Confession

Confession

No Confession

0,0

life, 2

Confession

2, life

B
5, 5

Because neither can control what the other will do, each faces two
possible outcome ranges. For example, if A confesses he may be
sentenced to terms of two or five years. If he does not he will be
released or sentenced to life imprisonment. In comparing these
alternatives and deciding whether to confess, A must decide whether
to rank them in terms of the best or the worst outcomes-release as
opposed to two years, or five years as opposed to life. Game theorists
have developed a well-recognized rule for such situations: The
reasonable person should choose the alternative that results in the
best worst-outcome; he should maximize the minimum outcome, or
"maxnmin." Thus, our hypothetical prisoner A should spurn the
chance at freedom, because it carries with it the possibility of an
unacceptable cost-life in prison-and accept the relative safety of
confession. This maximin rule should be employed, game theorists
maintain, when the costs of the worst outcome are unacceptable and
the statistical probabilities are uncertain." 3
382. For a technical analysis of the two-person, noncooperative, nonzero-sum game and its
application to the prisoner's dilemma, see R.D. LUCE &H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONs 88-113
(1957). The authors warn their readers that this model entails special preconditions and cannotbe
applied generally. AL at 88-89.
383. See J. RAWLS, supra note 362, at 152-57. See generallyR.D. LucE &H. RAIFFA, supranote
382, at 275-326 (discussion of individual decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty;,
maximin rule included in list of possible decisionnaking criteria).
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Social contractors are confronted by just such conditions, Rawls
says, at the original position.38 4 Uncertainty exists, the probabilities of
being in the worst-off group are considerable, and the costs of being in
that group are unacceptable. On this logic, Rawls maintains that the
original position contractors should obey the maximin rule and
therefore adopt the difference principle. 385 Similarly, if punishment is,
as here contended, a relevant social institution, the original position
contractors should again opt for the best worst-outcome for the
-worst-off group. This means they would reject incapacitation
determined by social and economic predictors, because the cost of
that alternative is unacceptably high, unless there were no other
means available to minimize the even worse outcome of being
victimized by crime.
In applying Rawls' theory to punishment it is important to pause
and take heed of the chief criticism that logicians and other technical
critics have leveled at the Rawls model: We cannot know that rational
people would choose the maximin rule in the original position. Noting
the extreme pessimism reflected in the rule, these critics have
questioned whether Rawls' original position contractors would be as
risk averse as he claims. The comments of welfare economist A. K.
Sen are representative:
The theory of decision-making under uncertainty does not
yield very definite conclusions on problems of this kind.
Certainly with a predominantly pessimistic outlook, the
maximin rule will be the only one to choose .... In several
institutional questions the appeal of the maximin approach
is well demonstrated by Rawls. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that Rawls' maximin solution is a very special one
and the assertion that it must be chosen in the original
position is not altogether convincing .... To choose one
particular decision rule, viz, maximin, out of many may be
appropriate sometime, but to claim that it must be chosen
by rational individuals in the "original position" seems to be
38 6
a rather severe assumption.
Rawls' choice of the maximin rule may be correct for some decisions,
but not necessarily for all. Even so, the critical point here is that even
if Rawls overstated the applicability of the maximin rule for a
384. J. RAVLS, supra note 362, at 155-57.
385. Id.
386. A.K. SEN. supra note 287, at 140.
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universal theory of justice, it remains the correct model for our special
case, the theory of punishment, which operates within the narrow
context of extreme risk.
Punishment is different. In no other situation is it likely that
reasonable people would be as risk averse. To paraphrase Samuel
Johnson, nothing concentrates the mind like the knowledge that one is
to be hanged. In short, the prospect of punishment involves unacceptable costs and entails considerable uncertainty. Thus, even if reasonable
individuals in the original position might prefer a social structure
favoring the upward mobile over the more egalitarian Rawlsian system,
they should retreat to the maximin rule when confronted with the
possibility of a social institution that measures imprisonment based on
socioeconomic criteria that disfavor the worst-off. For our purposes,
nothing more need be established about the rules for decisionmaking
under uncertainty.
But one final counterargument remains. Given that the maximin
rules should be followed, what is the worst possible outcome it tells us
to avoid? Does not the victim of a serious crime suffer a worse
outcome than the offender who is sentenced to a marginally extended
prison term?3 87 If so, the maximin rule might be read to require rather
than reject incapacitation. But there is an answer to this criticism.
There are alternatives to the prediction table that can generate the
same degree of social protection; in fact, the table basically serves not
to increase benefits but to reduce total costs by concentrating them on
the higher risk offender. Because neither the prediction table nor any
other approach totally obviates the risks of being the victim of a
serious crime, the rational strategy is to employ those alternative
means if they leave us no worse off vis-a-vis death-or any other worst
possible outcome-while enabling us to avoid the second worst
category of outcomes, preventive confinement based in part on social
status. 388
To understand the argument in favor of employing alternative
means that hold the individual no worse off with respect to the
387. This is particularly true when devices such as the Salient Factor Score result in only
marginal enhancement of punishment, on the order of six months to a year, for those in the higher
risk group. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.

388. In other words, once we have maximized the minimum outcome, the next step from the
pessimistic viewpoint of the maximin rule should be to maximize the second worst outcome for
those in the worst-off group. If two alternative social policies produce the same level of protection
from the worst possible outcome (murder, rape, injury, etc.), we should focus next on which

allocates the lesser cost to the worst-off group. Rawls also suggests that we must consider the
second worst outcome after we have dealt with the first. See J. RAWLS, supra note 362, at 83
(advocating maximization of successive worst-off groups until welfare of best-off group
maximized).
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arguably greater danger, it. is necessary to return to our earlier
concept of Pareto optimality. 8 9 In a variant of the difference
principle, Rawls argues that an inequality is not justified if some other
institutional structure will produce the same desired benefit with less
inequality.3 90 Because the unique feature of prediction tables is the
precision with which they calculate the relative risk of recidivism
presented by various classes of offenders, such tables enable us to
quantify the social benefit we expect to realize from them. By the
same token, they also permit us to consider alternative routes to the
same end.
Let us consider the following heuristically simplified example.
Assume our only interest for the moment is in incapacitation, which is,
after all, the raison d'etre of such tables, 391 and that a hypothetical
table can segregate offenders into two groups as follows: (1) a highrisk group having as a group a 60% chance of recidivism within two
years, and (2) a low-risk group having a 40% risk over the same period.
Possessing this knowledge, a Parole Commission adopts a guideline
system that for a given crime assigns four years confinement to the
high-risk group and two years to the low-risk group. We can now
quantify the expected social gain. If each risk group has a population
of 1,000 offenders, we have interdicted 600 criminal careers for an
additional two years by doubling the sentence of the high-risk group.
Now the issue becomes what other alternatives produce the same
coldblooded social benefit with less inequality. The answer is most
easily visualized schematically:
igh 41B

Table IV

2,5)

Risk

(0,0)

"

-

-

Low Risk Group

389. See notes 368-69 .supra and accompanying text.

390. J. RAWS, supra note 362, at 66-67.

391. It is necessary, however, to distinguish prediction tables from guideline systems in
general, because the latter have other functions: they structure discretion, reduce disparities, and
so produce more equality. But prediction of future misconduct is a means of achieving only
incapacitation; it cannot achieve general deterrence or retribution.
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Point A, with the coordinates 2 and 4, represents the sentences
assigned by our hypothetical guideline system. We know that the
marginal effect of such a differentiated sentencing structure is to
interdict temporarily 600 more criminal careers than does a system
that simply assigns two years to all offenders convicted of the same
crime. Calculated differently, the total benefit is the interdiction of
3,200 man-years of criminal careers-400 low-risk group offenders
times two years plus 600 high-risk group offenders times four years.
But now consider point B with the coordinates 0.5 and 5. By assigning
five years to the high risk group and six months to the low risk group,
the total sum of criminal man-years interdicted is still 3,200, though of
course, the relative inequality has increased. Next, for the sake of
deliberate perversity, consider point C, with the coordinates 8 and 0.
Here, the low-risk group receives eight years and the high-risk group
receives probation. Although this allocation may appear insane, the
total benefit under our formula remains constant at 3,200.
Of course, parameters must be placed on the operation of any
system. On the other hand, the eighth amendment lmits the
maximum sentence that may be assigned to any person or group. In
turn, the goal of general deterrence should generate minimum
boundaries. Otherwise there would not be an adequate disincentive
3 92
for other persons who resemble the group given the lower sentence.
Finally, consider point D with the coordinates 3.2 and 3.2. Now we
have an "equal" resolution that also produces the same constant
benefit of 3,200.
Connecting these points with line BC, it is possible to speak of this
line as Pareto optimal in the sense that all points yield the same level
of efficiency, albeit at different costs. It is impossible both to hold
constant the total amount of incapacitation desired-3,200 manyears-and also to change the position of either risk group to make it
better off without also making the other group worse off. Once again
then, we face the problem that a principle of efficiency standing alone
yields an indeterminate solution. The Rawlsian catechism at this point
seemingly dictates that we turn to a principle of justice-the
difference principle-and choose the alternative that minimizes the
inequality, obviously point D with its equal coordinates.
The close observer may have noticed with some dismay, however,
that the various points on line BC involve very different costs when
the total prisoner population is considered. Point D, which is only the
392. To be sure, the mere risk of conviction may be sufficient to deter some, because of the
associated stigma and possible civil penalities and forfeitures attached. Thus, it is possible that

the minimum boundary could consist of a guideline sentence of zero to six months.
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weighted average of 4 and 2 given the different populations of
recidivists in the two groups, raises the per unit cost of incapacitation
over that of point B or A. That is, although all the points on line BC
produce the same benefit in terms of the interdiction of crime, the cost
of point D for the total prisoner population is substantially higher than
that of point A. At point D we have imprisoned 2,000 citizens for an
average of 3.2 years each for a total of 6,400 man-years, as opposed to
only 6,000 man-years at point A, the sum of 4,000 high-risk years plus
2,000 low-risk years. In short, we pay a price for equality-400 man
years in the above example. The pure utilitarian sees the same benefit
obtainable at a lower cost and concludes that point A is more efficient,
or indeed that point B is the most efficient. The Rawlsian observer,
however, believes that efficiency must be subordinated to justice.
Rawls has argued that a less efficient but more fair allocation must be
preferred: "[In justice as fairness, the principles of justice are prior to
considerations of efficiency. .. -"91 Thus, using a similar diagram,
Rawls adds that even nonPareto optimal points below and interior to
our line BC must be chosen over "efficient points which represent
unjust distributions."3 94 In favor of such a conclusion, it may well be
argued that, given the choice, the rational individual would be risk
averse and would follow the maximin rule, thereby choosing the
certainty of 3.2 years over the possibility that a differentiated system
might assign him a substantially longer sentence.
Whatever the Rawlsian would argue, however, the debate does not
end here. A grim trade-off persists between liberty and equality. The
principle that like cases should be treated alike, from a backwardlooking perspective focused on culpability, appears to collide here
with the libertarian principle that the least drastic alternative should
govern the application of punishment.3 95
If we descend from the abstract unreality of economic utility theory
to a world of greater factual complexity, it is possible that this
egalitarian prescription derived from Rawls may entail a lower cost
than first appears likely. If at present some 45% of offenders receive
probation while a few selected offenders receive long term sentences, 96 the weighted average sentence necessary to achieve equality
393. J. RAWLs, supra note 362, at 69.
394. Id
395. The principle of parsimony reflected in the least costly alternative has been advocated by
a number of commissions and embodied in the Model Penal Code. For a list of these commissions
see P. O'DoNNELL, M. CHURGiN&D. CURns,supranote 2, at41 n.2. See also N. MoRRus,supra note
2, at 60-62.
396. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHUGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 25 (45.8% of federal
offenders in fiscal 1972 received probation terms).
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among similarly situated offenders may be lower than it first appears.
Still, a host of other objections to flat-time sentencing materializes.
For example, longer average sentences may acculturate offenders to
crime and breed more criminals,3 97 the families of offenders also will
be adversely affected, and some persons will suffer more from
imprisonment than others. A partial reply to these objections is that
made earlier in the discussion of Professor Posner's model: Loss
spreading reduces the aggregate suffering because it is easier to bear
a deprivation that others are also experiencing. The evidence for this
proposition, however, is more intuitive than empirical, and welfare
economists have long debated whether interpersonal comparisons of
such a kind are possible at all.3 98
But there exists another solution to this conflict between libertarian
and egalitarian principles. A Rawlsian approach does not necessarily
399
mandate rejection of either incapacitation or the prediction table. It
simply holds that reliance on socioeconomic criteria that prejudice the
worst-off group violates the central axiom of the difference principle.
To honor that principle we need not abandon statistical prediction; we
need only observe a side constraint that rejects the use of status as a
means of prediction. Other factors have predictive validity, and most
prediction tables are already primarily based on indicators such as
400
prior convictions and incarcerations, which relate to culpability.
The conflict between predictability and fairness can be avoided by
turning to prediction systems based on prior criminal conduct rather
than social or economic status. 40 ' Any loss in predictive efficiency
397. But see Beck & Hoffman, supra note 173, at 127 (longer imprisonment not criminogenic).
While the evidence is not conclusive for either side in this debate, itis arguable that when forced to
make a decision under conditions of uncertainty, we should at least provisionally opt for more
equal sentences and respond to the argument that this will produce more offenders prone toward
recidivism only when that argument has been more fully demonstrated.
398. See A.K. SEN, supra note 287, at 4-5.
399. Indeed, there are circumstances under which Rawls expressly rationalizes preventive
confinement. See J. RAWLS, supra note 362, at 242-43. Rawls' rationale simply requires that the
justification for such confinement not be based on the utilitarian balancing of the good for most
againstthe loss to some, but on the preservation of "basic equal liberties" for all. Id Punishing the
more culpable with greater severity but within retributive limits achieves a social good, namely
crime prevention, at a lesser cost than equal sentences for all, and thus satisfies utilitarian goals
without offending the Rawlsian notion of basic equal liberties. See notes 413-16 infra and
accompanying text.
400. See text accompanying notes 134-50 supra.
401. Why do sentences based on prior misconduct not also violate the difference principle
when they result in longer terms of imprisonment for minority group offenders than for others?
The Research Director of the Parole Commission has informed me that no variable on the Salient
Factor Score was more racially sensitive than prior convictions. Interview with Dr. Peter Hoffman,
Director of Research, United States Parole Commission (March 22, 1978). But the difference
principle is not applicable, according to Rawls, to the consequences of voluntary action. See note
418 infra Rawls distinguishes between inequalities of birth and inequalities arising from "men's
voluntary actions," and applies his principle only to the former. J. RAnLs, supra note 362, at 96.
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caused by the elimination of variables unrelated to relative
blameworthiness can be compensated for by raising the average
sentence.
To return to our earlier example of the 60% recidivist high-risk
group and the 40% recidivist low-risk group, we may find that the
elimination of neutral socioeconomic variables reduces our predictive
efficiency. Assume that after we purge our prediction table of all
variables unrelated to culpability, the expected recidivism rate of the
high-risk group falls from 60% to 55% with a necessarily corresponding increase in the expected recidivism rate of the low-risk group from
40% to 45%. The membership of the two groups may also change by
an even greater amount, but in any case the total number of recidivists
will remain constant because we are dealing with the same population
but only subdividing it differently. The result of this decline in
predictive efficiency is that it would now take more incapacitation to
obtain the same aggregate amount of social protection.
Rather than choose point D, which designates equal sentences, it
now seems fair to choose a point on line BC whose coordinates assign
to the low-risk group two-year sentences, or whatever minimum
sentence seems desirable from the standpoint of deterrence or
incapacitation, and to the high-risk group that longer sentence
necessary to hold constant the level of incapacitation desired. For
example, point A (with coordinates 2 and 4) would produce
approximately the same benefit in terms of the interdiction of
recidivist criminal careers, but with less total deprivation of liberty
than point D. By extending the high-risk sentence to 4.18, the total
incapacitation could be held exactly constant. It is not suggested that
any fixed point is mandated, but only that we can make conscious
choices, based on our justifying aim for imprisonment, that do not
involve measuring punishment based on status.
Of course, some problems will remain regarding equality among
offenders. For example, is the difference in degree of culpability
between two groups in our hypothetical sufficient to justify the
disparity between the sentences at coordinates 2 and 4? If it is not, we
can move the sentence closer to a weighted average of the two,
thereby sacrificing once again a degree of liberty as the price of
equality. In short, discretion is largely preserved under such a model.
Nothing forces us to hold sentences strictly proportional to
culpability; instead, a far less intrusive negative injunction commands
us only to forego prediction systems that are unnecessarily adverse to
the least favored within society.
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E. A COMPARISON OF THE EGALITARIAN AND
RETRIBUTIVE MODELS
Heuristic examples have a way of antagonizing readers. Either they
seem unreal and irrelevant, or the reader may begin to feel that he has
been patronized and force fed an ideological position that is either
less novel or more questionable in its assumptions than the author is
willing to acknowledge. For the reader who has now patiently plodded
through such an example, two questions may stand out to make him
wonder whether it has been worth the effort to journey so far afield
from the comfortable homeland of case law.
* If the Constitution did not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics, 40 2 presumably neither will it enact Mr. John Rawls' A
Theory of Justice. In short, what is the relevance of jurisprudential
arguments that cannot be directly addressed to courts?
* Does not the foregoing model simply follow a less traveled path to
produce the same results as the retributive model of DoingJustice?
Both approaches seem to key the allocation of punishment to
relative blameworthiness and reject reliance on socioeconomic
criteria unrelated to culpability. Is not the proposed model simply
a more complicated route to the same end?
The issue, then, is whether the game has been worth the candle. Several overlapping reasons can briefly be given to point out both the
operational differences between the two models and the importance of
the abstract foundation on which we rest any applied theory of
punishment.
Initially, our purpose was to demonstate that if we could not
accept the naked utilitarian justification for punishment, we could
better articulate our objections by using the Rawlsian syntax than by
resorting to highly subjective natural law concepts such as retribution.
On the narrowest of grounds-that of Ockham's Razor 4 0 3-a Rawlsian
model takes us to our goal more directly: We adopt the principle of
justice that we claim reasonable men, blind to their own position,
would be forced to choose. In contrast, the starting point of the
retributive model involves a more mysterious assumption: that it is
desirable to punish those who commit crimes because they "deserve"
it. For many, this "just deserts" principle is the problem, because
unlike deterrence or incapacitation it does not adequately explain the
end that is sought. Thus, as the principle of Ockham's Razor teaches,
402. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
403. William of Ockham, a fourteenth century English philosopher, first formulated the ruleknown as Ockham's Razor-that superfluous concepts are to be avoided and the simplest model
that explains the observed phenomena should be preferred.
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unnecessary arguments are to be avoided; here the superfluous
concept is retribution, and it can be eliminated by focusing on
Rawlsian principles of justice.
In addition, the rationale of retribution is not only mysterious in its
subjectivity; it is also dangerous. Abstract concepts can develop a
momentum of their own, sweeping up theorists and technicians in
their wake. Keynes said it best when he noted that even the most
practical man of affairs is often at heart the slave of some defunct
economist. Here, the dangers of legitimizing retribution, pointed to
earlier, also show the importance of how we articulate ideas.
Concededly, it is unlikely that courts will ever read the equal
protection clause as if it had been written by Rawls' representative
citizens in the original position.40 4 But such models do shape the
consciousness of so-called practical men, and in so doing they shape the
jurisprudential framework within which practical men of law, including
the new sentencing bureaucrats, will labor.
In addition to these theoretical distinctions, major operational
differences between the Rawlsian and retributionist approaches
should be noted. First, our proposed model is essentially Janus-faced
in allowing us to look both ways-forward to prevention in justifying
punishment and backward to culpability in framing a side constraint
on the allocation of punishment. In contrast, a purely backwardlooking system must inquire into what level of punishment is deserved
by a given offense-an inquiry that often seems hopelessly subjective.
Under the suggested model, one could begin instead by seeking to
establish the desired "expected punishment cost," to borrow
Posner's phrase 40 5 but not his formula for deriving it. Having thus
looked forward to prevention, we would then look backward to
determine that the allocation of that cost treats like cases alike.
In short, the minimal allocation requirement is not a rigid scale of
proportionality between offenses, but only a scale under which
persons guilty of the same offense are not differentiated in a way that
violates side constraints protecting the least favored. For example,
from the retributive perspective the spouse murderer commits a
crime of high gravity, but from a prospective orientation that crime
requires a relatively low expected punishment cost. Because no
punishment is required under our model for nonutilitarian reasons,
the sentence assigned to the spouse murderer may be equal or even
404. Cases such as McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973), do suggest that there is little
possibility that courts will utilize the equal protection clause to invalidate punishment allocation
decisions that bear a reasonable relationship to some legitimate objective. As noted earlier,
however, there are hints in the dicta of earlier constitutional decisions that punishment should be
proportional to culpability. See note 69 supra
405. R. POSNER, supra note 311, at 165.
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less than that given the extortionist or the armed robber, whose
crimes are less serious but more deterrable and more likely of
repetition. By no means is a common sense scale of proportionality
irrelevant, but under the proposed model it should serve as a
prudential guide rather than a fixed star.
The implementation of expected punishment costs may not sound
feasible. Yet with the advent of quasi-administrative sentencing
agencies, it is now within the realm of the possible. These institutions
eventually will be in a position to do what the individual sentencing
judge cannot do-take a systemwide view. From siAch perspective, the
agency should be able to determine (1) the desired aggregate
punishment cost, or at the very least the amount of increase or
decrease desired from the current level; (2) the probable number of
individuals coming before it-the relevant offender pool within which
that aggregate cost would have to be allocated; and (3) a fair ceiling on
to any one individual, in essence the
the per unit cost allocable
406
retributive limit concept.
Another virtue of the retention by the proposed model of a forwardlooking prevention orientation is the flexibility it offers. A backwardlooking perspective is largely static; it cannot easily change its view of
the relative culpability of a particular crime simply because of a need
for greater social protection. Assume a particular crime, such as drug
sales or antitrust violations, reaches epidemic proportions. To defend
itself society wishes to raise the expected punishment cost. Under a
retributive model, this would be a difficult matter, because the fact
that "everyone is doing it" hardly increases the gravity of an offense.
Rather, it tends to diminish it. 40 7 Still, most would agree that the
406. A far more complex approach to determining the optimum sentence length through costbenefit analysis has been recently suggested by a University of Illinois research team headed by
Professor Stuart Nagel. They would determine a recidivism cost curve and an incarceration cost
curve and, after plotting them on the same graph, set the standard sentence at their intersection.
Innovative and novel as their approach is, I remain skeptical as to whether these costs are truly
comparable and whether their proposals show the full human costs of either recidivism or
incarceration. Research, however, has begun in Illinois on how these proposals might be
Sentences, 61
implemented. See Nagel, Neef& Weiman, A RationalMethodforDeterminingPrison
JUDICATURE 371 (1978).
407. Packer has suggested that not only do the retributive and incapacitative rationales
produce different results on given facts, but they naturally tend toward diametrically opposed
results: "Baldlyput, the incapacitative theory is atits strongestfor those who, in retributive terms,
are the least deserving of punishment." H. PACKER, supranote 253, at 50-51. The incapacitative
claim is weakest, he added, for the gravest offenses, and deterrence as a justification works far
better against "high-risk deliberate crimes and crimes committed by the law-abiding" than
against other crimes that may be at least as serious from a retributive perspective. IM at 269.
Zimring and Hawkins have reached a similar conclusion that a deterrence-based rationale for
punishment may result in an allocation that is inversely proportional to culpability. F. ZIMRING &
G. HAWrNIUs, supra note 264, at 41.
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increased popularity of some crimes does give rise to a need for
° Thus, another comparative
greater deterrence. 408
advantage of our
proposed model is that we can periodically raise the punishment cost
to respond to changing circumstances without employing the strained
intellectual rationalizations that would be necessary under a
retributive model. Equally important, we can reduce that cost once
the epidemic subsides, thereby achieving greater parsimony in the use
of punishment. How does this differ from the use of exemplary
sentences previously criticized? Here we are spreading costs; under
our retrospective allocation principle, all offenders receive the same
level of punishment, subject to variation only for differences in their
degree of culpability. A select few are not isolated as scapegoats.
In sum, these differences indicate that egalitarian side constraints
involve a less fundamental frustration of the preventive aims of a
utilitarian criminal justice system than does the imposition of a
retributive framework. At worst, the proposed model raises the costs
of achieving our aims by preventing the use in some instances of
highly predictive criteria that fail the difference principle test. This is
a far lesser sacrifice than under a retributive theory that would force
the criminal justice system to change its end goal from prevention to
the dispensation of just deserts.
A final operational difference between a retributive model and an
egalitarian one involves their differing use of information suggestive of
culpability. Doing Justice suggests that one must look at the
individual's prior crimes. Others would go much further.4 °9 Certainly,
current sentencing law allows evidence of uncharged crimes and even
misconduct short of crime to be considered at sentencing as a basis
for enhanced punishment. 41 0 But what if such information has no
measurable predictive power? Under a retributive model, this is not
relevant: the more blameworthy deserve more punishment. Under our
proposed system, we need respond only to gross differences in
culpability that relate to some utilitarian consideration. The real
difference here is likely to be in the degree of inquiry into the
offender's past history that the two rival models tend to encourage. If
we postulate as our first principle that punishment must be
408. See J. RAwLS, supra note 362, at 242-43.
409. See notes 358-59 supra and accompanying text (views of Professors Gardner and
Goldstein).
410. See, e.g., United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972) (evidence relating to
charges may be considered at sentencing despite defendant's acquittal; acquittal does not
disprove all evidence introduced against defendant); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721
(2d Cir.) (counts dismissedfrom indictment because of statute of limitations may be considered in
sentencing; criminal activity of defendant, particularly activity related to instant crime, highly
relevant), cert denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
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proportional to culpability, we authorize a more elaborate inquiry into
the offender's past life and general character. The current
presentence inquiry already errs in this direction, and the substitution
of a "just deserts" model for a "treatment" model may only change
the type of information sought. If, as argued earlier, a zealous attempt
to unearth all signs of an individual's prior culpability tends to
produce an impressionistic methodology, one that will most likely
prejudice that social underclass relatively more exposed to institutionalized recordkeeping, 411 then another basis exists for preferring
the proposed model over a retributive one. Other social values are
also implicated here: Even the ex-offender deserves some measure of
privacy and a "forgiveness point" at which old records selfdestruct.4 12 The tendency of a system of punishment geared to
relative culpability is to override these values.
A counterargument surfaces here. Is not this willingness to be
nearsighted about evidence of culpability inconsistent with the
proposed egalitarian side constraint when persons unequal in terms of
prior culpability receive the same sentence? At this point it seems
necessary to refine the concept of equality that arises from the
difference principle. Traditionally, the idea of equality among
offenders has been understood as having two components: Like cases
should be treated alike, and unlike cases should be treated
differently. 413 Surprisingly, it is hard to find a theorist who has
considered whether we can accept the first proposition without fully
endorsing the second. Any system of punishment, however, inevitably
treats dissimilar persons similarly when it places a ceiling on
punishment. This would occur even in capital cases unless different,
41 4
excruciating tortures were devised for the most culpable.
411. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 1394-1405, 1458-62; text accompanying notes 33-35, 20910 supra.
412. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 1395, 1459-60 nn.370 & 371. Old police and juvenile records
may be of little predictive value because of staleness; while records remain static, the individuals
described change over time. Moreover, such reports may be highly prejudicial, subject as they are
to "Gresham's Law of Information": the unfavorable information overtakes the favorable
information because it is easier for a probation or parole officer to rely on outdated accounts than
to conduct his own independent investigation. Finally, the application of old records to a new
context may be of questionable validity. Id at 1395. It may therefore be desirable to reduce
information disparities by generally restricting the decisionmaking process to classes of data that
are available on a relatively equal basis for all offenders, thus excising reports resulting from the
subject's overexposure to recordkeeping. Id at 1459-60.
413. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 24-25, 172.
414. Because death was used more commonly as a sanction for crime, medieval thinkers
worried about this problem and sought to devise crueler forms of execution for the more severe
varieties of capital offenses, lest criminals who committed a capital offense would face no
disincentive to commit additional crimes. See R. POSNER, supra note 311, at 171.
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The difference principle standing alone only partially incorporates
these two ideas. Because it focuses on structural inequalities that
disfavor the social underclass, it requires as its minimum side
constraint only that disproportionate punishment not be imposed on
members of that class for reasons unrelated to individual culpability.
Strictly interpreted, the difference principle does no more; inherently,
it is not offended by treating members of more favored classes, such
as white collar offenders, more harshly than would be justified under a
ritributive scale of offense gravity. It would thus be permissible to set
a higher per unit punishment cost for a white collar crime that had
reached an epidemic stage than that concurrently imposed for crimes
of higher gravity. 41" Nor is the difference principle offended by
treating unlike cases similarly if we accomplish this result by
compressing the punishment scale; thus, for example, use of
probation as a sentencing alternative seems more compatible with an
egalitarian model than a retributive one. This is not to argue that we
should abandon either of these traditional rules of equality, which can
be defended on the utilitarian ground that the appearance of justice
and a respect for common morality must be maintained if the system
is to be respected. But again, we find that the side constraints of this.
model impose fewer restrictions on our preventive aims than would a
retributive approach. A scale of proportionality among offenses seems
required under a strict interpretation of the difference principle only
to the extent necessary to preclude disproportionately high
punishment costs for crimes that are disproportionately committed by
416
the worst-off group.
On the continuum of currently available theories of punishment, the
model now outlined probably fits somewhere between those of Morris
and DoingJustice. The zone of indeterminacy permitted by the Morris
model is here reduced by an allocation principle that generally
415. Note, however, that because our basic justification was preventive, we must believe that
such increased punishment would result in greater deterrence, and the penaltymust still be within
an outer retributive limit.
416. Although crimes are the result of voluntary action and differences in sentence lengths do
not automatically offend the difference principle should they adversely affect the worst-off
groups, see note 401 supra, structural inequalities between the amount of punishment given for
different crimes of similar gravity does offend the quintessential Rawlsian notion of "basic equal
liberties" if the disparity prejudices the worst-off group. This problem is aggravated by the
tendency of different groups to commit different crimes. See note 399 supra.The converse is not
necessarily true, however, because members of better-off groups already enjoy more advantages,
which can be justified within a Rawlsian framework only if such inequality improves the position of
the worst-off. Therefore, to assess a higher expected punishment cost against such better-off
groups only restores the balance and does not necessarily violate the idea of basic equal liberties.
Put differently, it constitutes not a discriminatory pricing system, but a form of progressive
taxation. See note 318 supra.
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will produce either equality in sentences assigned persons who have
committed the same level of offense, or proportionality in accordance
4 17
with their prior culpability.
F.

SOME FINAL COUNTERARGUMENTS: THE ASSUMPTION OF

RISK OBJECTION AND THE CLAIMED PRIORITY FOR LIBERTY

Tempting as it might be to write Q.E.D. at this point, some
objections must still be addressed concerning whether one can utilize
the difference principle as the basis for developing a theory of
punishment. These counterarguments are:
(1) Participation in crime is voluntary; punishment,
therefore, even if unequal, is knowingly risked and hence
418
not unfair;
(2) A theory of punishment should not have to meet the
standards of an ideal normative theory such as that
developed by Rawls, but may instead be judged by less
rigorous standards; 419 and
(3) When trade-offs exist between liberty and equality, the
Rawlsian system itself always assigns a clear-cut priority to

liberty.

420

The first of these arguments derives apparent support from the
Rawlsian catechism which holds that "inequalities... aris[ing] from
men's voluntary actions" are not inherently unjust. 421 Obviously,
some distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions is
inevitable. It would be beyond the capacity of any social structure to
hold everyone harmless for differences in wealth or power brought
about through their own volition. Moreover, the internal mechanics of
417. Morris rejected, for sentencing purposes, the concept of enhanced punishment based on
the prediction of dangerousness or future misconduct of the particular defendant, but he accepted
the enhancement of punishment within an outer retributive limit in order to achieve general
deterrence. See N. MoRRIs, supranote 2, at 76. Once we no longer seek to reconcile utilitarian and
retributive concepts in one model, but seek only to circumscribe a utilitarian model with an
egalitarian side constraint borrowed from Rawls, it becomes possible to predict future recidivism
within Morris' zone of indeterminacy on the basis of prior culpable acts. To permit, of course, is
notto require, and some methodological obstacles may remain, although the success of the Salient
Factor Score suggests they are not insurmountable.
418. Rawls states that the difference principle does not apply to the consequences ofvoluntary
actions. See note 401 supra.
419. Cf J. RAWLS, supra note 362, at241-43, 315 ("question of criminal justice belongs for the
most part to the partial compliance theory").
420. See id. at 243-51, 541-48.
421. See id. at 96.
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the Rawlsian system would break down if the relative position of
groups in society, and hence that of the worst-off group, were to be
determined in part on the basis of voluntary decisions. Consider the
absurdity of deeming prisoners the relevant worst-off group. To
justify the imposition of punishment, the difference principle would
then require a showing that punishment worked to the advantage of
the worst-off group-a virtual impossibility now that the age of faith in
rehabilitation has ended. Not surprisingly then, Rawls emphasizes
that the worst-off group is to be determined 422by involuntary
differences, such as race, sex, or economic status.
Once we follow this directive and identify the worst-off group as
comprising not prisoners or criminals but that social underclass
defined by limited education, substantial unemployment, long term
poverty, and typically minority group status, we must still examine
whether a particular system of punishment improves the welfare of
that group as much as would an alternative system of punishment that
produces the same level of social protection. We may thus consider
how a particular institution (punishment) treats voluntary action
taken by the worst-off group. Our system of punishment is in part a
taxing system. If it charges a discriminatory price by using statussensitive criteria, that price is not beyond the scrutiny of the
difference principle simply because the conduct taxed was voluntarily
undertaken. 423 To confer a wider immunity on voluntary actions from
the operation of the difference principle would be to overread Rawls,
whose purpose here is only to set up a limiting criterion by which to
define his least-favored group. Where the reason for the rule stops, so
should the rule.
The second argument for rejecting the difference principle-that
problems of criminal justice belong not in the domain of pure theory
but in that of applied theory424 -overlaps with the question of the
422. See id.at 99. But see text accompanying note 441 infra (discussion of the gray area in which
factors relating to conduct overlap with those relating to status).
423. Put simply, voluntary action does not define the least-favored group, but once that group
is properly defined we must consider whether its members are charged a higher price than others
for participation in a given activity.
Questions then arise regarding the use of culpability-related predictors, as opposed to neutral
socioeconomic factors, because predictors such as prior convictions tend to be disproportionately associated with minority group offenders, at least in the case of the validation of the
Salient Factor Score. See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra. Two answers may be given.
First, the multiple offender may legitimately be charged a higher price than the first offender
because repetition of a crime is an activity qualitatively different from its original commission.
Thus, the differential in penalties is nondiscriminatory. Second, the level of culpability within the
worst-off group is not a relevant characteristic of that group, and only differentials in treatment
that relate to the relevant characteristics of that group can offend the difference principle.
424. See note 419 supra.
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consequences of voluntary action. Having assigned problems of
criminal justice to partial compliance theory, Rawls seems to suggest
that more relaxed standards should govern this area. Although this
distinction between pure and applied theory approaches the kind of
definitional stop fallacy that Hart has warned haunts all discussions of
punishment,4 25 there still are two reasons why the difference principle
should govern, even within the context of partial compliance theory.
First, poverty is criminogenic. 426 The representative citizens in
Rawls' original position, therefore, would be concerned that they and
their descendants might be exposed to an unequal risk of punishment.
Second, and perhaps more important, if our representative
citizens truly understood the structure of society, 427 they would
probably view crime in a different light than does Rawls.42 s Studies
tend to show that surprisingly high percentages of citizens have
committed crimes. 4 29 Legal theorists have increasingly come to view
noncompliance with law as inevitable and to call for remedies aimed at
reducing crime to optimum levels rather than striving for total
prevention. 43 0 The modern tendency among criminologists is to speak
425. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 253, at 5; text accompanying note 262 supra.
426. See N. MORRIS. supra note 2, at 83 (defining a "highly criminogenic social group" as one
suffering "disrupted family setting in an underclass whose life experiences are typified by
fortuitous involvements in crime").
427. See J. RAWLS, supra note 362, 137-38 (original position contractors presumed to know
general facts about human society, such as political affairs, economic theory, social organization,
and laws of human psychology).
428. When Rawls turned to the topic of punishment, he immediately focused on the issues of
responsibility and the need for a fair opportunity to ascertain the law's directives. See id at 241.
He consigned the problems of punishment allocation largely to partial compliance theory. See id.
at 315. In short, his representative citizens in the original position appear to have attended
Professor Hart's Oxford classes onmensrea, but not to have learned that noncompliance with the
law is a pervasive fact in modem society.
429. For example, Marvin Wolfgang's classic study of a birth cohort showed that over one-third
of the boys studied acquired a police record. See Wolfgang, supra note 41. Yet this figure related
only to the level of detected crime-crime resulting in either apprehension or some form of policecitizen contact. Various estimates suggest that only 15-25% of all crimes committed are actually
reported. See R. HOOD &R. SPARKS, supra note 24, at 15 (data gathered in England). Studies of
juveniles have shown that a majority of male youths have admitted at least one serious offense.
See, e.g., idt at 21 (data gathered in Stockholm). Even among adults, the percentages reported for
some less serious crimes and for white collar crimes has run as high as 85%. Id at 47-51 (data
based on New York study). See also Erickson & Empey, CourtRecords, Undetected Delinquency
andDecision.making,54 J. CRim.L.C. &P.S. 456 (1963); Gold, UndetectedDelinquentBehavior,J.
OF RESEARCH IN CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 27 (1966); Short & Nye, Extent of UnrecordedJuvenile
Delinquency,49 J. CRIm L.C. &P.S.296 (1958). For a general assessment of self-reporting studies
see F. ZINRING & G.HAWKINS, supra note 264, at 321-27.
430. See generally R. PosNE, supra note 311, at 166; Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of
Laws, 78 J. POL EcoN. 526 (1970); Note, supranote 304. Earlier utilitarians also recognized that
"a certain amount of non-observance is rather advantageous...." Note, supraat 687 n.3 (quoting
H. Sidgwick).
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of the "normality of crime," to stress its pervasiveness as a social
phenomenon, and to reject the view of the criminal as qualitatively
different. 431 But the concept of the criminal as different-whether he
is regarded as "sick" or as "wicked"-remains deeply embedded in
the ideology of our criminal justice system.4 32 Indeed, this concept has
433
roots in the Calvinistic origins of that system.
How we view crime and how we deal with it are closely related. If
our hypothetical citizens saw crime not as a phenomenon unique to
criminals but as one "common to human beings, ' 43 4 they would be
less likely to ignore the allocation of the costs imposed. In this light,
punishment emerges as a social institution that must concern the
original social contractors. The relative immunity to punishment
enjoyed by less disadvantaged citizens (who would be considered low
risks according to prediction tables) resembles a structural inequality
closely tied to social and economic circumstances. In sum, a theory of
punishment is too important to the fabric of any rational society to be
consigned to the second order status that Rawls seemingly gives it.
A final problem with extending the difference principle to the
criminal justice context is that Rawls seems to give a priority to liberty
over the value of equality. 435 The short answer here is that "liberty" in
the Rawlsian sense should not mean freedom from lawfully imposed
punishments.4 3 6 Rawls' first principle that all should enjoy the most
extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for others 4 "1 may
logically be applied to questions about who may be punished, but not to
questions of punishment allocation. If we view punishment as a
taxing system, as does the utilitarian, the difference principle and not
Rawls' first principle naturally applies to all questions of punishment
allocation. Indeed, to apply the first principle in this context would
seem to force one to make seemingly self-contradictory statements.
Can one, for example, meaningfully talk about the "most extensive
liberty to commit crimes compatible with a like liberty for others"?
Finally, even if one colicludes that the first principle applies, it does not
logically yield a principle of parsimony such as that offered by Morris. 4 38
431. See, e.g., R. HOOD & R. SPARKs,supranote24, at46-47; Griffiths, supra note 294, at 1416,
1402-03.
432. See Porterfield, The "We-They" Fallacyin Thinking About Delinquents and Criminals,in
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND MODERN PENOLOGY 133 (w. Lyle & T. Homer eds. 1973).
433. See Dershowitz, BackgroundPaper,in FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 83 (1976).
434. Griffiths, supra note 294, at 1416.
435. See J. RAWLS, supra note 362, at 250 (liberty "can be restricted only for the sake of
liberty").
436. See iL at 60.
437. Id. at 60, 250.
438. N. MORRIS. supra note 2, at 60-62.
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Rather, the first principle so used would still have its built-in rule of
equality, namely that the liberty recognized must be compatible with a
effect, this means any sanctions
like degree of freedom for others. In
43 9
imposed must be equally imposed.
We can now reexamine critically the tension between the goals of
liberty and equality that arises when we attempt to justify a theory
potentially requiring more punishment than alternatives producing
the same social benefit. Whether the conflict between those goals is
real or spurious depends on our definitions. If liberty means the
maximization of happiness, our proposed model may involve a
potentially higher cost because it may sacrifice a degree of predictive
efficiency. But if we define liberty as Rawls did, to mean rights that all
can possess equally, then the conflict between liberty and equality
dissolves, because there cannot be a right to less than equal
punishment. This does not mean that all must be punished equally or
even according to their culpability; it means only that to the extent the
individual can have rights in this context, the rights given by a
Rawlsian system should be to equal treatment, rather than to the
minimum sanction possible.
G. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: WHAT SHOULD A SENTENCING
COMMISSION DO?
The proposed model indicates that it is unfair to allocate
punishment on the basis of status, but permissible to do so on the
basis of conduct. This conduct-status distinction cannot be avoided
by asserting that the intent of the system is to predict recidivism
rather than to discriminate deliberately.
What kind of guideline system should a Sentencing Commission
then adopt? Surprisingly, it could look much the same as it does now.
The important difference is that the X axis would have to be purged of
predictive criteria relating to status. Once this is done, a side
constraint model is compatible with a system that predicts recidivism
on the basis of voluntary conduct and so increases punishment on the
basis of prior culpable acts. The two axes then might compare the
439. One could read the first principle to require a rule of similar sentences for the similarly

situated and hence a scale of proportionality. But to do so changes our model from one involving a
side constraint to one positing end state goals, because our goal would then be to maximize equal
liberty for all rather than the more modest objective of preventing a disproportionate allocation of
costs to the least favored. Moreover, such goal is illusory. The interests of victims and those of
offenders inevitably conflict. It is therefore nonsensical to conclude that at some level of
punishment these two groups possess equal basic liberties. The difference principle supplies a
superior mode of analysis because it offers a means of allocating costs but does not purport to
define the aggregate punishment cost that must be imposed.
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present offense and the past level of culpability-to the exent the
latter positively correlates with recidivism-and thereby determine a
guideline range. Other contemporary models deny us this flexibility.
Norval Morris' system wholly rejects predictions of future
misconduct, and the Doing Justice model locks us into a rigid scale of
44 0
proportionality, which entails various dangers.
A final complication must be acknowledged. The line between
conduct and status is frequently blurred. Indeed, most predictors fall
into a gray area; they are neither purely the consequence of voluntary
action nor wholly the result of involuntary status. For example,
441
consider the use in the Salient Factor Score of prior incarcerations.
Such a factor appears to measure the offender's level of prior
culpability. Presumably, the prior sentencing judge confined him to
prison rather than releasing him on probation largely because of the
severity of his crime or the existence of prior culpable acts indicated
in the presentence report. This often may be the case, but it is also
possible that other considerations such as race, socioeconomic status,
or derivatives of that status affected the judge's decision.442 To the
extent that marked disparities exist between the rates of
imprisonment for white collar offenders and for other offenders, 443
prior incarcerations may serve as a measure more of the category of
law previously violated than of the gravity of prior offenses.
The problem of distinguishing measures of conduct from those of
status cannot be ideally resolved in a real world setting. Even if
criteria such as prior incarcerations were eliminated, there would
remain the problem that other, more clearly culpability-oriented
factors such as prior convictions, are subject to related criticisms.
Apprehension rates, for instance, differ markedly for different crimes.
Nevertheless, although the dividing line between conduct and status is
often blurred, we should not discard the distinction. It retains a
fundamental and easily perceived equity despite problems in its
application. Few would deny that there is a difference between
440. See text accompanying notes 330 & 343-44 supra.
441. See note 124 supra. The blurring of conduct and status is also present in the use of prior
parole revocations, because of the ability of parole officials to revoke parole for technical reasons
other than commission of a crime.
442. See Dershowitz, supra note 433, at 105-06 (considering all factors); Tiffany, Avichai &
Peters, A StatisticalAnalysis of Sentencing in Federal Courts: Defendants Convicted After Trial
1967-68, 4 J. OF LEGAL STUDIEs 369, 386-88 (1975) (discussing impact particularly of appointed
versus retained counsel).
443. Seymour, 1972 Sentencing Study for the SouthernDistrictof New York; 45 N.Y. ST. B. J.
163, 164 (1973) (reporting a 36% rate ofimprisonment for white collar offenders versus a53% rate
for defendants convicted of nonviolent common crimes in general and an 80% rate for those
convicted of violent common crimes).
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increasing the offender's sentence because of a prior conviction and
increasing that same sentence because the offender was unmarried or
had failed to finish the twelfth grade. These difficulties in drawing
exact distinctions should not cause us to reject the goal of minimizing
the degree to which punishment is based on status, but should instead
bring us back full circle. Because there are no perfect solutions, we
need a system that yields politically visible and accountable answers.
Because the line drawn between conduct and status will be somewhat
arbitrary, the process of line drawing should be subject to public
scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
Lawyers tend to defer to experts. During the last decade, the legal
profession learned to view skeptically the asserted clinical ability of
the psychiatrist to predict dangerousness. During the next decade,
the legal profession must come to terms with the actuarial
methodology of the criminologist-cum-statistician. Because the
number of offenders facing sentencing or parole decisions is far
greater than the number of those pleading the insanity defense, the
stakes are now considerably higher.
The problems are also different today. The danger most frequently
encountered in the lawyer-clinician relationship was the tendency of
the clinician to overpredict and to seek to preempt the legal
decisionmaker. Now the hazards are more subtle. Because the
structuring of discretion may also tilt the exercise of discretion in ways
that are themselves predictable-namely, toward the objective factor
of risk and away from the subjective factor of culpability-greater
visibility is necessary to ensure that value questions are not subordinated.
Properly controlled, a guideline system need not "dehumanize"
sentencing, but to guard against the dangers that "soft" variables will
be ignored and questions of distributive justice downgraded, an
adequate accommodation must yet be worked out between the lawyer
and the expert on this new macroscopic level. This article has suggested
that the special responsibilities of the lawyer on this level are two-fold:
(1) He must compel the expert to frame issues, rather than permit him
to resolve them himself, and to frame them in a way that maximizes the
political visibility of the relevant options; and (2) he must offer
normative critiques of this new science of prediction-a task for which
he is uniquely well suited. In the aftermath of the criminologist's new
achievement, the ethics of prediction remain largely unexplored. This
article has offered at best a tentative model. At the heart of that model
are three core ideas.
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1. Cost Spreading. Social costs should be distributed evenly rather
than disproportionately loaded on a select few. Although this idea
constitutes Rawls' basic critique of utilitarianism, it can also be
articulated from a conventional utilitarian standpoint, because loss
44
sharing reduces the perceived costs to those who must bear them.
Categoric risk prediction systems thus become objectionable because
of their tendency to focus costs rather than to spread them. This does
not mean that categoric risk techniques must be rejected entirely. But
when we choose to deviate from a basic norm of cost spreading, that
departure may be justified on the grounds of some overriding moral
principle, such as the desirability of allocating punishment in
445
proportion to culpability.

2. Side Constraints. This article has sought to formulate an
architectural critique of the design of jurisprudential models in this
area. Those that employ a side constraint structure possess definite
comparative advantages over those that seek to define a desired end
state. To insist only that status not be used as a basis for the
allocation of punishment interferes far less with legislative
prerogatives, with common sense considerations, and with our ability
to respond to changed circumstances in the future than does the
assertion that punishment must always be proportional to the gravity
of the offense. Flexibility is one of the key justifications for a
Sentencing Commission. A more rigid theoretical model might thus
tend to disable such a Commission. A side constraint model also better
avoids the perils of ipse dixitism. As Hart, Packer, and Nozick have
shown, it is far more persuasive to demonstrate why a limitation is
necessary than to make a bald assertion about the end goals society
should pursue.
3. Predictability.Prediction is a means, not an end. Knowing who is
more likely to become a recidivist does not dictate how one should act
on the basis of that knowledge. Such knowledge should instead raise
two questions. By what alternative means can we produce the same
benefit as can be obtained by differentiating offenders according to
444. See, e.g., G. CLABREsi, supra note 323; notes 323-25 supra and accompanying text.
445. This article has sidestepped the problem of defining culpability, in part out of cowardly

recognition that all such definitions are highly vulnerable to criticism. See, e.g., Griffiths, supra
note 294, at 1446-47. In addition, a side constraint model that speaks in terms of negative
injunctions requires a less elaborate definition of culpability. Although the problem offormulating
such a definition must inevitably be faced, I suspect that on the operational level of a categoric risk
system the only alternatives are to rely on prior convictions and possibly prior incarcerations or on
an expanded real offense hearing procedure. See note 57 supra (criticism of the incongruous lack
of procedural safeguards governing current hearing procedures of the U.S. Parole Commission).
The classic work on the general topic of defining culpability is J. FEINBERG. DOING AND DESERVING
(1970).
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their propensity toward recidivism? Which of the available
alternatives is more fair?
Others will undoubtedly discern more points of contact between
criminal justice and welfare economics that have escaped this writer's
attention.4 46 In part, a new vocabulary is needed because normative
theory has yet to catch up with the developing practice of prediction.
Until it does, one must settle for a second-best answer: a system in
which value decisions are more visible and decisionmakers are subject
to greater accountability through the political process.

446. A particularly interesting approach has recently been mapped from such a starting point
by Professors Calabresi and Bobbitt in the field of welfare economics. See G. CALABRESI & P.
BOBBrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). Because they use the term "tragic choice" to refer to the social
dilemmas caused by the need to allocate scarce but vital resources (such as artificial kidney
machines), it does not quite apply in our context of punishment allocation, since punishment is a
cost rather than a benefit. Still, their analysis offers some penetrating insights.
Typically, they say, society refuses to respond to the necessity of making tragic allocations with
any truly rational mechanism-be it a pure market approach, an accountable political process, or
an egalitarian lottery. Instead, the "customary approach" i- "the avoidance of self conscious
choice: The method of choosing is not explicitly chosen and may not even be known by the mass of
people." Id at 44-45. In the language of this article, such issues are repressed. One technique of
avoidance, they add, is to decentralize the decision by giving it to what they term an "aresponsible
agency," which is representative and decentralized, and need give "no reasons for its decisions."
Id at 57. As an example of such an agency that can decide cases without articulating reasons that
would necesarily give rise to value conflicts, they cite the role ofjuries in euthanasia cases. But the
sentencing judge may be an even better example. His capacity to decide the issue without
articulating any consistent, if socially divisive, body of principles will, however, be curtailed by a
sentencing commission, with the result that increased conflict over issues of punishment will be

likely.
Finally, they note that where a rationale must be expressed for an allocative decision, the
tendency is to convert such a decision "from one of allocation to one of absolute worthiness,"
because society seeks to avoid making naked, allocative decisions. Id at 64. Arguably, the recent
revival of interest in retribution is consistent with this phenomenon: In the name of administering
"just deserts," legal theorists are converting an allocation decision into a "worthiness" decision.
A concluding observation made by these authors offers an additional interesting thought: all
allocative processes they studied eventually led to substantial dissatisfaction and ultimately
forced decisionmakers to turn their attention from the "second order" issue of allocation to the
"first order" issue of how to increase the supply of the scarce resource being allocated. Id at 190.
Will the problems of allocating punishment by more formalized criteria analogously cause
decisionmakers to reconsider the total amount of that cost (i.e. punishment) to be imposed? This
may be an overly optimistic prophecy, but a more egalitarian sentencing structure could well
have the effect of inducing society to reduce the aggregate punishment costs levied in order to
lessen the per unit costs imposed on the more privileged offender. In the long run, then, equality
and parsimony might in this sense co-exist.

